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The European Union’s ‘Fight against Terrorism’: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorism has gained ever more political 
salience, occupying a place at the top of the EU political agenda. In response to the perceived 
threat, the EU has developed a distinct approach to counter-terrorism, themed around what is 
called the „fight against terrorism‟. This approach is more than just a set of institutional or 
public policy responses designed to negate the threat of terrorism; it is also an influential 
political discourse which plays an important role in the construction of counter-terrorism 
policy and the legitimisation of counter-terrorism policy responses. This thesis uses critical 
discourse analysis to study the discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism policy. It uses 
representative extracts from twenty counter-terrorism documents prepared by/or for the EU 
institution the European Council, across a ten-year period from November 1999 to December 
2009. The analysis identifies several strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which 
it is argued are central to its constitution and that remain consistent across the period 
analysed.  In the post-September 11 period, these strands of the counter-terrorism discourse 
play an important role in constructing an ubiquitous internal/external „terrorist‟ threat. These 
include:  terrorism as a „criminal act‟; terrorism as an act perpetrated primarily by „non-state 
actors‟; terrorism as „new‟ and seeking to gain access to and/or use weapons of mass 
destruction; the threat of terrorism linked to an „open‟ or „globalised‟ geo-strategic 
environment, thus requiring measures of „control‟ at the EU border; and the threat of 
terrorism linked to „violent radicalisation‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟, emanating both internally 
(„home-grown terrorism‟) and externally to the EU. When these different strands are taken 
together they constitute the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. It is argued that this discourse 
helps to construct the identity of the EU, whilst simultaneously the identity of the EU is 
central to the formulation of counter-terrorism policies. As such, the representations 
contained within the counter-terrorism discourse and counter-terrorism policy are considered 
to be mutually or co-constitutive. The main contention of the thesis therefore is that EU 
identity is constituted through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse.  Critical discourse 
analysis was chosen as a method through which to investigate EU counter-terrorism policy 
because it allows us to: map how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is constructed; to 
demonstrate how it provides a language for talking about terrorism; to understand how the 
discourse defines what is accepted knowledge about (who or what is) terrorism; and to reveal 
how that knowledge structures the counter-terrorism policy response as a „natural‟ or 
„common-sense‟ approach to the challenge of terrorism. This approach is novel in the sense 
that it is attentive to often neglected issues such as identity. In particular, it explores how the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self in opposition to a 
„terrorist‟ Other. It investigates the extent to which the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
plays a role in the legitimisation of new security practices; as well as reflecting on the extent 
to which these practices are contributing to the blurring of the distinction between internal 
and external security policy. It also considers whether the discourse is reflective of a process 
of „securitisation‟ of social and political life within Europe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In America and Europe the events of September 11, 2001, thrust a new set of „international‟ 
terrorist threats to the top of the political agenda, creating a great deal of public anxiety, 
whilst simultaneously providing the impetus for action by government in the policy area of 
counter-terrorism. In America and in the Europe Union (EU) these events have led to the 
development of two distinct approaches to counter-terrorism policy, the „war on terror‟ and 
the „fight against terrorism‟ respectively. These two approaches are more than just a set of 
institutional or public policy responses designed to negate the threat of terrorism; they are 
also influential political discourses that play an important role in the construction of counter-
terrorism policy and the legitimisation of counter-terrorism policy responses. From this 
perspective the „war on terror‟ or the „fight against terrorism‟ can be understood as 
simultaneously a set of actual practices (new laws, agencies, institutions) as well as a 
language or discourse (assumptions, beliefs, justifications, knowledge) about terrorism. As 
such, it is argued throughout that there is a dialectical relationship between the practice of 
counter-terrorism policy and the language of counter-terrorism policy, an assumption that 
rests on the belief that discourse is a form of „social practice‟. Discourses contribute both to 
the shaping of social structures and simultaneously are shaped by them. From this perspective 
both the EU and the American approaches to counter-terrorism have two interconnected 
levels which can be analysed, the level at which policy is formed and the discursive level 
where action is legitimised and consent is manufactured through the application of language. 
It should be noted that these levels are only analytically separable; in reality they are 
mutually constitutive and operating simultaneously. Although an analysis of the US counter-
terrorism discourse would provide an interesting case against which to contrast the findings 
from an analysis of the EU counter-terrorism discourse, in terms of the volume and 
manageability of data this would be an unfeasible task for one thesis. It is for this reason that 
the scope of this thesis is restricted to an analysis of the discursive level of the EU‟s „fight 
against terrorism‟.   
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Adapting Lene Hansen‟s argument about the relationship between identity and foreign policy, 
it is argued that whilst the production of counter-terrorism policies relies upon representations 
of identity, it is through the formulation of counter-terrorism policy that „identities are 
produced and reproduced‟.1 If we start from a perspective whereby we accept that counter-
terrorism policy can be understood as a discursive practice, we must also accept that counter-
terrorism discourses „articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent 
that the two cannot be separated from one another‟.2 As such, the main contention of this 
thesis is that EU identity is constructed through and influences the formulation of EU 
counter-terrorism policy, or to put it another way: the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
contributes to the constitution of an EU sense of Self.  It is this contention that guides the 
overall direction of this research and specifically the research questions outlined below, 
which are centred on the significance of representations of identity for formulating and 
debating counter-terrorism policies. 
 
A word on terminology is also in order at the outset. Throughout this thesis the temptation to 
refer to the events of 11 September, 2001, as 9/11, will be resisted.  Nor shall the events in 
Madrid on March 11, 2004, or the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, be referred to 
as 3/11 or 7/7 respectively. As Richard Jackson has argued, shortening the dates of these 
attacks is neither natural nor without consequence. The effect of such a practice is to „erase 
the history and context of the events and turn their representation into a political-cultural icon 
where the meaning of the dates becomes both assumed and open to manipulation‟.3 For 
example, Stuart Croft prefers the label „the second American 9/11‟, asserting that we should 
remember „that there are other 9/11s‟.4 Following Jackson, this thesis seeks to avoid this 
mythologising practice by using the full dates of each and every terrorist attack that is 
referred to.  
 
It has been argued by some commentators, such as Jean-Louis Bruguiére, that the UN-backed 
invasion of Afghanistan and the unilateral US-led invasion of Iraq, in the aftermath of the 
                                                             
1 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 1. 
2 Ibid., p. 1. 
3 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 7. 
4 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 
16. Like Croft this thesis does not seek to make moral judgements about the claims made of that day (September 
11, 2001).Instead it seeks to understand how those events and subsequent events in Madrid (March 11, 2004) 
and London (July 7, 2005) were given meaning; and how that meaning has shaped EU policies and practices. 
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September 11 attacks, have played a role in the countries of mainly Western Europe 
becoming a „core target‟ for terrorism, as the terrorist bombings of the public transport 
systems in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and London on 7 July, 2005 serve to demonstrate.
5
 
Terrorism is now widely perceived to be both politically and socially one of the most 
prescient security threats facing Europe in the post-Cold War era. Speaking in 2005, Javier 
Solana, the former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), outlined a specific perception of the current terrorist threat, a perception that has 
been central to the construction of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Why should we continue to be concerned about terrorism? Because it remains a very 
serious threat to the lives of our citizens and to the functioning of our economies. 
From many devastating attacks world-wide we know that terrorists think nothing of 
inflicting mass casualties. And the scale of destruction would be much worse if 
terrorists succeeded in laying their hands on weapons of mass destruction. 
Perhaps even more insidious than the threat to our lives, is the threat that terrorism 
poses to the very nature of our societies. Terrorism can strike anywhere, anytime, 
anyone. It is frightening in its unpredictability and unsettling by its random nature.
6
 
 
Solana‟s statement is representative of the high level of political attention that has been paid 
towards the threat of terrorism since the events of September 11, 2001, and is part of a 
discourse that serves to construct terrorism as a distinct form of violence that poses a massive 
risk to „the lives of our citizens‟. However, as Geoffrey Edwards and Christoph Meyer point 
out, high levels of political attention or public anxiety are by no means objective indicators of 
the actual risk posed by the threat of terrorism.
7
 This line of argument is reinforced by the 
fact that the main focus of terrorist activity in terms of incidents and the number of casualties 
is, and continues to remain, outside of Europe, most notably in the Middle East.
8
 As Edwards 
and Meyer argue, just „how new and grave this strand of terrorism [as articulated by Solana] 
                                                             
5 See Jean Louis Bruguiére, Financial Times, 25 August 2005, cited in Geoffrey Edwards and Christoph O. 
Meyer, „Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), 
pp. 1-25.  
6 Javier Solana, „Protecting People and Infrastructure: Achievements, Failures and future tasks', The East West-
Institute, Second Annual Worldwide Security Conference, Brussels, 7th February 2005, Available at: 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_4320_fr.htm 
7 See Edwards and Meyer, „Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation‟. 
8 See Rik Coolsaet, Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 
p. 1. Coolsaet argues that long before the first victims fell in Washington and New York, tens of thousands of 
Muslim and Arab citizens had been murdered in waves of terrorist attacks across the Middle East. 
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actually is and what the most appropriate response to it should be remain subject to intense 
debate‟.9 It is a central premise of this thesis that an investigation into the language of 
counter-terrorism policy can reveal that this perception of terrorism, which is outlined above 
by Solana, is based on knowledge about terrorism which is constituted through a number of 
different words, terms, phrases, labels and assumptions that are replicated or reproduced 
throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy.  
 
It is quite clear from Solana‟s statement that he is articulating a particular „narrative‟ about 
terrorism, one that constructs terrorism as more than just a threat to the lives of EU citizens 
but also as a threat to the values upon which its society is founded. Whilst this „narrative‟ 
shall be analysed in greater detail in Chapter Four, Solana‟s statement provides an interesting 
starting point from which to analyse the role of the EU in the production of counter-terrorism 
policy. To construct terrorism as a threat to the „very nature of our societies‟ tells us 
something about how Solana perceives the threat of terrorism, in particular that it is a threat 
to the security of EU citizens and to the security of European society in a more general sense. 
The articulation of such an „insidious‟ threat to „our lives‟ implies the need for security 
policies intended to counter such a threat. As such, analysing the construction of the EU‟s 
political discourse on terrorism, the „fight against terrorism‟, means drawing attention to an 
important question that surrounds the concept of security: if terrorism is perceived to be a 
prescient security threat that requires the production of specific security policies, in the 
European context, what do we mean when we speak of the EU as a provider of security? 
 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy and the EU as a Provider of Security 
 
In the study of International Relations (IR) security has traditionally been understood through 
an emphasis on the physical (or political) dimension of territorial entities, as „the absence of 
existential threats to the state emerging from another state‟.10 The state maintains a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, providing security for its citizens 
from external threats to their security. On the one hand there is the concept of „external 
security‟, which refers to the measures taken by nation-states to ensure their own safety and 
survival within the international arena. This includes the use of the military and foreign 
                                                             
9 Edwards and Meyer, „Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation‟, p. 1. 
10 Harald Muller, „Security Cooperation‟, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds.), 
Handbook of International Relations, (London: Sage, 2002), p. 369. 
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policy instruments to provide a feeling of safety from external security threats to the state. 
„Internal security‟ on the other hand refers to the keeping of peace within the domestic 
borders of a nation state. It is provided for through the police, law-enforcement and the 
judiciary. It can also refer to the state of that society in terms of individuals being able to 
enjoy within the law their social, cultural, economic and political life free from the threat of 
persecution or terror. Traditionally IR did not discuss the notion of „internal security‟, instead 
it focused on the sovereign state as the most important „actor‟ in world politics, an 
international environment characterised by anarchy and a sharp distinction between domestic 
politics and international politics.
11
 The reason for drawing attention to this is because the 
construction of security policy at the EU level provides a challenge to the traditional 
conceptualisation of security in the IR literature. Not only is security policy formulated at the 
supranational level (above the nation-state) but EU security policy contains elements that 
traverse the distinction between the domestic and the international. 
 
It is important to highlight at the outset of this thesis that the understanding of the EU 
developed here is one that emphasises the post-modern nature of this system of governance. 
It is not a monolithic or unitary form of governance. Instead it is a mix of intergovernmental 
and supranational governing dynamics; a system of governance that as a result of its 
institutional, juridical and spatial complexities, has been described by John Gerard Ruggie as 
constituting „the first truly postmodern international political form‟.12 As such, the EU should 
be considered a „transformational polity‟ in the sense that it raises questions about the 
appropriate mechanisms for political organisation beyond the state.
13
 In particular, and of 
particular relevance to the direction of this thesis, it also raises questions that challenge the 
pre-eminence of the state as a provider of security for its citizens. This is because we can 
identify a number of emerging structures and processes that are being developed beyond the 
state. We can argue therefore that while the EU is not a state, it has a developing role as a 
provider of security. Specifically, it contributes to the practice of security through the 
production of common „internal‟ and „external‟ security policies. 
 
                                                             
11 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
12 John Gerard Ruggie, „Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations‟, 
International Organization, 47:1 (1993), pp. 139-174, see p. 140. 
13 Jozef Batora and Brian Hocking, „Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards „post-modern‟ 
patterns‟, ECPR/SGIR 6th Pan-European Conference, Turin 12-15 September 2007. 
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Since the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (TEU),  the provision of security has been split between 
the second pillar (external security), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 
the third pillar (internal security), Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA). Covering „external security‟ issues there is the CFSP. This is the agreed foreign policy 
of the EU which encapsulates both defence and security issues. The TEU declared quite 
unambiguously that a „common foreign and security policy‟ would be established and that it 
was to be „governed under the following provisions‟. Subsequently, the Treaty set out a 
number of different objectives for the CFSP that included: „strengthening the security of the 
Union and its Member States‟, „preserve peace and international security‟, „promote 
international cooperation‟ and to „develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law‟.14 
The Treaty also envisaged „the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in 
time lead to a common defence‟.15 Covering „internal security‟ issues there is JHA. The TEU 
set out a number of areas that would henceforth be considered matters of common interest, 
including asylum policy, immigration policy, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters and police cooperation. As with the conduct of policy-making in the CFSP, policy-
making in this field has traditionally been conducted in a strictly intergovernmental manner, 
with the key institution in the policy process being the European Council.  This has been one 
of the most rapidly evolving areas of EU policy. The Amsterdam Treaty, 1999, led to the 
establishment of an „Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‟ (AFSJ) in which a number of 
JHA and JHA related policy areas were transferred to the first pillar (the EC) and the 
remaining policy issues were reorganised under a new title, „Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters‟.  
 
Although the analysis conducted in this thesis focuses on the production of counter-terrorism 
in the period before the Lisbon Treaty, December 2009, it is pertinent to make clear that the 
institutional developments brought about by the Treaty have impacted upon the EU‟s 
capacity as a provider of security. Much of the treaty is concerned with amending and adding 
to the TEU and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), which has now 
been renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The third pillar 
of the TEU, „Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters‟, has been moved from the 
TEU into the TFEU. This has enabled most of the EU JHA policies to be brought together 
under Title V of the TFEU, covering the „Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‟ (AFSJ), 
                                                             
14 Official Journal of the European Union, OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992, Article J. 1. 
15 Ibid., Article J. 3. 
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subjecting those (internal security) policies to more supranational governing dynamics. The 
second pillar of the TEU, the CFSP, remains largely unchanged. It continues to be located in 
the TEU rather than having been transferred to the TFEU and as such those (external 
security) policies are still subject to intergovernmental governing dynamics. It should also be 
noted that the EU now has a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Baroness Ashton, whose post was created through the merging of the Council post of High 
Representative for the CFSP with the Commission post of Commissioner for External 
Relations.
16
 
 
These realms of „internal‟ and „external‟ security have traditionally been treated as distinct or 
separate; however, since the events of September 11, 2001, the boundaries that exist between 
these once distinct policy domains have become increasingly blurred. Included as an addition 
to Chapter One (see bottom of this chapter), is a table highlighting the main developments in 
EU counter-terrorism policy and security policy more generally. Furthermore, the historical 
development of EU counter-terrorism policy will be expanded on in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. In particular, it will demonstrate how this blurring of „internal security‟ and „external 
security‟ concerns is a central element of the counter-terrorism response.17 Although counter-
terrorism policy is treated primarily as an „internal security‟ issue in the EU, at the level of 
policy formation it contains a number of measures that traverse the internal/external security 
divide. However, this process that is leading to the blurring of the boundaries of security 
becomes much clearer if we consider the implications of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse. Indeed, it is asserted in this thesis that we cannot understand this process unless we 
consider how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse constructs a condition of perceived 
insecurity, a condition which make this contingency (the blurring of „internal‟ and „external‟ 
security) a reality. The constant (re)articulation of the threat posed by terrorism, alongside 
other „interrelated‟ threats such as organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and immigration, through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, plays a 
                                                             
16 For a further explanation of the institutional developments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty see Neil 
Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 7th Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), pp. 78-85. 
17 It will be argued that this process becomes quite apparent when we consider how the EU seeks to increase its 
competences as a provider of security by frequently articulating a need to expand the security agenda(s), either 
through a focus on the important internal dimensions that exist in relation to the continued development of the 
CFSP, or the way in which it emphasises the important external dimension of its internal security policies 
(developed through the construction of an AFSJ). 
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key role in the construction of this condition of insecurity. The „fight against terrorism‟ can 
therefore be described as a discourse of insecurity.
18
 
 
In this context of global insecurity (constructed through the articulation of these threats) the 
borders between „internal‟ and „external‟ security are much harder to identify. As Jef 
Huysmans and Anastassia Tsoukala explain, the defining borders between key concepts such 
as war, threat or freedom are being reframed.
19
 As such, „the operational borders of security 
agencies merge as police and military-related activities exceed their traditional field of action, 
and intermingle with one another‟.20 Furthermore, „sectoral borders are discarded as security-
related issues are increasingly handed over to private agencies, and security concerns are 
thought to be of interest even to ostensibly irrelevant sectors, such as business and finance‟.21  
What this means then is that the notion of the state, as conceived in IR theory, is unable to 
adapt to the tensions created by the transnational bureaucratic links that now exist between 
the police, intelligence agencies and the military. The role of the private sector in these new 
types of security practices adds a further layer of complexity to this situation. As Didier Bigo 
points out, this is especially the case in Europe where new networks and informal groups that 
transcend national frontiers have „localised the space of political decision-making‟.22  
 
Whilst these issues are extremely important, the main focus of this thesis is not specifically to 
explicate the origin or evolution of these new security practices. Instead, it is to investigate 
how the language of the „fight against terrorism‟ contributes to the normalisation of these 
new security practices as an appropriate response to the threat of terrorism. This thesis seeks 
to analyse not only how the language of the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
constructs the specific characteristics of the terrorist threat, but also the role that this 
discourse plays in the legitimisation of a number of different security measures that are 
                                                             
18 Didier Bigo, „Globalized-in-security: the Field and the Ban-Opticon‟, in John Solomon and Naoki Sakai 
(eds.), Translation, Biopolitics and Colonial Difference, Traces: a multilingual series of cultural theory and 
translation, 4, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp. 109-156. Bigo argues that terrorism is but 
one of a number of threats (alongside war, organised crime or „migratory invasion‟) contributing to a condition 
of „global in-security‟ and reflected in what he call processes of „in-securitisation‟. 
19 Jef Huysmans and Anastassia Tsoukala, „Introduction: The Social Construction and Control of Danger in 
Counterterrorism‟, Alternatives, 33 (2008), pp. 133-137. 
20 Ibid., p. 133. 
21 Ibid., p. 133. 
22 Didier Bigo, „Globalized-in-security: the Field and the Ban-opticon‟, in John Solomon and Naoki Sakai (eds.), 
Translation, Biopolitics and Colonial Difference, Traces: a multilingual series of cultural theory and translation, 
4, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp. 112. By the phrase, „localised the space of decision-
making‟, Bigo means that security professionals (e.g. the military, the police, border guards etc.) are able to take 
decisions on security in lieu of political professionals.  
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presented as central to the EU counter-terrorism effort. It is argued that the formulation of 
such policies rests upon certain representations of identity; so for example, the type of actor 
the EU should be or who and what the „terrorists‟ are. As such, the primary focus of the thesis 
is to investigate how the identity of the EU is shaped by and helps to influence the types of 
counter-terrorism policies which are advocated as central to the „fight against terrorism‟. In 
particular, there is a focus on how this discourse of insecurity, the „fight against terrorism‟, 
contributes to the „securitisation‟ of social and political life in Europe through an 
investigation of its role in the normalisation of a number of general security processes and 
changing security practices.
23. The concept (or process or theory) of „securitisation‟ will be 
defined in greater detail in Chapter Two. The next section shall introduce the aims of the 
thesis, including the four research questions that shall structure the general direction of the 
thesis. 
 
 
Thesis Aims and Research Questions 
 
The literature on EU counter-terrorism policy is characterised by a substantial focus on the 
historical and legal development of policy in this area.
24
 There is also a growing literature on 
the implementation and governance of EU counter-terrorism policy.
25
 This thesis however is 
about a thus far relatively neglected area of research: the language of the EU‟s „fight against 
                                                             
23 It should be noted that while the focus of the thesis is not on the origin or implementation of these new 
security practices, through this process of analysing the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse the origin and 
evolution of these new security practices will be revealed. 
24
 For a historical overview of EU counter-terrorism policy see; Monica Den Boer, „9/11 and the 
Europeanization of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment‟, Notre Europe Policy Paper, (2003), No. 6; 
Paul Wilkinson, „International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU‟s Response‟, Chaillot Papers, 84 
(2005); Mirjam Dittrich, „Facing the Global Terrorist Threat: A European Response‟, European Policy Centre 
Working Paper, 14 (2005); Jorg Monar, Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union‟s 
Counter Terrorism Strategy and its Problems, Government and Opposition, 42: 3 (2007), pp. 292-313. For legal 
analysis of developments in EU counter-terrorism policy see Bill Gilmore, „The Twin Towers and the Third 
Pillar: Some Security Agenda Developments‟, EUI Law Working Paper, (2003), 2003/7; Steve Peers, EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Law, (1st edition, Longman, 2000); (2nd edition, OUP, 2006). 
25 Oldrich Bures, „EU Counterterrorism Policy – A Paper Tiger?‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:1 
(March 2006), pp. 57-78; Raphael Bossong, „The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism‟, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), pp. 27-48; Monica Den Boer, Claudia Hillebrand and Andreas Nölke, „Legitimacy 
Under Pressure‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), pp. 101-124; George Joffé, „The European 
Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), pp. 147-172; 
Christian Kaunert, „Towards Supranational Governance in EU Counter-Terrorism? The Role of the Commission 
and the Council Secretariat‟, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Special Issue: 
Europe at Sixty, 4:1 (May 2010). 
  Chapter 1: Introduction 
10 
 
terrorism‟ discourse.26 In particular, it focuses on the counter-terrorism policy documents 
produced by the EU. These policy documents include a number of texts that deal directly 
with terrorism, as well as a number of more general texts that cover both „internal‟ and 
„external‟ aspects of EU security policy. The thesis analyses how the language of the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse plays a role in the legitimisation of the counter-terrorism policy 
responses contained within those documents. The effect of this, it will be argued, is to 
normalise those responses as a „common-sense‟ approach to counter-terrorism policy; 
responses which are reflective of what we might identify as an ever increasing trend towards 
the securitisation of social and political life within Europe. 
 
In order to analyse how the identity of the EU is both shaped by and helps to shape the 
formulation of counter-terrorism policy, the research is guided by three main aims. First, to 
investigate how this discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ is constructed: to identify the 
main words, terms, phrases and assumptions which are central to the discourse and provide a 
language for speaking about terrorism; to uncover the main themes which constitute the 
different „strands‟ of the discourse; and how that language (or knowledge) about terrorism 
structures the logic, meaning and response to the representations contained within the texts. 
The research examines this language of EU counter-terrorism policy in order to demonstrate 
how the EU perceives the threat of terrorism. The research does not simply focus on how the 
EU defines this threat but how it actually conceptualises the threat of terrorism through the 
language of counter-terrorism policy. It also focuses on how language is used not just to 
construct the „terrorist‟ (as enemy or Other) and the kind of danger, risk or threat that they 
pose but also how the counter-terrorism policy response, the „fight against terrorism‟, is 
presented as a „common-sense‟ approach that can negate that threat. 
 
Second, is to draw out how a „European‟ sense of Self is constructed in opposition to the 
„terrorist‟ Other, to understand how the EU constructs a particular „space‟ from which it can 
speak as the I/We of the discourse, to reveal how certain interpretations of the „terrorist‟ 
Other are legitimised, how other interpretations are silenced, and how courses of action 
against them are conditioned by those interpretations.  
 
                                                             
26 There is only one academic article which focuses explicitly on the EU counter-terrorism discourse. See, 
Richard Jackson, „An analysis of EU Counterterrorism Policy Discourse‟, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 20:2 (2007), pp. 233-247. 
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Third, is to demonstrate how the language of the „fight against terrorism‟ is contributing to a 
blurring of the distinction between „internal‟ and „external‟ security. It will be argued that this 
is occurring at the level of policy production, through the development of a number of 
measures and policy provisions that are contained within the EU counter-terrorism policy 
documents; and at the discursive level in terms of a discourse of insecurity, which invokes the 
threat of terrorism (and other interrelated threats) to justify the very development of those 
policies that are identified as contributing to the blurring of internal and external security. It is 
a main contention of this thesis that this blurring of the distinction between „internal‟ and 
„external‟ security is now occurring to such an extent that we can speak of a „hybridised‟ or 
„holistic‟ EU security policy.27 This idea will be explored in greater detail in the concluding 
chapter (Chapter Seven).  
 
This thesis seeks to answer four main research questions: 
 
1. With respect to the role of language, how has the production of EU counter-terrorism 
policy contributed to the construction of „terrorism‟ as a specific type of danger, risk 
or threat to the EU? 
 
2. Having established that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse provides a specific 
conceptualisation of the danger, risk or threat posed by terrorism, what are the main 
themes (or strands) of the discourse and how do they contribute to this specific 
conceptualisation of the „terrorist threat‟? 
 
3. Having identified the main discourse strands, how does the over-arching „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self, understood here as 
„European political identity‟, in opposition to a „terrorist‟ Other? 
 
4. What role does this counter-terrorism discourse, the „fight against terrorism‟, play in 
the legitimisation of new security practices (within the EU), are these practices 
contributing to the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security 
                                                             
27 In particular, the thesis focuses on the process by which the threat of terrorism is invoked as one of a number 
of key security threats (alongside organised crime, drug/human trafficking, regional conflicts and immigration) 
to the EU, which legitimates the development of these new security policies and practices. 
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policy and are they reflective of a process of „securitisation‟ of social and political life 
within Europe? 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will do several things. First, in order to provide a 
rigorous conceptual framework for the study of EU counter-terrorism policy, the next section 
will investigate how terrorism is defined and conceptualised in law and in academic debates. 
Having considered these different definitions of terrorism this section then turns to the 
question of whether the state can be labelled „terrorist‟. It does this because the EU‟s political 
discourse on terrorism, the „fight against terrorism‟, articulates (or is reflective of) a state-
centric perception of terrorism. Although the EU is not a state the counter-terrorism policy 
discourse will always be in part a reflection of the interests of the leading or most influential 
member states. This provides some explanation for the state-centric perception of terrorism 
that is constructed through the production of EU counter-terrorism policy. Indeed, it will be 
argued throughout the thesis that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse has a tendency to 
preclude the state from the label „terrorist‟. Second, given these conceptual questions that 
surround the term terrorism this chapter will consider how the development of a „critical‟ 
approach to the investigation of security issues has influenced the direction of the research 
conducted in this thesis. In particular, it will focus on the subject area of Critical Security 
Studies (CSS), locating this research within the broader understanding of what is meant by 
being „critical‟. Having done this, it will then turn to an analysis of the recent development of 
a „critical terrorism studies‟ (CTS) research agenda within the field of terrorism studies. This 
is done in order to clarify the context within which current research into terrorism is being 
conducted. It is also done because CTS is based on a number of theoretical and 
methodological commitments that are similar to those which provide the framework for this 
thesis.  
 
Third, having considered these conceptual questions, the chapter will then turn to a brief 
overview of the development of EU counter-terrorism policy, drawing attention to historical, 
legal, governance and implementation approaches to the study of terrorism and indicating 
their contribution to our understanding of EU counter-terrorism policy. Fourth, the chapter 
will then explain how a discursive analysis of the „fight against terrorism‟ can offer a 
nuanced approach that asks a series of different questions about EU counter-terrorism policy. 
It will be argued that this approach allows for critical reflection on how the social 
construction of terrorism conditions the type of policy responses that have been developed in 
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response to the threat of terrorism, structuring certain courses of action against terrorism as 
appropriate whilst denying others as inappropriate or ignoring other approaches all together. 
The final section will provide a brief overview of the remaining chapters in the thesis, 
indicating the general direction of this research and drawing out the main arguments 
contained within each. It should also be noted that included at the end of Chapter One is 
Table 1.1 outlining the main developments in EU security policy, with a specific focus on 
counter-terrorism responses. This table is included to provide a reference point for the 
research conducted in this thesis. 
 
 
Defining Terrorism 
 
Given that this thesis is about the language of EU counter-terrorism policy it is most pertinent 
to consider the conceptual questions that surround the use of the term „terrorism‟ before 
engaging in an analysis of the policy itself. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman point out that 
many authors seem fatigued by the need to consider conceptual questions. They argue 
however that this is a „dangerous attitude‟ for it plays into the hands of the „operational anti-
terrorist camp‟ who have a „we-know-it when-we see-it‟ attitude that can easily lead to 
double-standards, which in turn can produce both bad science and result in bad counter-
terrorism policies.
28
 Bruce Hoffman has argued that while many people have a vague idea of 
what terrorism is they lack a „more precise, concrete, and truly explanatory definition of the 
word‟.29 He notes that the most compelling reason for this conceptual problem is that the 
meaning of the term has changed frequently over the past 200 years. The first time the term 
terrorism was widely used was during the French Revolution in which it was used to describe 
an example of state terrorism. The system or régime de la terreur (1793-94), from which the 
English word for terrorism came, was used to restore order during the period of turmoil that 
followed the establishment of the revolutionary French state. Since then the term terrorism 
has been used in varying contexts and has had multiple meanings. It has been used to refer to: 
revolutionary movements and violence directed against governments; to the practice of mass-
repression by totalitarian governments against their own citizens; to describe groups who 
engage in political violence in their struggle for national liberation and self-determination; to 
                                                             
28 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data-Bases, Theories and Literature, 2nd Edition, (Amsterdam: Swidok, 1988), p. 1. 
29 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 1. 
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state-sponsored violence or covert warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger states 
without the threat of retribution; and to individuals or groups of violent religious radicals.
30
   
 
Given the changing nature of this term „terrorism‟, the question of how best to define 
terrorism is one that continues to divide academics. The only real areas of consensus amongst 
those engaged in terrorism research are that terrorism is a pejorative term and that „the search 
for an adequate definition... is still on‟.31 Tony Coady has argued that the definitional 
question is further complicated because it is irresolvable through ordinary language alone: 
terrorism as a concept is not ordinary, instead it is highly subjective and finds „its natural 
home is in polemical, ideological and propagandist contexts, or less alarmingly, high political 
ones‟.32 For Charles Townshend, the reason for these difficulties in establishing an adequate 
definition of terrorism can be summed up in one word: labelling.
33
 The description of a group 
or individual as „terrorist‟ is almost always applied by others, very few individuals or groups 
voluntarily adopt that label. Primarily it is a label given by the governments of states, who 
have not been slow to brand violent opponents or enemies as „terrorist‟. The word has 
intrinsically negative connotations; therefore what we term terrorism depends on our point of 
view. As Jenkins has noted „use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can 
successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to 
adopt its moral viewpoint‟.34 This is not surprising given the implications of cruelty, 
inhumanity, criminality and lack of real political support inferred by the term terrorist. As 
such, states have not found it difficult to produce definitions of terrorism. 
 
Legal Definitions 
 
The US has a number of different legal definitions of terrorism. First, for example, under US 
law:  
 
                                                             
30 For an extensive historical analysis of the changing meaning of the term terrorism see Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism, pp. 3-20. 
31 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, „Political Terrorism‟, p. 1. 
32 C.A.J Coady, „Defining Terrorism‟, in Igor Primoratz (eds.) Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 3-14, pp. 3.  
33 Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
34 Michael Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, (Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 1980), p. 10. 
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(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than 1 country; (2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents; (3) the term “terrorist group” means any 
group, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.
35
  
 
Second, under the US federal criminal code: 
 
The term “international terrorism” means activities that (a) involve violent acts or 
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (b) appear to be intended - (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population (ii) to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (c) occur primarily outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States…36 
 
The EU, on the other hand, has developed its own common definition of terrorism:  
 
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional 
acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, 
which, given  their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a 
population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying 
the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country 
or an international organisation, shall be deemed to be terrorist offences: 
 
(a) attacks upon a person‟s life which may cause death; 
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; 
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking; 
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport 
                                                             
35 U.S. Code Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f(d) 
36 US Federal Criminal Code, Chapter 113B of Part I of Title 18 
  Chapter 1: Introduction 
16 
 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform 
located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger 
human life or result in major economic loss; 
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, 
and development of, biological and chemical weapons; 
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect 
of which is to endanger human life; 
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; 
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).
37
 
 
What these legal definitions demonstrate is that for the state, the only actor with recourse to 
the use of legitimate violence is the state.
38
 As was explained earlier the EU is not a state, 
however the legal definition of terrorism that the EU has agreed upon is a reflection of the 
interests of its member states and therefore its definition has a state-centric bias. „Terrorism‟, 
as defined by the US government and by the EU, is an act or acts perpetrated against the 
state, against its infrastructure, against its strategic interests and against its citizens. Although 
each definition is different there are a number of similarities. In particular, terrorism is 
defined as an act designed to intimidate a population and/or to coerce a government into 
undesired actions. The one constant feature of each legal definition is that the state is not 
considered to be a perpetrator of terrorism. Furthermore, many of the acts listed as terrorist 
offences are themselves already criminal acts under law which „makes terrorism appear to be 
a state of mind rather than an activity‟.39 Although each legal definition of terrorism is 
unique, they are characterised by a specifically state-centric perspective; whereas academics 
or scholars working in the field of terrorism studies have continued to disagree over how to 
conceptualise terrorism. The next section will consider definitions of terrorism from scholars 
working in this field.  
                                                             
37 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, (2002/475/JHA), Official Journal 
L164, 22/06/2002, pp. 3-7. 
38 See Townshend, „Terrorism.‟ Townshend argues that one might question whether all use of violence by non-
state actors is equally unjustifiable, even if it is illegal, given that certain groups throughout history have 
believed themselves justified in opposing, through violence, repressive regimes that restrict political and social 
freedoms. He highlights the case of revolutionary terrorists in Tsarist Russia.   
39 Townshend, „Terrorism‟, p. 3. 
The European Union‟s „Fight against Terrorism‟  Christopher Baker-Beall 
  Loughborough University 
17 
 
 
Academic Debates 
 
At the philosophical level, this problem of how to define terrorism is one that is central to 
academic debates. Paul Wilkinson makes the argument that „the general public in most 
countries in the world can recognise terrorism when they see campaigns of bombings, suicide 
bombings, shooting-attacks, hostage-takings, hijackings and threats of such action, especially 
when so many of these actions are deliberately aimed at civilians‟.40 But as stated earlier, 
when one claims that an act of violence is „terrorism‟, a more rigorous theoretical framework 
is needed than one that simply states „we-know-it-when-we-see-it‟.41 Instead our theoretical 
framework should be one that states „we-know-it-when-we-define-it‟; as such we should 
recognise that „terrorism‟ is constructed through language and discourse. Wilkinson does 
however consider the conceptual issues that surround terrorism in some detail, arguing that 
terrorism is conceptually different and can be distinguished from other modes of violence by 
the following characteristics: it is premeditated and designed to create a climate of fear; it is 
directed at a wider target than the immediate victims; it inherently involves attacks on 
random or symbolic targets, including civilians; it is considered in the society in which it 
occurs as „extra-normal‟, that is in a literal sense, it violates the norms regulating protests, 
disputes and dissent; and it is used primarily, although not exclusively to influence the 
behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups.  
 
Wilkinson accepts that while historically the use of terror by regimes or governments has 
been infinitely more lethal than that of non-state groups, in a democracy the main threat of 
terrorism comes from sub-state actors.
42
 This is a distinction rejected by Bruce Hoffman who 
precludes the state from the label terrorist, arguing that „while national armed forces have 
been responsible for far more death and destruction than terrorists might ever aspire to bring 
about; there nonetheless is a fundamentally qualitative difference between the two types of 
violence‟.43 He contends that terrorism is distinguishable from other forms of crime and 
irregular warfare for several reasons: it is political in aims and motives; it uses violence or the 
                                                             
40 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2nd Edition, (Routledge: London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 1. 
41 This is not to argue that „we‟ (e.g. civilians, citizens etc.) cannot determine whether an act of violence (or the 
threat of an act of violence) is terrorism; only that when we analyse terrorism at an academic level it is essential 
that we deal with the question of conceptualising terrorism.  
42 Ibid., p. 1. 
43 Hoffman, „Inside Terrorism‟, p. 26. 
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threat of violence; it is designed to have a far-reaching psychological impact beyond the 
immediate targets; it is conducted either by an organisation with an identifiable chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure or by individuals or collections of individuals 
directly influenced, motivated or inspired by the ideological aims of some existent terrorist 
movement and/or its leaders; it is perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity. For 
Hoffman, only sub-state actors can be classified as terrorist. His conceptualisation of 
terrorism reflects this proclivity for exempting the state from the label terrorist that one finds 
(not unsurprisingly) reflected or reproduced in the many legal definitions of terrorism offered 
by different states. 
 
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, after completing a survey of academics working in the 
field of terrorism studies, have offered a wide-ranging and substantial definition of terrorism 
that can provide a starting point for a more nuanced understanding of terrorism that goes 
beyond state-centric definitions. They argue that:  
 
„Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby- -in contrast to assassination- -the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-
and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily 
sought‟.44  
 
The length and complexity of their definition demonstrates the inherent difficulty in 
developing an accepted definition of terrorism amongst academics and serves to illustrate 
why governments and other international institutions have been unable to reach agreement on 
an accepted definition of terrorism. Surveying both academic debates on terrorism and legal 
definitions of terrorism reveals the essentially contested nature of the concept itself. The 
                                                             
44 Schmid and Jongman, „Political Terrorism‟, p. 28. 
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contested nature of knowledge about terrorism will be drawn out in greater detail in the later 
chapters; this will be done through an extensive analysis of the main themes (or strands) of 
the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. Before engaging in this analysis, and given that 
terrorism is treated primarily as a security concern by the EU, the next section shall analyse 
the influence of „critical‟ approaches to security on the direction of the research conducted in 
this thesis. 
 
 
A Critical Approach to World Politics: Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Critical 
Terrorism Studies (CTS)  
 
This next section introduces the idea of a „critical‟ exploration of security, what might be 
subsumed under the label Critical Security Studies (CSS), in order to emphasise its 
importance in defining the direction of the research conducted in this thesis. It starts by 
explaining what is meant by being „critical‟, noting the different connotations the term can 
have, before highlighting a dissatisfaction with the „traditional‟ or „realist-derived‟ 
approaches to security which it is argued have dominated the study and practice of security 
since the onset of the Cold War. Importantly it makes a distinction between uppercase 
Critical Theory and lowercase „critical theory‟, locating the research conducted in this thesis 
within the broader conceptualisation of „critical‟ approaches to security. The section then 
highlights the difference between „problem-solving theories‟ and „critical theories‟, drawing 
out the themes around which „critical‟ approaches to security can unite. Having highlighted 
the impact of CSS on the direction of this research, this section then turns to an investigation 
of the recent development of a Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) research agenda and its 
implications for this analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy.       
 
Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams explain the use of the prefix „critical‟ should 
not lead us to assume that this is a single, monolithic or homogenous perspective from which 
security issues can be interrogated.
45
  Instead any reference to „critical‟ work should be 
recognised and understood primarily as a rhetorical device. There is no singular definition of 
what it means to be „critical‟ in security studies; rather there are an array of different 
perspectives which have become associated with this term. As such, the aim of this section is 
                                                             
45 Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, (Routledge: New 
York, 2010). 
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not to impose an idea of what critical security studies is or ought to be. Instead it is to outline 
how the theoretical commitments of a CSS research agenda tie into and have influenced the 
direction of the research conducted in this thesis. CSS encompasses two central traditions 
within the literature that are broadly consistent with Chris Brown‟s distinction between 
uppercase „Critical Theory‟, which refers to the Frankfurt School of social theorising, and 
lowercase „critical theory‟, which refers to „critical‟ theorising in a broader sense.46 Anthony 
Burke and Matt McDonald have argued that the first of these two approaches can be defined 
as a reconstructive project aimed at advancing alternative claims of what security is or should 
mean.
47
 This approach is best represented by the work of Ken Booth who has argued that the 
focus of security studies should be on the advancement of individual emancipation, which is 
defined as a process whereby space is created for the voices of marginalised actors to be 
heard in global politics. For Burke and McDonald, the second approach is best defined as a 
deconstructive approach to security. They argue that this second approach does not „primarily 
offer definitive alternative conceptualisations but rather seek to point to the silences, 
exclusions and blind spots of traditional approaches to security – to expose both their 
analytical limitations and their normative implications‟.48 
 
In the academic discipline of international relations (IR), the study of security has always 
been a central concern. From the aftermath of both World Wars (I and II), through the period 
of the Cold War and leading into the present focus on the „war on terror‟ and the „fight 
against terrorism‟, this issue area has dominated the preoccupation of students and scholars 
alike.  For Ken Booth what is certain is that as the field of security studies developed in its 
orthodox form during the Cold War, it „was constructed in the image of political realism‟.49 
As such, he argues that a „critical‟ approach to security studies requires a rethinking of „the 
common sense of this orthodoxy from the bottom up‟, whilst „exposing the extent to which 
political realism is part of the problem in world politics rather than being the problem 
solver‟.50  However, this rethinking of security is in no part a small challenge given the 
embedded nature of many of the core assumptions about security and insecurity that are 
central to orthodox security studies. Booth argues that even if the end-point of a „critical‟ 
                                                             
46 Chris Brown, „Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International 
Relations‟, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23 (1994), pp. 213-236. 
47 Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald, Critical Security in the Asia Pacific, (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, 2007). 
48 Ibid., p. 5. 
49 Ken Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, (Lynne Rienner: London, 2005), p.2. 
50 Ibid., p. 3. 
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exploration of security is uncertain the starting point is not; it must begin with a critical 
engagement with the political realist orthodoxy in security studies. For Booth political 
realism has operated as an „iron-cage‟ in world politics, in the sense that it has created a 
„prison of categories and assumptions‟ which have created a „world that does not work for 
most of its inhabitants‟.51 Booth contends that realist-derived approaches to security studies 
have attempted to impose just one image of reality on a world that „not only consists of many 
sovereign states but also is multicultural, divided by gender and class, and made up of 
individuals, families, tribes, nations and other collectivities‟.52 As such, Booth argues that it 
offers its students just one image of reality, with predefined answers to key global questions: 
it is an example of „a problem masquerading as the problem-solver‟.53  
 
In his much cited article „Social Forces, States and World Orders‟, Robert Cox made the 
important distinction between what he termed „problem-solving theory‟ and „critical 
theory‟.54 For Cox, a „problem-solving theory‟ takes the world as it finds it, including the 
predominant social and power relations and the institutions into which they are organised, 
and tries to resolve problems within that existing framework. Political realism fits neatly into 
this category. Cox contrasts such theory with „critical theory‟, which he argues is critical 
because it does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted; instead it 
attempts to stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and questions the historical and 
structural context of problems. However Cox views „critical theory‟ in the narrow sense of 
the term, as referring to a specific theoretical approach to world politics most commonly 
known as the „Frankfurt School‟ of social theorising. Frankfurt School Critical Theory 
(FSCT) has an explicitly normative dimension in that it favours a social and polit ical order 
which is different from that of the prevailing order. This is reflected in the claim that through 
the process of critique, FSCT provides potentialities for the provision of ideas that might 
promote the emancipation of people from oppressive situations and/or structures. However, 
as noted earlier, the term „critical theory‟ can also be used in a much broader sense. From this 
perspective critical theory can be understood as encompassing all schools of thought that 
challenge what has often been referred to as the positivist orthodoxy within Western social 
sciences. These theories are considered to be anti-foundational because they argue that any 
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claim about what is true in human society cannot be measured against any objective or 
neutral set of criteria. As Ken Booth explains, the defining feature of all critical approaches is 
that they „reject the idea that human social behaviour can be studied with the same scientific 
method as the study of the behaviour of glaciers‟.55 This is because „the latter is amenable to 
conclusions that might be described as “true” in a way that is not available to the former‟.56 
 
This distinction between „problem-solving theory‟, FSCT and „critical‟ theory in a more 
general sense is important when considering the direction of this research. Broadly speaking, 
this research can be considered a contribution to the expanding agenda of Critical Security 
Studies (CSS). However the use of the label „critical security studies‟, is not unproblematic. 
There are important differences within the sphere of critical approaches to security, which are 
reflected in the distinction between „critical theory‟ in a broad sense and FSCT in a more 
narrow sense. For the purpose of clarity, it should be noted that this research is based upon 
the broader deconstructive conceptualisation of „critical theory‟ and as such is committed to 
what might be termed a „postmodern‟ or „poststructural‟ research agenda, in the analysis of 
EU counter-terrorism policy.  
 
Regardless of these differences, there remain themes around which critical perspectives on 
security can unite. Obviously, these perspectives unite around a dissatisfaction with the 
impact and influence of „problem-solving theories‟, such as political realism. This 
dissatisfaction will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Two, where a case shall be made 
for the use of discourse analysis as a tool through which to analyse EU counter-terrorism 
policy. However, critical perspectives can also unite around the idea that „security is 
essentially a derivative concept‟. As Booth points out, what this means is that contending 
theories about world politics will provide different conceptualisations of what security is all 
about in world politics. Although there is general consensus on a definition of security as 
being or feeling safe from threats or danger, „security in world politics can have no final 
meaning‟.57 As such, the meaning of security is derived from the different perspectives which 
help us to conceive the structures and processes of our societies; it is derived from the 
theories which help us to explain or understand the events which constitute our social and 
political realities. By understanding security as a concept whose features vary depending 
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upon the assumptions of different theoretical perspectives, it becomes clear that the ideas 
which have shaped mainstream security studies since the onset of the Cold War (and which 
remain powerful today) have been derived from „a combination of Anglo-American, statist, 
militarised, masculinised, top-down, methodologically positivist, and philosophically realist 
thinking, all shaped by the experience and memories of the interwar years and World War II 
and the perceived necessities of the Cold War‟.58 As such, the effect of adopting any critical 
approach to security will be to provide a challenge to the conceptualisation of security 
derived from such a worldview. 
 
Challenging this worldview has also provided the basis for the development of a „critical‟ 
agenda in relation to the field of terrorism studies. As Richard Jackson, (who is one of the 
main proponents of this research agenda) explains, there have been two developments within 
contemporary research into terrorism that have provided the foundations and necessitated the 
development of an explicitly „critical‟ turn within terrorism studies. The first is the 
proliferation in terrorism-related research and teaching, since September 11, 2001. Terrorism 
studies has been transformed from a minor sub-field of security studies to a standalone field, 
and is now one of the fastest expanding areas of research within Western social sciences. 
Secondly, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the field and the output 
by many of the leading scholars. Jackson argues that much of what passes for terrorism 
research lacks rigorous theories and concepts, is based primarily on secondary information, 
lacks a historical context and is heavily biased towards Western and state-centric 
perspectives. Furthermore, related to this is an academic unease about the direction of 
domestic-counter terrorism policies and the prosecution of the „war on terror‟.59 Making the 
case for CTS therefore requires, firstly, a compelling critique of the current state of orthodox 
terrorism studies and, secondly, relies on the „articulation of a relatively coherent and 
consistent set of epistemological, ontological and ethical normative commitments, as well as 
a clear research programme and future trajectory‟.60  
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CTS entail four main criticisms of the traditional terrorism studies field.
61
 First is a list of 
methodological and analytical weaknesses. These include a reliance on poor research 
methods, an over reliance on secondary information and a general failure to undertake 
primary research. Added to this is a failure to develop an accepted definition of terrorism, the 
descriptive and condemnatory character of much of the terrorism research output, the 
dominance of orthodox IR approaches, a lack of inter-disciplinarity and a tendency to treat 
terrorism as a „new‟ phenomenon that began on September 11, 2001. Secondly, much of the 
research into terrorism has an inherent state-centric bias that tends to produce a limited set of 
assumptions and narratives about the nature, causes and responses to terrorism. The main 
problem here is that much of this „knowledge‟ is actually contested and is unsupported by 
empirical proof. The third criticism relates to the „embedded‟ nature of many terrorism 
experts in that many are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power that makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres. The fourth is linked to the 
dominant type of knowledge in the field; as noted above, what Cox has called „problem-
solving theory‟ or „explanatory theory‟.62 The advocates of CTS argue that traditional 
terrorism studies, like „problem-solving theory‟, „takes the world as it finds it, with the 
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, 
as the given framework for action‟.63 As Jackson argues, what this means then is that the 
majority of traditional terrorism studies fail to question the status quo and the extent to which 
it is implicated in the „problem‟ of terrorism and political violence.   
    
Jeroen Gunning has argued that research into terrorism has suffered as a result of „these core 
epistemological, methodological and political-normative problems... [they range] from a lack 
of conceptual clarity and theoretical sterility to political bias and a continuing dearth of 
primary research data‟.64 He argues that the dispersed nature of innovative work that is 
published outside the core journals of „terrorism studies‟ is problematic.65 In relation to the 
core journals, much of the research is based on secondary data analysis such as books, 
journals, and the media and not on primary sources. Research tends to focus on short-term, 
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threat assessment as defined by state elites. The local and historical context of conflicts is 
ignored and terrorism is treated as a one-size fits all term. Furthermore, „terrorism studies‟ is 
theoretically naïve. Writing in 2004, Andrew Silke noted that within the core journals, less 
than 2% of articles actually deal with concepts.
66
 Traditionally, research into terrorism has 
accepted uncritically the framing of the conceptual problem by the state. This orientation 
towards the state has an effect in terms of the questions that remain unasked.  Being critical 
offers an alternative approach in that it prevents any predisposition towards the status quo. 
For Gunning, orthodox terrorism studies „makes it difficult to ask questions about the extent 
to which counter-terrorism policies perpetuate the „terrorist threat‟ or whether political 
transformation may be more effective than mere coercive force aimed at eradication. 
Researchers may be too embedded socially and culturally in an entity under „attack‟ from 
„others‟ to engage these „others‟ subjectively or contemplate radically different counter-
terrorism tactics. Existing research foci and practices may also prevent researchers from 
doing so by acting as disciplining agents‟.67 
    
John Horgan and Michael Boyle have welcomed the advent of CTS for its potential to make 
terrorism studies more self-aware and reflective in practice. However, they believe that 
current work on CTS should be challenged.
68
 They argue that CTS overstates the novelty of 
its case, that many of the shortcomings associated with traditional terrorism studies have 
already been acknowledged and that scholars have long sought to overcome them. They also 
believe that the assertion that traditional terrorism studies engage primarily in problem-
solving theory, and that it is dependent on instrumental rationality, is overstated. 
Furthermore, they contend that by creating a „straw-man‟ – „orthodox terrorism studies‟ – it 
unfairly portrays 40 years of interdisciplinary research. It demonstrates a suspicion of 
academics engaged in policy relevant research and implies a „bad faith‟ amongst those 
engaged in this kind of research. They also believe that rather ironically it has created the 
kind of dualism that critical theory was designed to overcome and overlooks the fact that the 
same moral concerns underlying CTS are the same moral concerns underlying traditional 
terrorism studies. They argue that being critical about the subject matter need not lead to an 
abandonment of empirical approaches to social and political inquiry. However, it should be 
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noted that CTS is not critical of empiricism per se, rather it is critical of the epistemological 
foundations of empirical knowledge. 
 
The editors of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism recognise some of these criticisms 
and have argued that one of the key challenges for CTS is not to bifurcate the „terrorism 
studies field into critical and orthodox intellectual ghettos who then refuse to engage with 
each other‟s concerns‟.69 Indeed, the aim of CTS is not to abandon empirical approaches to 
social and political inquiry but to incorporate them into a more critical and reflective 
approach to terrorism studies. Furthermore, CTS does not seek to claim that all work 
subsumed under the label „traditional terrorism studies‟ suffer from these conceptual and 
methodological problems, which are identified above, only that a great deal of the work that 
might be labelled as traditional terrorism studies suffers from these problems.  
 
Regardless of whether one accepts the distinction between „traditional terrorism studies‟ and 
„critical terrorism studies‟ what is quite clear is that, as Frederick Schulze explains, terrorism 
studies are caught in an academic catch-22 situation.
70
 Schulze points out that much of the 
research on terrorism is based on secondary or tertiary accounts, with most of the raw data 
based on media accounts. He argues that terrorism studies have developed in this way 
because „a triumvirate of the media, government and academia has to a great extent 
proscribed the course of terrorism studies‟.71 He identifies the event-driven nature of 
responses to terrorism and the high-profile terrorist incidents of the late 1960s and 1970s as 
providing simultaneously a reason for liberal democracies to engage in terrorism research and 
a foundation upon which current terrorism research rests today. This in turn has led to an 
„inevitable collusion of interests emerging designed to control information flow and content 
leading to an agenda focusing on prophylactic measures to counter the threat of international 
terrorism‟.72 This triumvirate of the media, government and academia are representative of an 
entire „counterterrorism industry‟ that now exists; they in turn exert considerable influence 
over the discourse(s) on terrorism.
73
 When conducting a critical analysis of the EU‟s „fight 
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against terrorism‟ discourse, it is important to recognise the role of this triumvirate in 
defining what is accepted knowledge about terrorism. The influence of academia, 
government and the media will be considered in greater detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
These chapters explore the foundations of the knowledge on terrorism which it is argued has 
been central to the formulation of the EU‟s counter-terrorism policy.  
 
The aim of this thesis is not to explore the methodological and theoretical commitments of 
CSS or CTS. This thesis is, however, heavily influenced by this research agenda because it is 
also driven by an interest in interpretive approaches and the „linguistic turn‟ in the social 
sciences.
74
 It is essential to acknowledge the importance of CSS and the recent development 
of CTS because many of the concerns that are central to these research agendas are concerns 
that are central to the direction of this thesis. These concerns include: the overtly state-centric 
nature of much research on terrorism, which is reproduced and reflected in the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse; the need for conceptual clarity, which is central to any investigation of 
language; and the need for a contextual analysis of counter-terrorism responses, which 
recognises that accepted knowledge on terrorism is constructed on the basis of a limited 
number of contestable assumptions about what terrorism is and how best to respond to it. 
Having outlined the difficulties inherent in conceptualising terrorism and drawing attention to 
the influence of the CSS and CTS research agendas on this thesis, the chapter will now 
survey the contribution of approaches which focus on the historical and legal development of 
EU counter-terrorism policy, as well as approaches which focus on the implementation and 
governance of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
 
The Role of the EU in Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
The historical development of EU counter-terrorism policy and the construction of a common 
threat perception, with a specific focus on the role of language, will be covered in greater 
detail in the third chapter. This section is designed to elucidate the role of the EU in counter-
terrorism policy by highlighting the important contribution the approaches, identified above, 
have made to our understanding of that policy. The events of September 11, 2001, provided a 
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significant challenge to the EU and in particular to its developing role as an „internal‟ and 
„external‟ provider of security. It was explained earlier that in the EU security policy has 
traditionally been split between the second pillar, the CFSP (external security), and the third 
pillar, JHA (internal security).
75
 Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the Function of 
the European Union, in 2009, this institutional arrangement has changed (see Table 1.1, 
located at the bottom of the page). The future impact of this change on the counter-terrorism 
policy discourse will be considered in the final chapter; however, this analysis will focus 
solely on the counter-terrorism policy produced in the period before Lisbon. This is simply 
because the timeframe chosen for the analysis of the EU counter-terrorism policy texts ends 
before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. The CFSP can be described as the foreign policy 
of the Union incorporating a number of important policy areas that include diplomacy, 
security and defence issues. Since its inception in 1992 (TEU) and ever more so since the 
adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, JHA has swiftly developed into one of the largest and 
most important policy areas encompassing the convergence of criminal law, judicial and 
police cooperation, asylum and immigration policy, as well as much of the EU counter-
terrorism policy. In terms of the EU‟s political discourse it has framed its counter-terrorism 
effort as predominantly an „internal‟ security concern, a „fight against terrorism‟, best dealt 
with through (third pillar) criminal and judicial measures.
76
 This is in contrast to the oft-cited 
American approach, „the war on terror‟, an approach that has sought to purvey the threat of 
terrorism as existential and predominantly an „external‟ security concern.  
 
The reasons for these differences can be traced back to past experiences with terrorism. 
European states such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have had to 
deal with internal or domestic terrorist threats and have as such developed a response based 
upon the application of criminal law.
77
 America has mainly experienced terrorism as a 
foreign policy prerogative; as a phenomenon that occurs outside its borders. As such, the US 
framing of contemporary „international terrorism‟ as a new and existential threat can be 
partly explained by this lack of experience in dealing with terrorism domestically, as well as 
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the dominance of the foreign and defence policy community within the American 
administration.
78
 Similarly, the EU‟s crime and justice centred approach can be explained by 
the dominance of the interior ministries in relation to counter-terrorism policy. This is true 
both historically and in the present context. Writing in 1986, Christopher Hill noted that the 
US retained a tendency to regard terrorists as simultaneously inhuman fanatics and rational 
actors, who will respond to acts of deterrence, whilst European states would tend to eschew 
the use of force (on the grounds that it would create a cycle of reaction and counter-reaction) 
in order to focus on the „root causes of terrorism‟.79 This type of framing remains remarkably 
similar in the present context. Edwards and Meyer point out, in the period after the events of 
September 11, 2001, it was the pre-existing superior expertise, administrative capabilities and 
strategic interests of the JHA ministers which help to explain why it was they and their 
related working groups/committees who led the EU counter-terrorism effort, and not the 
foreign ministers as originally envisaged.
80
 By way of contrast in the US it was the well-
resourced and influential Defence Department who out manoeuvred the State department as 
the leader in the „war on terror‟, framing terrorism as an „external‟ security threat.  
 
Rhinard, Boin and Ekengren have argued that because of this prominent role played by the 
interior ministers; JHA is an obvious place to explore EU counter-terrorism capacities.
81
 
They identify five areas of JHA activity that stand out in relation to the „fight against 
terrorism‟. The first is police cooperation. The idea that law enforcement agencies across 
Europe needed to become more interoperable in order to combat transnational criminal 
problems has been widely accepted in the EU since the 1990s. The Tampere European 
Council in 1999 played a key role in the advancement of cooperation on these matters with 
the creation of the „European Police Chiefs operational Task Force to exchange , in co-
operation with Europol , experience, best practices and information on current trends in 
cross-border crime and contribute to the planning of operative actions‟.82 The Tampere 
document envisaged the creation of joint investigative teams to combat such problems as 
crime, drugs and terrorism. Europol‟s (the European police office) counter-terrorism remit 
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has also been strengthened in the period since, with the development of a special anti-terrorist 
unit. The second area of JHA activity is judicial cooperation, which relates to the creation of 
a European „legal space‟ with regard to crime and terrorism. A key development here has 
been the establishment of Eurojust, an EU agency designed to enhance the effectiveness of 
national authorities when investigating and prosecuting those involved in serious forms of 
criminal activity. The third area relates to information exchange. This area is split between 
information used for law enforcement purposes and the more sensitive information used for 
intelligence and strategic analysis. In relation to law enforcement, the main instrument has 
been the Schengen Information System (SIS) a database originally designed to ensure 
effective border control which has now evolved into a sophisticated tool in the „fight against 
cross border crime‟. In relation to information used for intelligence, the EU member states 
now cooperate with the Joint Situation Centre of the Council (SitCen) to provide leaders with 
analysis of threats such as terrorism.
83
 The fourth area is immigration and border control. 
Although the process of creating a European Border Agency was already underway, the 
perceived threat of terrorism gave added impetus to the creation of a European agency 
designed to deal specifically with that challenge. The establishment of Frontex (operational in 
2005) has played a central role in the coordination of European border control operations.  
The final area of JHA activity identified by Rhinard, Boin and Ekengren that relates to 
counter-terrorism concerns the financing of terrorism. The EU has developed a „strategy‟ for 
combating the funding of terrorism, including a number of instruments that allow for the 
freezing of assets and the tracing of monetary transfers across borders.      
 
Alongside these developments in the „internal‟ sphere of counter-terrorism policy (the third 
pillar), the EU has developed a number of „external‟ responses to the threat posed by 
terrorism. Two of the more significant approaches to „external‟ counter-terrorism policy are: 
the framing of the counter-terrorism response through interaction with international 
organisations, such as the UN; and the development of a transatlantic framework with 
America through which to respond to the threat(s) posed by terrorism.  
 
Kim Eling has noted that in the period immediately after September 11, 2001, the EU went to 
great lengths to implement and support counter-terrorism policies designed in the framework 
                                                             
83 The role of SitCen is to coordinate both external intelligence services and domestic security services 
responsible for counter-terrorism actions in member states. Since the ratification of the TFEU SitCen now 
operates under the supervision of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  
The European Union‟s „Fight against Terrorism‟  Christopher Baker-Beall 
  Loughborough University 
31 
 
of the UN.
84
 Eling argues that two specific elements of the EU response must be considered 
in this context. First, the aim of tackling the financing of terrorism was driven almost entirely 
by the agenda set in this multilateral forum. Second, the aim of preventing terrorism came to 
affect the programming of EU development assistance. Eling contends that in both cases the 
existence of UN standards and policies enabled the EU to go beyond what it may have been 
able to achieve in terms of creating new policy tools to tackle terrorism. For Eling the key 
institution in this process has been the Security Council, which has agreed a series of 
resolutions designed to combat terrorism. In particular, she notes that the EU was (and 
remains) committed to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1373, a wide-
ranging anti-terrorism resolution designed to suppress terrorist financing and ensure greater 
international cooperation. Eling explains that SC1373 is now a „cornerstone of the EU‟s 
external counter-terrorism policy‟.85 It should also be noted that within the more general 
setting of the UN system, the main framework providing legal and judicial standards for the 
prevention and combating of terrorism are the thirteen international conventions on 
terrorism.
86
 The EU requires that all its Member States should become party to these 
conventions as soon as possible.
87
 Furthermore, in 2006, the UN released its own „Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟, which the EU fully supported and which it has stated „reflects 
the priorities of the EU‟s own strategy‟.88 Another key aspect of this external approach to 
counter-terrorism policy, alongside the developments in the UN, has been the construction of 
a transatlantic framework for combating terrorism. 
 
In his analysis of EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation, Wyn Rees has argued that given the 
contrasting perceptions over the threat posed by terrorism, there have been instances of 
considerable, if not always totally smooth, progress in relation to cooperation in the „internal‟ 
sphere of security provision.
89
 In terms of „internal‟ security, Rees highlights significant 
achievements in five areas. First, in the area of police and law enforcement cooperation he 
notes that there has been the establishment of a working relationship between the relevant US 
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authorities and Europol. Second, in the area of judicial cooperation Rees notes that European 
agreement on measures such as the common definition of terrorism, the creation of the EAW 
and the establishment of Eurojust have pleased the US because they make cooperation 
between the transatlantic partners more feasible. The signing of a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) between the EU and the US has also enhanced judicial cooperation. Third, 
there has been a moderate improvement in transatlantic intelligence sharing. The majority of 
this takes the form of information or data sharing, an area that has generated friction between 
both parties. Fourth, cooperation on border control, although beset by tensions over certain 
issues, has been improved through the development of a bi-annual forum entitled the „EU-US 
Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security‟. The aim of the forum is to build 
cooperation on immigration and border policy at an early stage through the sharing of ideas. 
The final area identified by Rees is the targeting of terrorist financing, a policy issue which 
he argues is now an important part of transatlantic security cooperation. Rees argues that with 
regard to „internal‟ security cooperation, although the inclination of the US has been to deal 
with European states in a bilateral manner, the widening competences of the EU have made it 
a more attractive partner in the policy area of counter-terrorism; furthermore, he notes that in 
the process of creating new ways of working together both sides have „grown to understand 
some of the inherent complexities faced by the other side‟.90  
 
Rees explains that while there has been considerable development in the „internal‟ sphere of 
security cooperation the opposite is true of „external‟ security cooperation between the EU 
and the US. Rees identifies a number of factors that have resulted in the divergent approaches 
taken by the EU and the US to the counter the threat of terrorism externally. These include 
the belief that the traditional vehicle for transatlantic security cooperation, NATO, is ill-
suited to counter-terrorism tasks and the fact that although EU Member States have sought to 
coordinate their views, they have preferred to pursue their own interests through bilateral 
relations with the US rather than engage in multilateral negotiation in the relatively under-
developed framework of the CFSP. However, the main reason for the divergence in „external‟ 
security cooperation has been the way in which the US has chosen to prosecute its „war on 
terror‟. Rees notes that during the 1990s this divergence could be seen in the way in which 
both the EU and the US approached the task of „confronting state sponsors of terrorism‟. This 
divergence became ever more apparent in the period after September 11, 2001, with the US-
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led war in Afghanistan, in 2001, and the US-led invasion of Iraq, in 2003. In the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks in New York there was a lot of European goodwill towards the 
Americans and a general consensus of support for US action in Afghanistan. The subsequent 
prosecution of that war, the treatment of prisoners and many other policies of the US 
administration (such as the establishment of a detention centre for „enemy combatants‟ at 
Guantanamo Bay) have led to a dissipation of that goodwill towards the US and conflict 
between certain EU member states. As Rees explains, the invasion of Iraq exacerbated 
difference differences between France and Germany who opposed the conflict and Britain 
who supported US action.
 91
 As such, the conflict exposed the divisions that exist between 
certain EU member states on foreign policy; as well as demonstrating the relative weakness 
of the CFSP in constructing a common European position on such an important issue. Rees 
concludes that it is this failure by the transatlantic partners to ensure effective external 
security cooperation that has undermined efforts to combat „international terrorism‟.  
 
Jorg Monar‟s analysis of the EU counter-terrorism response provides an excellent way of 
categorising all of the developments outlined above.
92
 He identifies four main elements to the 
EU‟s counter-terrorism policy. The first element is the development of a combination of 
„internal‟ and „external‟ security measures. Monar identifies two key advances here: there has 
been a significant advancement in external action in the domain of law enforcement 
cooperation with third countries, most notably the US (including a number of cooperative 
initiatives such as the agreement on exchange of Passenger Name Records (PNR) data); and 
there has been, pre-Lisbon and the ratification of the Treaty on the Functioning of The 
European Union (TFEU), a considerable extent of cross-pillarisation of counter-terrorism 
objectives.
93
 The second element is the development of a combination of legislative and 
operational measures designed to advance the internal aspects of EU counter-terrorism 
policy. The purpose of these measures has been to enhance cross-border law enforcement 
capabilities within the EU. Monar identifies a number of framework decisions that have 
increased this capacity for enhanced cooperation including specifically the Framework 
                                                             
91 The dubious assertions that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) thus making it an „imminent‟ 
threat, that Al-Qaida was in some way linked to Saddam Hussein, and that terrorists may as a result acquire 
WMD, provided the pre-text for the invasion; all of these assertion were later found to be nothing more than 
fantasy. 
92 Jorg Monar, „Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union‟s Counter Terrorism Strategy 
and its Problems‟, Government and Opposition, 42:3 (2007), pp. 292-313. 
93 Cross-pillar governing dynamics refer to the blurring of the distinction between the three pillars of the EU. 
For example, first pillar trade conditionality has been used to foster second and third pillar counter-terrorism 
objectives with third countries. 
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Decision on Combating Terrorism and the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant. The third element is the development of a combination of repressive and 
preventative measures. Monar argues that much of the policy until 2005 was aimed at 
improving law enforcement so was therefore repressive in nature however since then the EU 
has „moved towards complementing its repressive measures by more action on the prevention 
side‟.94 Monar specifically includes The European Union Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005, as an example of this development. 
Finally, he argues that the EU has placed a strong emphasis on developing its institutional 
capacity to deal with the common threat of terrorism. Monar notes that the roles of Europol 
and Eurojust have been strengthened, while existing structures such as SitCen and the Police 
Chiefs Task Force have had their role redefined to allow for a new focus on terrorism, and 
new institutional structures such as the European Police College (CEPOL) and the EU 
external border management agency (Frontex) have been immediately assigned counter-
terrorism tasks. 
 
However, outside of these notable developments he identifies three main problems with EU 
counter-terrorism policy. First, the EU response has been based on cooperation and 
coordination led by a supranational body (the European Council) rather than actual 
integration. In both the legislative and operational fields competence resides primarily with 
the member-states. Politically, this is almost certainly because national security is a 
politically sensitive issue and there is little political will for „supranational decision-making, 
more extensive common legal rules or any European operational command structures‟ in this 
policy area.
95
 Secondly, there has been poor implementation of the agreed measures. This is 
partly because the Commission has little power to put pressure on the member-states to 
ensure quick and efficient implementation but primarily it is because when it comes to 
implementation the EU has to deal with 27 different systems that have their own priorities 
and procedures. Finally, Monar draws our attention to the question of legitimacy of EU action 
in this policy area in which he recognises there is the very real negative impact that counter-
terrorism measures can have on civil liberties and human rights. He argues that whilst the 
absence of law-enforcement powers for the EU „protects‟ the individual against direct 
infringement, there is a risk that the objectives agreed upon in the Council (the policy 
                                                             
94 Ibid., p. 306. 
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documents or framework legislation) can lead to more controversial restrictive measures at 
national level. 
 
The argument made by Monar that implementation of EU counter-terrorism policy provisions 
has been poor is supported by Wyn Rees, Raphael Bossong and many other academics 
working in this field.
96
 Bossong in particular offers an overview of the development of EU 
counter-terrorism policy focusing specifically on policy outcomes and highlighting the event-
driven and contingent nature of counter-terrorism policy.
97
 He presents a critical assessment 
of policy outcomes to demonstrate that the EU remains unable to do more to „prevent 
terrorism‟, particularly at the operational level, a defect which he argues is seriously limiting 
the effectiveness and the output legitimacy of the EU‟s counter-terrorism efforts. Bossong 
supports the idea that over the course of its development the EU counter-terrorism policy has 
become more and more limited to technical and supportive policies, while the authority of the 
member states as the primary actor responsible for counter-terrorism policy has been 
underlined. 
 
What we can learn from the above, is that historical and legal analyses of EU counter-
terrorism policy do several important things. They identify the main developments in EU 
counter-terrorism policy, provide the context within which policy action was taken, 
highlighting areas of success and areas of failure, and offer recommendations for further 
action in the policy sphere. Likewise, analyses that focus on the governance and 
implementation of EU counter-terrorism policy offer something distinctive to our 
understanding of EU counter-terrorism policy. In particular, they draw out the problems that 
have occurred in terms of the implementation of many of the measures agreed upon in the 
counter-terrorism policy, demonstrating the difficult that the EU has had in terms of ratifying 
and implementing controversial measures from the top down. However, what they do not do 
is to investigate or analyse the language of EU counter-terrorism policy in any great detail 
(beyond the presentation of EU „threat perception‟). In particular, these approaches are 
characterised by inattentiveness to discourse which this thesis shall seek to overcome. The 
importance of the discourse of EU counter-terrorism policy will be elaborated on in greater 
                                                             
96 For example see, Rees, „Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation‟; Bossong, „The Action Plan on 
Combating Terrorism‟. 
97 Raphael Bossong, The EU‟S Mature Counterterrorism Policy – A Critical Historical and Functional 
Assessment, LSE Challenge Working Paper, (June 2008), Available at: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUpdfs/EFPUchallengewp9.pdf 
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detail in Chapters Two and Three. However, at this point there is a need for a brief 
explanation for this focus on language and discourse.  
 
As such, one of the key reasons for investigating the language of EU counter-terrorism policy 
is to demonstrate that the practice of counter-terrorism policy is inextricably linked to the 
language of counter-terrorism policy. As was explained earlier in the chapter, the focus of the 
thesis is on mapping how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is constructed; to 
demonstrate how it provides a language for talking about terrorism; and how it defines what 
is accepted knowledge about (who or what is) terrorism. This idea is central to the direction 
of the thesis in that it seeks to explore the often overlooked or neglected issue of identity. The 
aim is to investigate the way in which the discourse conditions the type of policy responses 
that have been developed, structuring certain courses of action towards terrorism whilst 
denying others. It will be argued that the different themes (or strands) of this discourse 
influence or reach beyond the measurement of the success or failure of counter-terrorism 
policy provisions and can be found across multiple policy areas. Furthermore, this thesis will 
explore the extent to which this discourse is contributing to (or reflective of) a securitisation 
of social and political life within Europe: a process which it is suspected is becoming ever 
more pronounced in the light of the blurring of the distinction between internal and external 
security; and a process which it is argued can be identified both at the level of policy 
formation and at the discursive level. As such a discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism 
policy can offer something distinctive to our understanding of the production of policy at the 
EU level.  
 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter Two, „Method and Theory‟, begins by outlining the reasons why discourse analysis 
was chosen as an appropriate method to analyse the EU counter-terrorism policy documents, 
highlighting the theoretical commitments of discourse analysis and offering a compelling 
case for why the analysis of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse should encompass a 
specific focus on the role of the language through which it is constituted. The chapter then 
offers an explanation for why the research focused primarily on the „fight against terrorism‟ 
as represented through an analysis of a number of European Council policy documents, 
instead of other institutions or individuals (sites of discursive production) such as the 
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European Commission, EU and national politicians or the media. These documents include 
texts that deal with counter-terrorism policy specifically, as well as a number of more general 
internal and external security documents that contain counter-terrorism provisions. The 
justification for their selection is covered in greater detail in the third chapter; although it can 
be stated here that the principal reason for their selection was that they represent the official 
source of the discourse. Having established why an analysis of the language of the EU‟s 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse is important, as well as why the analysis focused primarily 
on the European Council policy documents, the chapter then sets out the method which was 
used to carry out the research: a three-step critical discourse analysis. The fourth section of 
the chapter offers an explanation of two main theoretical concepts that underpin the 
arguments put forth in this thesis: the idea of „European political identity‟ and the process or 
theory of „securitisation‟. The chapter ends by setting out the production of these selected 
policy documents in a table (in chronological order), paving the way for their analysis in the 
remaining chapters. The main contribution of the thesis to our understanding of EU counter-
terrorism policy lies within chapters three through six where the focus of the analysis is on 
the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse as represented through the EU counter-terrorism texts.  
 
Chapter Three, „Constructing the Threat of Terrorism - Continuities and Change in the „Fight 
against Terrorism‟ Discourse‟, provides an overview of the historical development of EU 
counter-terrorism policy with a specific focus on the important role that language has played 
in the development and construction of that policy. This chapter represents a discursive 
testing ground for much of the research that follows in later chapters. The chapter does 
several important things. First, it provides an in-depth justification for the selection of the 
European Council documents that have been central to the construction of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. Simultaneously, it draws out how the discursive construction of 
terrorism has contributed to a common European threat perception of terrorism as a danger, 
risk or threat to „European society‟ and to its „values‟ of „freedom‟, „justice‟, „liberty‟ and 
„security‟. Second, in a more general sense, the purpose of the chapter is to identify all of the 
main discourse „strands‟ that when taken together as a whole constitute the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. The chapter does this by splitting the production of EU counter-
terrorism policy into four discernable periods. It highlights a number of continuities and a 
number of changes throughout the historical development of EU counter-terrorism policy 
arguing that the nine discourse „strands‟ (rising to ten) identified remain remarkably constant 
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across the period analysed. These main discourse „strands‟ are then investigated further in 
chapters four through six. 
 
Chapter Four, „An EU Conceptualisation of Terrorism - Discursively Constructing the 
„Terrorist‟ Other‟, identifies the three main strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, 
which it is argued are central to how the EU conceptualises terrorism and constructs the 
„terrorist‟ Other. The chapter analyses each discourse strand in a thematic manner. First, the 
chapter identifies how terrorism is constructed through a discourse strand that rests on an 
assumption that terrorism is crime. This section draws out how the narrative of terrorism as 
crime has led to a blurring of the distinction between terrorism and organised crime as 
activities that are synonymous with one another; as well as demonstrating how the discourse 
constructs terrorism as more than crime, through the use of emotive words, terms, phrases 
and labels. Second, the chapter identifies another discourse strand which constructs terrorism 
as an act primarily perpetrated by non-state actors against the state and its interests, 
expanding on its centrality to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. Third, it identifies the 
discourse strand that constructs terrorism in the post-September 11 period as somehow „new‟ 
and different to „old‟ forms of terrorism and therefore requiring of different policy responses. 
The chapter maps how each strand of the discourse is constructed. It also thematically 
analyses how each discourse strand structures the meaning, logic and policy response to 
terrorism, how the discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self against a notional „terrorist‟ 
Other and the practices which are normalised and/or legitimised by the discourse 
 
Chapter Five, „Constructing the Migrant Other, Globalisation, Securitisation and Control‟, 
analyses two discourse strands that it is argued have been central to the production of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse. The first discourse strand constructs the „terrorist‟ Other 
as a threat to the „globalised‟ or „open‟ society of the EU. The analysis demonstrates how this 
discourse strand rests: first, on an assumption that actual or potential terrorists are both 
seeking to and actively able to take advantage of this „globalised‟ or „open‟ environment 
provided by the EU: and second, rests on the conceptualisation of terrorism outlined in the 
previous chapter (as something „new‟ and committed to „maximum violence‟). It is argued 
that when the two assumptions are taken together they construct a specific type of terrorist 
threat: a „new‟ terrorist, committed to „maximum violence‟, who takes advantage of the EU 
migratory system to carry out acts of terrorism in an „open‟ or „globalised‟ society. The 
second discourse strand explicitly links migration and asylum policy to counter-terrorism 
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policy through the construction of a discourse of „surveillance‟ and „control‟. It is argued that 
this discourse of control is reflective of a process that is contributing to the securitisation of 
the „migrant‟ Other and EU migration policy more generally, which it is argued is 
inextricably linked to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. 
 
Chapter Six, „The Construction of the „Muslim‟ Other as Potential Threat in the „Fight 
against Terrorism‟, focuses on how Muslims and the religion of Islam are constructed as an 
implicit threat through the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse. The chapter starts by 
highlighting the tension that exists at the heart of this policy. It demonstrates that although the 
EU consistently states that it rejects any equation of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim 
world, the assumption that the threat posed by Al-Qaida and those inspired by Al-Qaida is the 
main terrorist threat that the EU faces is problematic. This is because the EU states that the 
only way to defeat Al-Qaida is through engaging „moderate‟ Muslims across Europe and 
beyond. The focus of the EU counter-terrorism policy on the development of policies to 
combat „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism is emblematic of this strand of the 
discourse that seeks to resist the conflation of terrorism and Islam, whilst simultaneously (and 
implicitly or unknowingly) constructing terrorism in the post-September 11 period as 
primarily a Muslim or Islamic problem. In particular, this chapter focuses on the discourse 
concerning „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism because of its inherent tendency to 
frame terrorism as a problem that is internal to the Muslim community. It is argued that 
through the construction of a single category of identity, the „Muslim communities in Europe 
and beyond‟, the possibility of processes of „othering‟ lies.  
 
Chapter Seven, „Conclusion - The Fight against Terrorism: a Hybridised Security Policy 
Discourse‟, draws together the main conclusions from the empirical analysis of the EU 
counter-terrorism policy documents. First, it provides a number of reflections on the 
contribution of this thesis to our understanding of EU counter-terrorism policy, arguing that 
„terrorism‟ is a social construct and as such cannot be understood outside of the discourse 
through which it is constituted. Second, it explores the role of the EU counter-terrorism 
discourse in the „blurring‟ of internal and external security policies. In particular, it reveals 
how the terrorist threat is assumed to have important internal and external dimensions. It is 
argued that as a result of this perception the discourse articulates a need for policies and 
practices that blur the distinction between internal and external security, which it is argued is 
reflective of this hybridisation of the policy discourse. Third, the chapter analyses the EU 
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counter-terrorism discourse and its commitment to developing counter-terrorism policies in 
accordance with/or respect for „human rights‟. It explores how this discourse strand 
constructs a „European‟ sense of Self in opposition to the „terrorist‟ Other.  It is argued 
however, that not only was this strand of the discourse late to develop, there is also a question 
over the extent to which respect for „human rights‟ or „fundamental freedoms‟ has been 
applied in practice. Fourth, the chapter offers a number of recommendations on how to 
expand this research outwards beyond a focus on the EU and its institutions, identifying 
future avenues for research. These include: the synergies between EU and US counter-
terrorism discourse, with an explicit focus on the „common language‟ of counter-terrorism 
and the relationship between the „fight against terrorism‟ and the „war on terror‟; as well as 
the continuities between the discourse of EU „security-related research‟ and the „fight against 
terrorism‟. The chapter concludes by offering some final remarks on this discursive analysis 
of EU counter-terrorism policy, including a reflection on some of the limitations of this 
thesis. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This first chapter has sought to clarify several key points that are central to the direction of 
this thesis. First, to introduce the idea that the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ is more than just 
a set of practices that relate to the governance of EU counter-terrorism policy. The „fight 
against terrorism‟ can also be understood as a language or discourse on terrorism that entails 
a number of  assumptions, beliefs, myths and justifications about what terrorism is and how 
best to respond to it. Therefore it has been argued that this discourse on terrorism is 
inextricably linked to the practice of counter-terrorism policy. Second, legal and academic 
definitions of terrorism were considered in order to demonstrate the contested nature of the 
term terrorism and to give the thesis a conceptual framework from which to begin an analysis 
of the language of EU counter-terrorism policy. In particular, the question of definition was 
considered in relation to whether the state can or should be considered terrorist. This was 
done in order to show how the application of the label terrorist is subjective but also to 
highlight that this conceptualisation of terrorism is central to the EU‟s „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. This will be considered in greater detail in the fourth chapter which 
deals specifically with how the EU conceptualises or defines terrorism. Third, the influence 
of Critical Security Studies (CSS) and the recent development of a crit ical terrorism studies 
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(CTS) research agenda were highlighted because they entail a number of methodological and 
theoretical commitments which are similar to the methodological and theoretical 
commitments made in this thesis. Again, this analysis was conducted in order to provide the 
more general framework from within which this research is being undertaken.  Fourth, a brief 
overview of the literature on the main historical and legal developments in EU counter-
terrorism policy, as well as research that focuses on the governance and implementation of 
that policy was presented. This was done in order to demonstrate both the important role that 
such research has played in explaining the successes and failures of EU counter-terrorism 
policy but also to show how a discursive analysis of that policy can offer an alternative 
approach, an approach that asks a series of different questions about the „fight against 
terrorism‟ that can further our understanding of both the construction of EU counter-terrorism 
policy and its impact on social and political life in Europe.  Finally, this introduction 
provided a brief overview of the remaining chapters in the thesis. The next chapter will 
introduce the method used to analyse the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟, expanding on the 
idea that discourse is a form of „social practice‟ and elucidating in greater detail how the 
language of counter-terrorism policy is linked to the practice of counter-terrorism policy.  
 
 
Table Providing Timeline of the Main Developments in EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
Outlined in the timeline below are the main political developments that have occurred in the 
EU since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), with a specific focus on the 
development of EU counter-terrorism policy and security policies more generally. 
 
Table 1.1 
 
 
Type 
 
 
Date 
 
Name 
 
Main Developments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratified 
November 
1993 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty of 
Maastricht on 
European Union 
(TEU) 
The creation of the European Union (EU) formed on the basis of a 
three pillar system: the European Communities (EC); a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Cooperation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
 
The TREVI group was subsumed into the K.4 Coordinating 
Committee, responsible for the administration of JHA related 
mechanisms, giving it a treaty base for the first time.  
 
The treaty outlined police cooperation for the purposes of 
preventing and combating „serious forms of international crime‟, 
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which at this point includes terrorism, as one area of common 
interest in the field of JHA. 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
December 
1995 
 
 
Madrid European 
Council 16 
December: 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
Set out a number of challenges that the EU would face in relation to 
reaching its goal of „ever closer union. These included a number of 
„internal and external challenges‟, such as terrorism, drug 
trafficking and international crime.  
 
Set out the policy goal of „a Union closer to its citizens‟ which 
includes strengthening control of its „external frontiers‟ as well as 
„ensuring better protection of the Union's citizens against 
international crime‟, including terrorism. 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
December 
1998 
 
 
Vienna European 
Council 10 and 11 
December: 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
Set out a plan of action to be taken to ensure the successful 
development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
 
Established „judicial cooperation‟, migration policy, „police 
cooperation‟ and „the fight against all important forms of organised 
crime‟ as important issue areas. Terrorism was not specifically 
mentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty 
 
 
 
Signed 
October 
1997 
 
 
Enters into 
force May 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
There is a transfer of a number of JHA policy issues from the third 
pillar to the first pillar (EC). This leads to JHA being renamed 
„Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters‟.   
 
Set out the objective of providing „citizens with a high level of 
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice‟ (AFSJ) 
through cooperation in police, judicial and criminal matters. 
 
The treaty stated that preventing and combating crime, organised or 
otherwise, is essential, including „terrorism, trafficking in persons 
and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms 
trafficking, corruption and fraud‟. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
October 
1999 
 
 
 
Tampere 
European Council 
15 and 16 
October: 
Presidency 
Conclusions 
The main aim was the completion of the area of freedom, security 
and justice (AFSJ) which would provide a common European 
environment for action in the areas of policing, judicial 
cooperation, migration and asylum policy. 
 
The Council set out a whole range of policy proposals including; a 
common EU asylum and migration policy; policy instruments for 
creating a genuine area of justice; a Union wide fight against crime; 
and recognition of an external dimension to these internal policies. 
Terrorism was again not specifically mentioned. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
September 
2001 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
adopted by the 
Council (Justice 
and Home 
Affairs) 
Brussels, 20 
September 2001 
The aim of the Council meeting was to develop „the necessary 
measures to maintain the highest level of security and any other 
measures needed to combat terrorism‟. 
 
The document listed a number of counter-terrorism measures to be 
taken in order to „step up‟ the „fight against terrorism‟ in the EU. 
These measures were grouped under five headings  and included 
„judicial cooperation‟, „cooperation between police and intelligence 
services‟, „financing of terrorism‟, „measures at borders‟ and 
„measures designed to improve cooperation with the United States‟. 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
 
September 
2001 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and 
plan of action of 
The aim of the extraordinary meeting was to outline the initial EU 
response to the threat of terrorism. 
 
This consisted of four key elements: „solidarity and cooperation 
with the United States‟; „the European policy to combat terrorism‟; 
„the Union‟s involvement in the world‟; and „world economic 
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the extraordinary 
European Council 
Meeting on 21 
September 2001 
prospects‟.  
 
The European policy to combat terrorism was the most important 
element of this initial EU response. This first EU Action Plan to 
Combat Terrorism identified five policy priorities: „enhancing 
police and judicial cooperation‟; „developing international legal 
instruments‟; „putting an end to the funding of terrorism‟; 
„strengthening air security‟; and „coordinating the EU‟s global 
action‟. 
 
 
Legislation 
 
 
Adopted 
13 June 
2002 
 
 
Framework 
Decision on 
Combating 
Terrorism 
 
Set out for the first time a common EU legal definition of terrorism. 
 
The framework decision lists eight intentional acts that when 
committed (or threatened to be committed) by a group or individual 
shall be deemed terrorist offences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adopted 
13 June 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Arrest 
Warrant 
The framework decision was designed to achieve the objective of 
„abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it by 
a system of surrender between judicial authorities‟.  
 
The EAW was the „first concrete measure in the field of criminal 
law implementing the principle of mutual recognition which the 
European Council referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial 
cooperation‟. 
 
The warrant listed 32 offences which if punishable in the issuing 
member state by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years shall lead to the surrender of 
the pursuant under the terms of the EAW. Terrorism was one of 
these offences. 
 
Treaty 
 
Ratified 
February 
2003 
 
The Nice Treaty 
The treaty dealt with the composition and functioning of the 
institutions of the European Union. Its primary objective was to 
take decisions about EU institutions that would provide a basis for 
the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to incorporate 25 member states. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
December 
2003 
 
 
 
EU Strategy 
against 
Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 
The policy document set out a strategy to prevent the proliferation 
of WMD. 
 
The document was split into three sections: first, it identified the 
threat posed by WMD, including a possible link to terrorism; 
second, it made a case for „effective multilateralism‟ in order to 
combat the proliferation of WMD; and finally, it highlighted the 
different policy instruments that could be used to prevent, halt, 
deter or eliminate the proliferation of programmes that cause most 
concern at the global level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Secure Europe 
in a  
Better World: 
European Security 
Set out the EU‟s external security strategy; the vision of a „Secure 
Europe in a better world‟. The document envisaged a role for 
Europe in terms of global policing of global threats, pre-emptive 
„threat‟ prevention and intervention in failing states. 
 
In particular, the document identified five key „threats‟ to the 
security of the Union: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. 
 
The document advocated an „international order based on effective 
multilateralism‟. In terms of policy implications for the EU it states 
that the EU needs to be more active, more capable and more 
coherent in its external actions.  
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Strategy 
 
The document played a key role in the construction of a specific 
perception of the threat posed by terrorism, it stated that „Terrorism 
puts lives at risk... it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole 
of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, 
connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited 
violence to cause massive casualties. The most recent wave of 
terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious 
extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the 
pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and 
the alienation of young people living in foreign societies‟. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
March 
25/26 2004 
 
 
 
Declaration on 
Combating 
Terrorism 
The document aimed to improve policy cohesion and present a 
clearer unity of purpose in relation to EU counter-terrorism policy. 
It included three main developments: the development of a 
„solidarity clause‟ between states that are victims of a terrorist 
attack; the introduction of an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
(CTC) to overview the development of counter-terrorism measures 
and monitor the implementation of Council decisions; and finally, 
the re-organisation of the EU‟s Action Plan to Combat Terrorism 
around seven strategic objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
 
 
December 
2004 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hague 
Programme 
The Hague Programme was designed to replace the Tampere 
Programme as the EU‟s new multi-annual internal security 
programme. 
 
The document outlined a number of policy priorities for the EU 
which included: asylum, migration and border policy; biometrics; 
visa policy; terrorism; police cooperation; crisis management; 
organised crime and corruption; drugs; judicial cooperation; and 
external relations. 
 
In particular, the document stated that „freedom, justice, control at 
the external borders, internal security and the prevention of 
terrorism‟ should „henceforth be considered indivisible within the 
Union as a whole‟. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
November 
24 2005 
 
 
 
The European 
Union Strategy 
for Combating 
Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to 
Terrorism 
Set out a strategy to combat „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to 
terrorism on the basis that although Europe has experienced 
terrorism in its history, it is the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaida 
and „extremists inspired by Al-Qaida‟ which is now perceived by 
the EU to be the main terrorist threat. 
 
In particular, the document outlined three main responses: to 
disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw 
people into terrorism; ensure that voices of mainstream opinion 
prevail over those of extremism; promote yet more vigorously 
security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all. 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
November 
30 2005 
 
 
 
A Strategy for the 
External 
Dimension of 
JHA: Global 
Freedom, Security 
and Justice 
The document outlined the external dimensions of JHA policy 
identifying a number of internal policy priorities with significant 
external implications. These included the threat posed by terrorism, 
as well as organised crime, corruption and drugs and the challenge 
of managing migration flows. 
 
In particular the document advocated „effective co-operation with 
third countries on JHA issues‟ in order to address security problems 
related to weak governance and promote trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The strategic commitment of the new document was „to combat 
terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe 
safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security 
and justice‟. 
 
The new counter-terrorism strategy redefined the strategic 
objectives of EU counter-terrorism policy under four headings 
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Policy 
Document 
November 
30 2005 
The EU Counter-
Terrorism 
Strategy 
„Prevent‟, „Protect‟, „Pursue‟, and „Respond‟. 
 
Prevent – „To prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the 
factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and 
recruitment, in Europe and internationally‟. Protect – „To protect 
citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack‟. 
Pursue – „To pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders 
and globally‟. Respond – „To prepare ourselves, in the spirit of 
solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist 
attack‟. 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
 
December 
2008 
 
 
 
 
Report on the 
Implementation of 
the European 
Security Strategy 
- Providing 
Security in a 
Changing World 
The aim of the document was not to replace the original security 
strategy but instead to update and to reinforce it.  
 
The document identified a number of „global challenges and key 
threats‟ that differ slightly from the original strategy, these include: 
„proliferation of weapons of mass destruction‟; „terrorism and 
organised crime‟; „cyber security‟; energy security‟; and „climate 
change‟.    
 
The document also advocated an EU role in „building stability in 
Europe and beyond‟. In order to meet these challenges and 
objectives the document envisages making the EU more effective 
and capable through increasing its capacity to act, engaging with its 
neighbourhood and contributing to a more effective multilateral 
order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December  
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Stockholm 
Programme 
The purpose of the document was to set out „a new agenda‟ for the 
AFSJ, building on the contribution of the Tampere Programme and 
the Hague Programme to cooperation in the field of internal 
security. 
 
The document identified six main „political priorities‟ for the EU 
including: „promoting citizenship and fundamental rights‟; „a 
Europe of law and justice‟; „a Europe that protects‟; „access to 
Europe in a globalised world‟; „a Europe of responsibility, 
solidarity and partnership in migration and asylum matters‟; and 
„the role of Europe in a globalised world – the external dimension‟ 
 
Terrorism was dealt with primarily under the section on „a Europe 
that protects‟. 
 
The document envisaged the development of an „internal security 
strategy‟, that is similar in concept to the European Security 
Strategy (dealing with predominantly external threats), which shall 
play a key role in the enhancement of action at European level. 
 
 
Treaty 
 
Ratified 
December 
2009 
 
The Lisbon 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union 
(TFEU) 
Treaty amending the TEU. The treaty abolished the pillar structure 
that had split EU policies between the EC, the CFSP and JHA. The 
treaty gave the EU a legal personality of its own, succeeding the 
legal personality of the EC, and meaning it could sign international 
treaties in its own name.  
 
The treaty regrouped all of the JHA competences that were split at 
Amsterdam under the AFSJ. The AFSJ is now dealt with as an area 
of shared competence within the EU. 
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Chapter 2: Method and Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis uses discourse analysis to study EU counter-terrorism policy. As was explained at 
the start of Chapter One, the main contention of the thesis is that the identity of the EU is 
constituted through the policy discourse. Starting from a position whereby it is assumed that 
representations of identity and counter-terrorism policy are mutually or co-constitutive, that 
they cannot be understood in simple cause and effect terms, it is argued that counter-terrorism 
policies need an account or a story of the issues that they are trying to address. There can be 
no understanding of counter-terrorism policy without a description of who the terrorists are, 
how the terrorists differ from the actor responding to them and the ways in which they both 
reinforce and transform the identity of that actor. As such, both the public policy response to 
the threat of terrorism and the discourse that constructs terrorism as a threat are understood to 
be intimately linked. In particular, it can be argued that the EU‟s counter-terrorism response, 
the „fight against terrorism‟, is more than just a set of institutional practices (new institutions 
and agencies, policies and practices) that help to provide the basis for a common European 
response to the threat of terrorism. It is also a discursive formation which is predicated on a 
number of assumptions, beliefs, justifications or knowledge (which is constituted through 
numerous discourse strands) about the nature and causes of terrorism. Crucially, it is argued 
here that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse plays a key role in the construction of 
„European political identity‟, or a „European‟ sense of Self, a concept which is explored in 
the fourth section of this chapter. Whilst it is true that this discourse on terrorism is constantly 
evolving, we can identify several themes (or strands) within the discourse that have remained 
relatively constant over time and are central to the actual practice of counter-terrorism policy.  
 
This relationship between discourse and practice is mutually constitutive in the sense that the 
practice of counter-terrorism policy is assumed to have a constitutive rather than a causal 
relationship with the language of counter-terrorism policy. At the EU level, counter-terrorism 
policies are legitimised as in the „European‟ interest through reference to identities, yet 
identities are simultaneously constituted, produced and reproduced through the formulation 
of counter-terrorism policies.  As Lene Hansen explains, „policies require identities, but 
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identities do not exist as objective accounts of what people and places „really are,‟ but as 
continuously restated, negotiated, and reshaped subjects and objects‟.
1
 The EU counter-terrorism discourse therefore appear to normalise certain counter-terrorism 
responses as the „natural‟ or „common-sense‟ approach, whilst simultaneously denying others 
as nonsensical, through representations of identity. The aim of this chapter is to set out the 
method that was used to analyse EU counter-terrorism policy, to explain how this method is 
used to identify the different „strands‟ of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, to show how 
the method allows us to investigate the way in which this discourse has been and continues to 
be constructed and to understand how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse shapes (and is 
shaped by) the identity of the EU. This is done in five sections.  
 
The first section sets out the reasons why discourse analysis was chosen as an appropriate 
method to analyse the EU counter-terrorism policy documents. The previous chapter focused 
on other approaches to EU counter-terrorism policy, approaches that analysed the main 
historical and legal developments in this policy area, as well as the growing literature on 
governance and implementation of policy. This section highlights the theoretical 
commitments of discourse analysis. In particular, its aim is to offer a compelling case for why 
the analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy should encompass a specific focus on the role of 
the language through which it is constituted. It argues that a focus on the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse can provide an alternative approach to the analysis of EU counter-
terrorism policy, which is attentive to often neglected issues like identity. The second section 
explains why it was appropriate for the analysis to focus solely on the counter-terrorism 
policy documents produced at the level of the European Council. It identifies six key reasons 
for analysing these documents. In particular, it is argues that the European Council 
documents represent the primary source of the discourse. 
 
The third section identifies the precise method that was used: a form of critical discourse 
analysis. This method involved a three step process, which included both individual text 
analysis and wider contextual analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy. This was because it is 
assumed that individual text analysis is insufficient on its own in terms of shedding light on 
the relationship between discourse and social practice. The first step involved the 
identification and analysis of twenty texts, produced across a ten year period from October 
                                                             
1 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. xiv.  
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1999 to December 2009. The second step involved direct engagement with the text(s) (e.g. 
the selected counter-terrorism documents) in order to discover how linguistic practices work 
within them. This was done by: coding the documents for the key words, terms, phrases and 
labels contained in each text; identifying the main assumptions contained within each of the 
texts; and explaining how the main themes or strands of the discourse are constructed. The 
third step involved explaining: how the different strands of the discourse structure the 
meaning, logic and policy response to the groups and/or the events that they describes; how 
the discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self against a notional „terrorist‟ Other; and 
highlighting the types of knowledge and/or practices that are normalised and/or legitimised 
by the discourse. 
 
The fourth section, explores two theoretical concepts which are central to the arguments that 
are made in this thesis: the concept of „European political identity‟ and the process of 
„securitisation‟. This section starts by explaining what is meant by the terms „collective 
identity‟ and „European political identity‟. First, it explores the idea of „collective identity by 
analysing the work of Alexander Wendt and comparing his interpretation of the process of 
„othering‟ to that of Iver B. Neumann and Lene Hansen‟s interpretation of the same process. 
Second, it focuses on the concept of „European political identity‟ arguing that the 
construction or self-representation of a particular political identity cannot be understood in 
isolation from the discursive construction of an „Other‟ against which that identity is 
reinforced. This is done in order to set out how, for the purpose of this thesis, the process of 
identity construction is assumed to occur. The fourth section then turns to the process of 
„securitisation‟. It explains what is meant by this process, explores its applicability to the EU 
and ultimately argues for its reconceptualisation.  In particular, this section seeks to explain 
how both concepts fit into a discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy. The final 
section provides a brief overview of the documents that were selected for analysis. This 
information is presented as a table (Table 2.1); it differs from Table 1.1 included at the end of 
Chapter One, which focused on the main developments in EU counter-terrorism policy and 
security policy more generally. Instead, it identifies all of the documents selected for this 
analysis of the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. The justification for their selection 
will be expanded on in Chapter Three. The next section will now make a case for using 
discourse analysis to analyse EU counter-terrorism policy. 
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1. The Case for Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse analysis represents a method for analysing EU counter-terrorism policy in a 
slightly different way from other approaches, which focus on either the historical or legal 
development of counter-terrorism policy or issues of governance and implementation of 
counter-terrorism policy. This is because it covers the role of discourse in constructing 
reality; it focuses on the often neglected issues of identity construction and the ideologies that 
underpin the social representations within the counter-terrorism texts, which in turn shape the 
overall direction of EU counter-terrorism policy. This discursive approach is not supposed to 
be antithetical to these other approaches; instead it is intended to complement them by 
investigating or illuminating the connection between the ideational and the material. In the 
discourse approach language always precedes action. This is not to say that there is no reality 
without language, only that language makes action possible. To study language is not to deny 
the existence of reality, instead we simply affirm that reality is mediated through (or 
represented by) language, which is, if not prior to it, at least intrinsic to our accessing of it.
2
  
 
As Jennifer Milliken explains, whatever divergent claims are made about the group of 
scholars who engage in what might be labelled postmodern „discourse theorising‟, they share 
certain theoretical commitments about how discourses function in social and political life.
3
 
She argues that this is because postmodern theorising is committed to a contemporary 
analysis of the power/knowledge nexus and the idea of „theory as practice‟. Indeed, Norman 
Fairclough and Ruth Wodak have suggested that discourse should be defined as a form of 
„social practice‟.4 They contend that „describing discourse as social practice implies a 
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation, institution and 
social structure that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes 
them‟.5 In agreement with Matthew Broad and Oliver Daddow, this thesis understands 
discourse(s) to be „performative, meaning-making attempts to make sense of the world 
                                                             
2 I owe this insight to Oliver Daddow. 
3 Jennifer Milliken, „The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods‟, 
European Journal of International Relations, 5:2 (1999), p. 225-254. 
4 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Polity Press, 1992); Ruth Wodak, Disorders of Discourse 
(New York: Longman, 1996); Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, „Critical Discourse Analysis: An 
Overview‟, in Van Dijk, T. A. (ed.) Discourse Analysis (Sage, 1996). 
5 Wodak, Disorders of Discourse, p. 15. 
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through words and language‟.6 More generally, what unites those who engage in „discourse 
theorising‟ is a research programme committed to the critical task of illustrating how „textual 
and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the 
implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world‟.7  
 
Following Norman Fairclough, this thesis uses discourse analysis to take a coherent position 
on the important question of language and reality in the construction of EU counter-terrorism 
policy.
8
 As Jutta Weldes explains, this focus on language is because it „actively produces the 
issues with which policy makers deal and the specific problems that they confront‟.9 
Fairclough argues that there are three different aspects of political language that can be 
identified: the way language is used in the process of governing (or „governance‟), the 
political discourse associated with a particular group (in this case the EU and its political 
discourse of the „fight against terrorism‟), and the communicative style of political leaders. 
He argues that these different aspects of political language can be labelled: genres, discourses 
and styles, respectively. 
 
First, he refers to genres, which are to do with how language features as a means of 
government; language is part of action, part of the activity that goes on in the social practice, 
so governance of counter-terrorism policy involves a particular use of language. We can say 
then that a counter-terrorism (or security) policy document constitutes a particular genre, a 
particular way of using language in the process of governing through security policy. Second, 
he refers to discourses, such as the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which are to do with 
political representations. So, the political discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ contained 
within the European Council policy documents, represents governance (of counter-terrorism 
policy but also security policy more generally) within the EU in a particular way. Third, he 
refers to styles, which are taken to mean the communicative style of political leaders (and that 
                                                             
6 Matthew Broad and Oliver Daddow, „Half-Remembered Quotations from Mostly Forgotten Speeches: The 
Limits of Labour‟s European Policy Discourse‟, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12 
(2010), pp. 205-222, see p. 208.  
7 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, (Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 191. 
8 Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language?, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). 
9 Jutta Weldes, „Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment‟, Mershon International Studies 
Review, 42:2 (1998), pp. 216-225, see p. 217. 
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focus on political identities and values).
10
 Fairclough points out that these are only 
analytically separable and in practice they are simultaneously all in operation.
11
   
 
Importantly, Fairclough draws our attention to the concept of „governance‟, which he argues 
should be conceptualised as a form of social practice. By this he means that „governance‟ is a 
particular area of social life which is structured in a distinctive way, involving particular 
groups of people (this might include politicians, public employees, policy-makers, the public 
etc.) that are situated in particular relations with each other. He argues that whilst the social 
practice of „governance‟ changes and its relationship with other social practices (e.g. the mass 
media) changes, „it roughly sustains over long periods of time its identity as one area of 
social life in contrast with others‟.12 This thesis is therefore concerned with how the EU „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse is constructed as a form of „social practice‟, constituted through 
certain policy documents which represent governance of counter-terrorism policy in a 
particular way. This type of theorising is central to the direction of the thesis. 
 
Whereas much of the traditional literature of International Relations (IR) shares a 
commitment to what David Campbell has called an epistemic realism – whereby the world is 
comprised of the autonomous realms of the subject(s) and object(s) whose existence is 
deemed independent of ideas or beliefs about them – and building on the theoretical and 
methodological commitments of Critical Security Studies (CSS) outlined in Chapter One, this 
thesis is constructed on the basis of an alternative way of thinking.
13
 Epistemic realism makes 
the assumption that there are material causes to which events and actions can be reduced, 
which in turn sanctions two other analytical forms: „a narrativizing historiography in which 
things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves; and a logic of 
explanation in which it is the purpose of analysis to identify those self-evident things and 
material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity they 
engender‟.14 Instead then of the logic of explanation, which is central to much of the 
scholarship within IR and CSS, this thesis offers a challenge to standard disciplinary 
                                                             
10 Fairclough elaborates on the distinction between language, politics and government further in the introductory 
section to his book using the political discourse of „New Labour‟ to explain these concepts further. See 
Fairclough, „New Labour, New Language?‟, pp. 1-20. 
11 See Fairclough, „New Labour, New Language?‟, p. 14. 
12 See Fairclough, „New Labour, New Language?‟, pp. 143-144. 
13 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), 
14 Ibid., p. 4. 
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approaches (a different „mode of thinking‟). Demonstrating a commitment to the logic of 
interpretation and acknowledging „the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and 
specifying the „real causes‟ [of social phenomena]... [it] concerns itself instead with 
considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another‟.15 As such this thesis is reflective of a „critical‟ approach to security which is 
achieved through a discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy.  
 
Inspired by Michel Foucault, and following the likes of Campbell, Fairclough, Jackson, 
Milliken and Wodak, this thesis starts from a position whereby social and political life is 
understood to be comprised of a set of practices in which things (and their meaning) are 
constructed in the process of dealing with them. The aim of this dissent is not the constitution 
of a discrete methodological school that claims to magically shed light on the multiple 
problems, such as terrorism, that one may associate with global politics. Instead it should be 
considered: 
 
a form of dissent that celebrates difference; the proliferation of perspectives, 
dimensions and approaches to the very real dilemmas of global life. It is a form of 
dissent which celebrates the particularity and context-bound nature of judgements and 
assessments, not because it favours a (so-called) relativist retreat into the 
incommensurability of alternatives, but because it recognizes the universalist conceits 
of all attempts to force difference into the straightjacket of identity.
16
  
 
What this alternative approach seeks to do then is to problematise „the dominant modernist 
commitment to a world of given subjects and objects and all other dichotomized givens‟.17 In 
relation to the EU and counter-terrorism policy the thesis seeks to reformulate basic questions 
of modernist understanding. Therefore it emphasises not the sovereign subject (e.g., the 
EU/the „terrorist actor‟) or the object (e.g., independent world/text) but instead the historical, 
cultural and linguistic practices (the language contained in the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse) in which subjects and objects (theory and practice/facts and values) are 
constructed. The argument here then is that the EU or the „terrorist actor‟ can in reality never 
be reduced to a complete or entirely coherent object, which is accessible to universalised, 
                                                             
15 Ibid., p. 4. 
16 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
17 See George, „Discourses of Global Politics‟, p. 192. 
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essentialist or totalised understandings of it. Neither exists independently or outside of the 
multiple social discourses within which they have been and continue to be (re)constructed. 
From this position the EU can be understood as but one site of discursive production amongst 
many; it is a place where discourses meet and are reconstructed and refracted back into social 
and political life. Therefore, the „fight against terrorism‟ can be understood as the 
predominant practice through which the EU understands, explains and responds to terrorism.  
However, it is also important to remember that even those discourses that are dominant are 
unstable grids that constantly require work to „articulate‟ and „rearticulate‟ their knowledge, 
their identities. This in turn makes all discourses open-ended, changeable and historically 
contingent. As Michael Foucault argues, „we must be ready to receive every moment of 
discourse in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it reappears, and in that 
temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly 
erased, and hidden far from all view‟.18 
 
Central to this approach then is the role of identity. It seeks to explain how identity is 
constructed by identifying the institutional and discursive power relations that privilege 
particular actors and subjects while simultaneously marginalising others; identifying who has 
the authority to speak and who does not; as well as identifying who the dominant 
representation (or the competing representations) endows with legitimacy and to whom 
legitimacy is denied.
19
 It also seeks to identify „which actors are able to speak in each policy 
arena but also the modes of expression they are able to use, the policy decisions that are 
conceivable and the resultant practices, as well as the absences and exclusions inherent in 
these meaning-making structures‟.20 Following Stuart Croft, this thesis is in agreement that: 
 
Discourses create and reflect identities, and thus they construct those who are our 
allies and those who are our enemies. When not in flux, they settle who „we‟ are, and 
who „they‟ are; what „we‟ stand for, and what „they‟ mean to us. They construct the 
space for „our‟ legitimate activity; and the space for the behaviour we will (and will 
not) tolerate from „them‟.21  
 
                                                             
18 Michel Foucault, „The Archaeology of Knowledge’, (London: Tavistock, 1972), p.  25. 
19 See Weldes, „Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment‟, p. 215. 
20 Jamie Gaskarth, „Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy‟, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 2 (2006), pp. 325–341, see p. 327. 
21 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 1. 
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Broad and Daddow emphasise this point by arguing that not only do discourses constitute a 
„space of objects‟ by rendering things meaningful in certain ways but „discourses constitute 
the identities of social actors by carving out particular subject-positions, that is, sites from 
which the social actors can speak as the I/we of a discourse‟.22 As such, the „spaces‟ which 
this thesis focuses on identifying are those which construct a „European‟ sense of Self against 
that of a „terrorist‟ Other, including the techniques used to construct, describe and legitimise 
that „always-artificial distinction‟, which is apparent in the texts that were analysed.23 The 
specific conceptualisation of identity which is developed here is that of „European political 
identity‟, a concept which is outlined in greater detail below in section four of this chapter. 
 
It should also be remembered that although the role of language is crucial to the notion of 
discourse, social and political life is not reducible to language or linguistic analysis alone. 
Discourses are constituted through distinct institutional and organisational practices. This 
makes a discourse much broader than simply the texts or words associated with language - 
they are what we call discursive practices.
24
 In Foucault‟s own words, discursive practices 
are characterised by a „delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate 
perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories‟.25 Roxanne Doty notes that a discursive practice cannot simply be 
traced to a fixed and stable centre such as individual consciousness or a social collective.
26
 
Instead these discursive practices, that constitute both subjects and modes of subjectivity, are 
scattered or dispersed through various locales. This then is why the notion of intertextuality is 
so important.
27
 As Doty explains, „texts always refer back to other texts which themselves 
refer to still other texts. The power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is 
centralised, emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, like the discursive practices in which 
it inheres, power is dispersed and, most important, is productive of subjects and their 
worlds‟.28 Jackson agrees with this point, noting that „discourses can be considered to be an 
amalgam of material practices and forms of language and knowledge where each reinforces 
                                                             
22 Broad and Daddow, „Half-Remembered Quotations from Mostly Forgotten Speeches‟, p. 208. 
23 Ibid., p. 208. 
24 Damian E. Hodgson, Discourse, Discipline and the Subject: A Foucauldian Analysis of the UK Financial 
Service Industry, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 66; cited in Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 19. 
25 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 
p. 199. 
26 Roxanne Doty, „Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positive Analysis of US Counterinsurgency 
Policy in the Philippines‟, International Studies Quarterly 37:3 (1993), pp. 297-320. 
27 Ibid., p. 302. Doty defines intertextuality as „a complex and infinitely expanding web of possible meanings‟. 
28 Ibid., p. 302. 
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the other in a continuous cycle‟.29 If a discourse is understood to consist of a „system of 
statements in which each individual statements makes sense‟ then it produces interpretative 
possibilities, it becomes intelligible, because it is „virtually impossible‟ to think outside of 
it.
30
 As such discursive practices provide a language for talking about something – such as the 
concepts, categories, metaphors and analogies by which meanings are created – restricting 
what one can say on a subject. This restriction occurs because when considering certain 
social phenomena (such as terrorism) one is unable to think outside of a particular „regime of 
truth‟ that has been created through those discursive practices surrounding such phenomena. 
The power of discursive practices is inherent in the sense that not only are we are unable to 
think outside of such practices; we also extend and sustain such an arrangement. 
 
The EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ is more than just the sum of the policy proposals contained 
within the official EU counter-terrorism policy documents. Instead, it should be seen as an 
over-arching discourse on terrorism. It is a discourse that plays the central role in the 
construction of what is considered to be terrorism and who is considered to be a terrorist (in 
or by the EU). It calls terrorism or terrorists to mind, bounding the „terrorist‟ Other off into a 
category against which a „European‟ sense of Self is constructed. As such it is a discourse 
that legitimises certain actions, preventing alternative constructions of the „terrorist‟ Other 
and therefore preventing alternative courses of action against them. It is a discourse which 
reflects a wider number of social and political narratives that are being reproduced and 
reconstructed through EU counter-terrorism policy. It is a discourse which, more specifically, 
is contributing to the construction of a condition of insecurity; an environment within which 
certain non-discursive practices, such as the ever increasing number of „technical‟ security 
measures contained within EU counter-terrorism policy, are themselves legitimised through 
the invocation of discourse(s) that emphasise the threat of terrorism.
31
. It is a form of practice 
that provides the language for talking about terrorism in the context of European policy-
making; as well as a form of practice which legitimises (or normalises) the policy actions 
taken under the pre-text of counter-terrorism responses.  
                                                             
29 Jackson, „Writing the War on Terrorism‟, p. 19. 
30 Doty, „Foreign Policy as Social Construction‟, p. 302. 
31 See Jef Huysmans and Anastassia Tsoukala, „Introduction: The Social Construction and Control of Danger in 
Counterterrorism, Alternatives 33 (2008), pp. 133-137. Huysmans and Tsoukala argue that the question of 
identity lies at the heart of the interaction between the discursive articulation of threats; and the non-discursive, 
administrative and technical security measures which are central to counter-terrorism policies. As such, „identity 
is considered both the object of a discursive construction of sameness and otherness in contemporary Western 
societies, and as the legitimizing basis for the implementation of an increasing control apparatus that covers 
delinquent, deviant, and even ordinary behaviour‟. See, p. 134. 
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The purpose of this first section was to establish how discourse analysis represents a method 
for analysing EU counter-terrorism policy in a way which emphasises the importance of 
political language and discourse, as opposed to other methods that focus on the historical or 
legal development of policy or governance and implementation of policy. By focusing on the 
idea that language is central to the construction of reality and that discourse should be 
understood as a form of social practice, this theoretical framework allows us to investigate 
both the specific features of the language of EU counter-terrorism policy and the relationship 
between the production of this discourse and its impact upon social and political life within 
(and to a certain extent beyond) Europe. The key reasons for using discourse analysis as a 
method through which to study EU counter-terrorism policy is that it allows us to explore the 
link between the ideational and the material; and it draws our attention to the role of language 
in the construction of policy, which is itself (language) intrinsic to our attempts to mediate 
reality. Importantly, as was highlighted by Daddow and Broad, it draws attention to the 
relationship between context and the agency of the language user(s), as such discourse(s) 
constitutes the identities of social actors by carving out particular subject-positions, or the 
sites, from which the social actors can speak as the I/We of a discourse. Finally, discourse 
analysis allows us to investigate how the EU counter-terrorism discourse conditions or 
structures certain courses of action towards terrorism whilst denying others. The next section 
shall now explain how and why certain EU counter-terrorism policy texts were selected for 
analysis.  
 
 
2. Selection of Texts: the European Council Policy Documents 
 
The analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy contained within this thesis focuses on a number 
of policy documents that have played a central role in the production and subsequent 
evolution of EU counter-terrorism policy. These documents include general policy 
documents, „internal‟ and „external‟ security documents and actual counter-terrorism policy 
documents. In particular the policy documents examined were those debated and endorsed by 
a specific institution, the European Council, and only those documents which included a 
major focus on counter-terrorism policy or referred to the „fight against terrorism‟ were 
selected. The documents selected for analysis also included a number of reports on progress 
in the development and implementation of EU counter-terrorism policy, prepared by the EU 
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Counter-Terrorism Coordinator for the European Council. The justification for the selection 
of each specific document will be outlined in greater detail in the next chapter. However, it 
can be stated that they consist of all the primary documents that constitute the official EU 
policy discourse on terrorism. The reasons for concentrating on primarily the policy 
documents produced by the European Council are outlined in greater detail in the section 
below. This is done in order to establish the significance of that institution in the production 
of EU counter-terrorism policy.  
 
Reasons for focusing on the European Council 
 
The focus of this discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy on the policy documents 
produced by the European Council is for several reasons. First, this institution brings together 
the Heads of State and Government of the Member States.  As such, it is the European 
Council which has played the key role in defining the political direction and the political 
priorities of the EU. As Neill Nugent explains:   
 
The European Council [is] at the very heart of EU-decision-making – not on a day-
to-day basis in the manner of the other four main EU institutions, but rather from a 
more distanced position where it is centrally involved in setting the overall 
parameters of the EU system. Final and legally binding EU decisions may be taken 
by other EU institutions, but major political decisions concerning the institutional 
and policy developments of the EU are now generally taken by, or at least are 
channelled through and given clearance by, the European Council.
32
  
 
As a result of this, the European Council has played a central role in the initiation of counter-
terrorism policy. Historically, in the late 1980s it prompted initiatives (such as TREVI) in the 
areas of immigration, drugs and terrorism, and in the present context, it has been responsible 
for every major policy initiative that is relevant to or designed specifically for the EU 
counter-terrorism policy response. This is not to suggest that the European Commission or 
other European institutions are irrelevant or have not played an important role in the 
development of policy, simply that the European Council is responsible for the production of 
                                                             
32 Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 7th Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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each final policy document, which taken together form the basis of EU counter-terrorism 
policy.  
 
Second, terrorism has traditionally been dealt with by the EU as primarily an „internal‟ 
security issue, with counter-terrorism policy being constructed under the rubric of the third 
pillar: justice and home affairs (JHA). This brings into play certain important institutional 
factors in relation to the way in which activities have traditionally been conducted under this 
pillar of the EU. As Balzacq and Carrera point out issues that are included in this area tend to 
be „probably the most dynamic, sensitive and hotly contested.‟33  This is because they form 
„an essential part of the traditional concept of national sovereignty‟ and as such „are fraught 
with national fears, rival ideologies and competing political sensitivities.‟34 The difficulties 
that are faced in the development of coherent European policies, on a number of the issues 
subsumed under JHA, are exacerbated by the fact that decisions in these fields are developed 
through an intergovernmental framework of cooperation and have been subject to strict 
unanimity voting at the Council of Ministers. These institutional (or material) factors need to 
be recognised because they do have an impact on the construction of the EU counter-
terrorism policy discourse. 
 
Third, the importance of the European Council in the formulation of counter-terrorism policy 
can be recognised in that although the original intention was that the European Council would 
operate at a more general level, it concerns itself with a number of quite specific internal 
policy issues. As Neill Nugent explains, this is several reasons: certain issues are either so 
politically sensitive (such as counter-terrorism policy) or so intractable that agreement can 
only be reached at the level of heads of government; the European Council, because of its 
non-sectoral nature, is often the best institution to put together broad ranging policies or 
broker deals that cut across policy sectors
35
; and given the status of the European Council, 
there is now a general expectation (even an assumption maybe) that policy matters of 
significance should be given clearance, if not be determined, at that level.
36
   
 
                                                             
33 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge to Europe’s Future, (Ashgate, 
2006). 
34 Ibid., p. 1. 
35 This is especially the case in terms of counter-terrorism policy in that the EU counter-terrorism policy has 
contributed to the blurring of the distinction between the three pillars and induced cross-pillar governing 
dynamics. 
36 Nugent, „The Government and Politics of the European Union‟, (7th ed.), pp. 175-176. 
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Fourth, it is reasonable to state that counter-terrorism policy responses to non-state terrorist 
groups or actors are, to a large extent, event-driven. The development of new policies and 
practices, institutions and agencies, designed to prevent further incidents of terrorism tend to 
follow the occurrence of terrorist violence. Whilst this may seem a rather vague justification 
for analysing solely the European Council documents there is actually a valid reason in that it 
reminds us of „the crucially important fact that policy development and decision-making 
processes in the EU are closely related to prevailing political and economic circumstances, to 
the perception by the key actors – especially national governments – of their needs in the 
circumstances, and to perceptions of the potential of the EU to act as a problem-solving 
organisation in regard to the circumstances‟.37 It is the event-driven nature of counter-
terrorism policy and the perception that the EU can offer „added value‟ in the „fight against 
terrorism‟ that drives the production (at the level of the European Council) of this constantly 
evolving EU counter-terrorism policy discourse. 
 
Fifth, the focus of the research on the production of counter-terrorism policy discourse 
through the European Council documents is not intended to deflect attention away from the 
important role other institutions such as the European Commission, or individuals (and 
his/her support staff) such as the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, play in the production of 
that discourse. Indeed, some of the most important policy documents that were analysed, for 
example the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, were drawn up by the Commission and the office 
of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, before being forwarded to the Council for agreement 
and then transmitted to the European Council for adoption. Furthermore, where appropriate 
the analysis uses the iterations or utterances of these other sites of discursive production to 
support or challenge the arguments being made. The focus remains on the European Council 
documents because in the EU context the European Council documents represent the primary 
source of the policy discourse.   
 
Before moving forward it is worth illustrating this point, that the European Council is not the 
only site at which EU counter-terrorism discourse(s) are produced, in greater detail. It is 
important to be aware that the EU is not a monolithic or unitary actor; it has numerous 
institutions which are simultaneously working together and in conflict with one another. As 
such, the European Council is not the only institution which, through the formulation of 
                                                             
37 Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 6th Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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counter-terrorism policy, contributes to the construction of EU counter-terrorism 
discourse(s). For example, Anastassia Tsoukala has engaged in some interesting research on 
EU counter-terrorism discourse(s) as produced through the public debates of the European 
Parliament, on combating terrorism, between September 2001 and March 2003.
38
 In the pre-
September 11 period Tsoukala identified two main positions, articulated by the MEPs, that 
she notes stand in opposition to one another: a denial that the counter-terrorism measures that 
the EU is seeking to implement infringe upon civil rights and liberties; and a warning against 
the breach of human rights.  
 
In the post-September 11 period, Tsoukala‟s analysis revealed that the debates of the 
European Parliament, on combating terrorism, contained three competing counter-terrorism 
discourses which traverse the distinction between these two positions. First, Tsoukala 
identified what she calls the „defence of the emergency rules thesis‟. This first position is 
characterised by the establishment of a continuum of threats and the implication of a close 
connection between terrorism and immigration, necessitating the establishment of exceptional 
measures related to the control of migrants. She argues that this position also contains an 
assumption that the terrorist threat would have been less significant if the previous legal 
framework had been less concerned with the protection of human rights. Second, there is the 
„two-fold‟ concern. Although this second position relies on an assumption that the value of 
„security‟ is opposed to the value of „human rights‟, unlike the „emergency rules thesis‟ it 
does not prioritise security over human rights. Instead, this counter-terrorism discourse 
frequently refers to the term „balance‟, thereby establishing a sort of social equilibrium 
between liberty and security. Third, Tsoukala identified what she calls the „defence of human 
rights thesis‟. This position is characterised by the argument that in our „open societies‟, the 
fight against all forms of criminal behaviour should not go beyond the limits of the law, nor 
should it involve the breach of human rights and liberties or the suspension of the rule of law.  
 
Tsoukala concludes that although the events of September 11, 2001, provided the trigger for 
many discourses legitimising or discrediting the implementation of emergency measures, 
over time (and as the immediate impact of those events has lessened) the dominant position 
of the European Parliament lies with the „defence of human rights thesis‟. However, having 
analysed the iterations of the representatives of the other EU institutions (including the 
                                                             
38 Anastassia Tsoukala, „Democracy against Security: The Debates about Counter-Terrorism in the European 
Parliament, September 2001-June 2003‟, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29: 4 (2004), pp. 417-439.  
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European Council and European Commission) she argues that it is difficult to find such a 
clear-cut position as that held by the European Parliament. Instead, she contends that the 
dominant discourse within those other institutions appears to rest with the „seemingly 
moderate but actually illiberal‟ two-fold thesis. As such, she argues that, in most cases, it is 
possible to affirm that „the EU institutions seek to present the future adoption of emergency 
rules as a necessary step to be taken in order to protect the internal security of the EU 
countries and of the rest of the world‟.39  In relation to the arguments made in this thesis, this 
research is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the point made above, that 
although the European Council can be identified as the key institution in the formulation of 
counter-terrorism policy, it is not the only source of EU counter-terrorism discourse(s). 
Second, Tsoukala‟s research reveals a competition for dominance between numerous 
counter-terrorism discourses, which confirms the line of argument made above that even 
though there are certain aspects of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse which remain stable 
over time, like any discursive formation the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is open-ended 
or changeable. It is contested both from within (amongst European institutions) and without 
(„critical‟ scholarship).       
  
A final reason for why the analysis focused solely on the language contained within the 
European Council documents was partly practical. To investigate the documents of all the EU 
institutions, the speeches of all the key EU and national politicians, and media iterations on 
terrorism that contribute to a more general European discourse on terrorism, would have 
produced a large and unmanageable volume of data. By restricting the analysis to the 
documents produced by the European Council, the analysis remains focused on the primary 
source of the discourse. However, there remains the potential to expand the analysis of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse outward to include other European institutions, such as the 
European Commission or the European Parliament. In particular, the Commission has 
produced numerous documents on counter-terrorism policy, as well as security policies in a 
more general sense. Furthermore, there have been a great number of speeches, interviews and 
statements by European politicians and policy-makers, including the EU CTC, and in the pre-
Lisbon period, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
numerous EU Commissioners for Justice and Home Affairs and External Relations, which 
have contributed to the construction of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. As explained 
                                                             
39 Ibid. 
  Chapter 2: Method and Theory 
62 
 
above, where appropriate these other sites of discursive production are used to challenge or 
support the arguments being made during the actual analysis of the selected documents. The 
next section outlines the precise method that was used. 
 
 
3. The Method 
 
In conducting a discourse analysis of the topic of EU counter-terrorism policy it is important 
to stress that the approach to discourse analysis used here is not exclusive to this thesis. It is 
an amalgam of a number of different methodological commitments consisting of a specific 
set of methods, or „tools of inquiry‟, designed to further our understanding of EU counter-
terrorism policy. In order not to confuse the concept of „method‟ with the concept of 
„methodology‟ a brief note on the distinction between the two terms is necessary. In line with 
Jonathon W. Moses and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, this thesis understands „methodology‟ to be 
something more basic and comprehensive than „methods‟.40  „Methods‟ are understood to be 
problem-specific techniques, a mixture of tools or approaches used for solving the problem(s) 
one encounters; while a „methodology‟ on the other hand implies very real and important 
differences in understanding the world. They state that while the term „method‟ refers to 
„research techniques, or technical procedures of a discipline‟, the term „methodology‟, in 
contrast, „denotes an investigation of the concepts, theories and basic principles of reasoning 
on a subject‟.41 
 
It should also be noted at this juncture that the field of discourse analysis is incredibly 
diverse. There are many different approaches to discourse analysis as a method, none of 
which can claim to be uniquely „right‟, including the approach used in this thesis. It has been 
described as „an emerging research programme engaging a community of scholars‟ that 
through a combination of „canonical citations and constructive narratives‟ is constitutive of a 
„particular approach to International Relations, and to how they can contribute to the 
explanation and critique of international practices‟.42 This thesis seeks to build on these 
approaches and is a contribution to this developing research programme. Like all forms of 
discourse analysis the method used to investigate this topic borrows a number of these 
                                                             
40 Jonathon W. Moses and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and 
Political Research, (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2007).  
41 Ibid., p. 4. 
42 Milliken, „The Study of Discourse in International Relations‟, p. 226. 
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different „tools of inquiry‟, which have been developed by other discourse scholars, and 
reconstructs them in order to analyse the discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism 
policy. Furthermore, discourse analysis is highly adaptive, as James Paul Gee has pointed 
out, „different approaches often fit different issues and questions better or worse than others. 
And, too, different approaches sometimes reach similar conclusions through using somewhat 
different tools and terminologies connected to different “micro-communities” of 
researchers‟.43  
 
A word on the terminology used here is important at the outset. The „fight against terrorism‟ 
is considered to be an example of a discursive practice. Following Foucault, it incorporates a 
complex web of understanding, the first characteristic of which is the „delimitation of a field 
of objects‟, or the narrowing of our field of vision and the exclusion of a wide range of 
phenomenon from being considered worthy of attention.
44
 The second characteristic is „the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge‟; this refers to the 
construction of a position of authority or legitimacy from which the EU can speak as the I/We 
of the discourse. The third characteristic being a „fixing of norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories‟, or the concepts, categories, metaphors and analogies by which 
meaning (knowledge about terrorism) is (re)created, restricting what one can and cannot say 
on the subject. In particular, this thesis focuses on the idea that the discursive practice of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ is constituted through numerous discourse strands, which can be 
understood as large or small texts fragments that when taken together (across a number of 
texts) construct certain themes that underpin the discourse. The next section shall outline the 
specific technique of analysis that was used to analyse the counter-terrorism policy 
documents. 
 
The Technique of Analysis 
 
Employing this method of critical discourse analysis to analyse the EU counter-terrorism 
policy documents involved a careful reading of the text of the documents and asking a series 
of interrelated analytical questions. This was done in three steps. 
 
The first step, involved asking one specific question: what are the key texts?  
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The second step involved asking three interrelated questions: what are the key words, terms, 
phrases and labels (the language), which are central to each of the texts?; what are the main 
assumptions contained within each of the texts?; taking together the language and the 
assumptions (contained within each of the texts) which underpin the policy, what are the 
main „strands‟ of the discourse?  
 
The third step involved asking another three interrelated question: how do the different 
strands of the discourse, structure the meaning, logic and policy response to the groups and/or 
the events that they describes?; how does the discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self 
against a notional „terrorist‟ Other?; what knowledge or practices are normalised and/or 
legitimised by the discourse? 
 
Notice how these questions are designed to allow us to investigate both the text(s) itself (the 
second step), as well as the wider social, cultural and political context within which the EU 
policy discourse on terrorism is constructed (the third step).   By analysing the documents in 
this way, it is possible to draw out the different representations of identity that help to 
construct (and are constructed by) the EU counter-terrorism response. As such, theorising 
counter-terrorism policy as discourse rests on this assumption that identity and policy are 
mutually constitutive. The next section explains exactly how the technique of analysis was 
applied in practice. 
 
Analysing the Discourse 
 
As was noted above, the method used involved a three step process in which a series of 
analytical questions were applied to the EU counter-terrorism texts. This section uses 
examples from specific counter-terrorism texts, as well as examples drawn from the whole 
group of texts analysed, in order to demonstrate how the technique of analysis was used to 
investigate the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse. 
 
The first step involved the identification and analysis of twenty texts, produced by the 
European Council and the office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, across a ten year 
period from October 1999 to November 2009. The chosen texts consisted of a number of 
counter-terrorism policy documents and more general security policy documents. The 
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selection of certain general security documents, which include both „internal‟ and „external‟ 
security policy documents, was thought to be justified if they contained either a substantial 
focus on the conceptualisation of terrorism or a dedicated section on how best to respond to 
terrorism. The explanation for the selection of each document will be outlined in greater 
detail in the third chapter, which provides an overview of the development of EU counter-
terrorism policy with a specific focus on the role of language. 
 
The second step involved a direct engagement with the chosen texts in order to discover „how 
discursive practices operate linguistically within those texts‟.45 This step shall be referred to 
as „mapping the discourse‟; it involved coding the documents for the key words, terms 
phrases and assumptions and sorting them into themes. Unlike quantitative coding whereby 
the researcher applies preconceived codes to the data (all planned before the researcher has 
even collected the data); the approach taken in the conduct of this research was qualitative. 
As such, the codes were created as each text was studied and then at a later stage sorted into 
themes; the analysis was assumed to be complete when adding new texts created no new 
thematic categories.
46
 
 
In order to demonstrate briefly how the discourse is constructed and to establish how the 
approach developed above was applied in practice, this section uses examples from the 
European Security Strategy, 2003. First, each text was coded in order to determine the key 
words, terms, phrases and labels that are central to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. For 
example, the European Security Strategy uses words, terms, phrases and labels such as „new‟, 
„violent‟ or „extremism‟ to describe terrorism or terrorists. Second, the texts were analysed in 
order to identify the different assumptions (the knowledge) upon which the counter-terrorism 
policy discourse is based. For example in the European Security Strategy, there is an 
assumption that terrorism „poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe‟ or that 
terrorists are „willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟. Third, the 
different words, terms, phrases, labels and assumptions (the „discursive practices‟) were then 
categorised in a thematic manner. For example, the use of the term „new‟ coupled with the 
assumption that terrorists are seeking to cause „massive casualties‟, provides a theme or 
strand of the discourse which is also articulated in other counter-terrorism documents: the 
                                                             
45 Jackson, „Writing the War on Terrorism‟, p. 25. 
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idea of „new terrorism‟. This process was repeated in order to reveal how each strand of the 
discourse has been constructed and was assumed to be complete when the analysis was 
unable to identify any new themes. At this point it is important to note that many of the 
words, terms, phrases, labels and assumptions, which construct the numerous themes within 
the discourse, are interlinked and as such can assume multiple meaning and be applicable in 
the construction of different discourse strands. For example, „violent extremism‟ is applicable 
simultaneously to the strands of the discourse which articulate the idea of „new terrorism‟ and 
the strand of the discourse which implicitly constructs Islam as a potential terrorist threat. 
 
The third step was to analyse the different discourse strands from a wider interdisciplinary 
perspective, which contained textual and social analysis of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse. This part of the analysis focused not on one specific text but instead explored 
thematically all of the texts analysed; the aim of which was to understand how the discourse 
structures the policy responses to the events/and or groups that it describes, how identity is 
constructed and how certain practices are normalised/legitimised, through each strand of the 
discourse. This level of analysis complements the first for the reason that individual text 
analysis „is not sufficient on its own to shed light on the relationship between discourse and 
social processes‟.47 As Paul Simpson and Geoff Hall explain, this is because „discourse 
analysis should reveal as much about the contexts as about the text‟.48  
 
Within this third step, the first task was to analyse the documents in order to explain how the 
different strands of the discourse (of EU counter-terrorism policy) play a central role in 
structuring the meaning, logic and policy responses to the groups and the events that they 
describe. For example, if we take the discourse strand, analysed in Chapter Six, which 
focuses on the discursive construction of the „Muslim‟ Other. The language contained within 
the discourse strand speaks of „violent radicalisation‟ or „violent religious extremism‟ as the 
main terrorist threat to the EU in the post-September 11 period. It then argues that in response 
to this threat the EU must pursue a policy of „combating radicalisation and recruitment to 
terrorism‟. This strand of the discourse conflates the „Muslim‟ Other with the „terrorist‟ 
Other; it does this by presenting the engagement of „Muslim communities in Europe and 
beyond‟ as an essential element in combating „radicalisation and recruitment‟ and the 
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prevention of terrorism; a discursive move which it is argued implicitly constructs (or 
structures) the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat. The second task was to 
investigate how the discourse constructs a „European‟ sense of Self against a notional 
„terrorist‟ Other. For example, if we take the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse as a whole, 
there are numerous examples of how the discourse constructs a „terrorist‟ Other in opposition 
to a „European‟ sense of Self. The policy documents were analysed in order to identify how 
the EU constructs its own self-representation (e.g. as a provider of „freedom‟, „security‟ and 
„justice‟ or a respecter of „human rights‟); in opposition to representations of the „terrorist‟ 
Other (e.g. as „ruthless‟, „horrific‟, „violent‟, „criminal‟ and „unjustifiable‟, to name but a few 
of the more prominent descriptions). The third task was to examine the documents in order to 
reveal what knowledge and/or practices are normalised and/or legitimised by the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse. For example,  if we take the discourse strand analysed in 
Chapter Five, the discourse articulates the need to „control‟ the EU border to prevent the 
threat of terrorism; in turn this discourse strand plays a key role in legitimising the 
construction of numerous security policies and practices as central elements in the counter-
terrorism response. The threat of terrorism therefore helps to normalise this securitising 
process (that is the introduction of extensive security measures of/for „control‟ at the EU 
border). 
 
The aim of this third section has been to demonstrate how the theoretical framework 
(discourse analysis) established in the first section is operationalised through the method 
(three step technique of analysis) outlined above. This section provided numerous examples 
drawn from individual texts and the discourse as a whole. However, precisely how the 
method was applied will become clearer in the subsequent chapters, which contain the 
empirical analysis of the counter-terrorism discourse. It has been argued that this method 
provides a unique way of analysing the EU counter-terrorism policy, allowing us to focus on 
the instrumental role discourse plays in both the practice of that policy and also our 
understanding of that policy. The next section will outline two theoretical concepts that 
underpin the research in this thesis: the idea of „European political identity‟; and the process 
of „securitisation‟. 
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4. Theoretical Concepts: ‘European Political Identity’ and the process of 
‘Securitisation’  
 
The aim of this fourth section is to explore two theoretical concepts which are central to the 
arguments that are made in this thesis; and in particular, to explain how they fit into a 
discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy. This section begins by identifying the 
concept of „collective identity‟ and contrasting it against what is meant by „European political 
identity‟. This is done in order to establish how the process of identity construction is 
assumed to occur. Where reference to the concept of „European political identity‟ is made, in 
the context of this thesis, it is considered to be synonymous with the identity of the EU.
49
 As 
such, it is argued that „European political identity‟ is based on a shared set of political values 
around which a sense of personal and collective identification with the EU can be made, that 
it is not derived from a common culture. For example, EU policy documents are replete with 
reference to/or the identification of certain values around which this identity can be 
constructed (such as „human rights‟ etc.) However, it is also argued that the construction of 
political identity cannot be understood outside of the construction of an „Other‟ against which 
that identity can be (re)affirmed. This is certainly the case when we consider the production 
of counter-terrorism policy and the way in which it constructs the „terrorist‟ Other; a social 
construct which is perceived to be a direct threat to those values which underpin „European 
political identity‟. It is argued that a discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy can 
play an important role in identifying the (textual) processes by which this identity is 
constructed.   
 
The second concept that is explored is the process, concept or theory of „securitisation‟. This 
focus on securitisation fits neatly within the framework of a „critical‟ approach to security 
outlined in Chapter One. Indeed, the theory of securitisation is one of the most unique and 
interesting concepts to have been developed within the area of Critical Security Studies 
(CSS). It is a main contention of this thesis that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is 
representative of a process of securitisation of social and political life within Europe. Within 
the field of security studies, the use of the term securitisation refers to a specific theoretical 
process developed by the „Copenhagen School‟. However, there have been other attempts at 
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reconceptualising the concept of securitisation, not least by the „Paris School‟ who have 
developed the idea of „(in)securitisation‟. Therefore, when using the term securitisation (or 
(in)securitisation) it is essential that we are explicit in articulating what is mean by it. As 
such, this section on securitisation does several things: it explores the „traditional‟ 
securitisation framework as outlined by the Copenhagen School; it draws our attention to a 
number of critiques of securitisation; it explains why (for a number of reasons) a „traditional‟ 
conceptualisation of securitisation is not directly applicable to the EU; it then contrasts the 
Copenhagen School‟s approach to securitisation with Didier Bigo‟s focus on processes of 
(in)securitisation, arguing that we must reconceptualise this process in line with the Paris 
School in order to explain whether EU counter-terrorism discourse is reflective of a process 
of securitisation of social and political life (in Europe). The section ends with a reflection on 
the extent to which critical discourse analysis can help to illuminate this process. Before 
exploring this concept in more detail, this section will first engage in an analysis of the 
concept of identity, contrasting what is meant by the term „collective identity‟ with that is 
meant by the idea of „European political identity‟. 
 
Collective Identity and ‘European Political Identity’ 
 
One of the key elements of this thesis is to investigate how representations of identity are 
constructed through and help to mediate our understanding of the formulation of EU counter-
terrorism policy. In order to do this it is important to engage in a thorough explanation of how 
identity and the process of identity formation is conceptualised, for the purpose of this thesis. 
As such, and in keeping with the discursive approach set out above, the next section identifies 
the concept of „collective identity‟, establishing how a discursive approach to identity, as 
articulated by Lene Hansen, differs from that of a constructivist approach, best represented by 
the work of Alexander Wendt. Having done this it then turns to the concept of „European 
political identity‟. It explains how this concept differs from the concept of „collective 
identity‟, before arguing that all identities are relational and cannot be separated from 
suppositions about the „Other‟.  
 
The term „collective identity‟ can refer to a variety of different concepts; however it is 
generally used to refer to an individual‟s sense of belonging to a particular social group. Iver 
B. Neumann has argued that the text which firmly and unequivocally transposed the study of 
this concept into the mainstream of the discipline of international relations (IR) was Wendt‟s 
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1992 article „Anarchy Is What States Make of It‟.50 Wendt argued in that article, and later in 
his book Social Theory of International Relations, that is it possible to identify a pre-social 
intrinsic state identity, which can form the basis of a „collective identity‟. This position is at 
odds with the understanding of identity developed here.
51
 Instead, this thesis follows Lene 
Hansen by conceptualising identity as social: that is to understand identity as something 
constituted through a set of collectively articulated codes, not as a private property of the 
individual or a psychological condition.
52
 Like Hansen, identity is understood as both 
discursive and relational. States (or systems of governance like the EU) are not assumed to 
have identities operating underneath discursive articulations; whilst language is seen as a 
referential system, identities are always constructed through processes of linking and 
differentiation. This conceptualisation of the process of identity formation is quite different 
from that of Wendt‟s, who argues that identity need not be constructed as relational 
difference.
53
 This is for two reasons. First, Wendt contends that states have certain essential 
qualities which concern a specific type of identity. He argues that states have pre-social 
„personal‟ or „corporate‟ identities which are „constitutionally exogenous to Otherness‟, or to 
be more succinct, „there is no particular Other to which the Self is related‟.54 Second, Wendt 
argues that because states have intrinsic identities particular to the individual actor, it is 
possible to distinguish between „role‟ identities and „type‟ identities, such as „democracy‟. 
Wendt‟s interpretation of identity, as an independent variable, is based upon his 
epistemological commitment to a research programme which seeks to investigate the 
explanatory power of ideational, rather than material, factors.  
 
For Iver B. Neumann, the great strength of Wendt‟s argument is the way in which he 
explicitly links collective identity formation to the question of understanding how certain 
conceptualisations or representations of identity (in this case of the state) take on a material 
quality, as they are perpetually reconstructed and taken more and more for granted as factors 
playing a role in the decision-making of the state. However, where the approach taken in this 
                                                             
50 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: „The East‟ in European Identity Formation‟, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), p. 31.  
51 Alexander Wendt, „Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics‟, 
International Organisation, 46: 2, (1992), pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
52 Hansen, „Security as Practice‟, p. 6. Hansen points out that this is not to argue that individuals are incapable 
of understanding themselves as having identities, instead it is to understand that individual identity is constituted 
within and through a collective terrain. 
53 Wendt, „Social Theory of International Relations‟, pp. 224-228.  
54 Ibid., p. 225. 
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thesis differs from that of Wendt‟s is in his argument that „in periods of relatively stable role 
identities, ideas and structures may become reified and thus treated as things that exist 
independently of social action‟.55 As Neumann explains, this is problematic in that it can lead 
to the reification of the category of the Self and prevent the „possibility of studying the 
multidimensionality of identity formation‟, a move which he argues leads to the implicit 
treatment of the Self as a foundation.
56
 Whilst there is little doubt that certain representations 
(such as democracy) may be reified over time, to assert that they can ever be treated as 
something independent of the discourses which continually produce and reproduce identities 
should be considered problematic. As Hansen explains, „the adoption of a discursive 
epistemology makes a pre-social, corporate and intrinsic identity an impossibility, and vice 
versa: if identity is assumed to be ontologically intrinsic, then it cannot be identified through 
a discursive epistemology but has to be attributed externally by the analyst‟.57 The point here 
then is that identity is considered to be a fluidic concept which is constantly changing and 
always in flux; and that in the process of identity formation, the idea of essentialised or pre-
existing social identities are considered to be an impossibility. As such, it is argued that 
identity can only be understood through analysing the multiple discourses through which it is 
constructed. Having established how (for the purpose of this thesis) identity is conceptualised 
in a more general sense, this analysis shall now turn to the concept of „political identity‟. 
 
Following Sonia Lucarelli, the focus of this thesis is on „political identity‟ rather than 
„collective‟, „cultural‟ or „religious‟ identity.58 First, „political identity‟ is understood as a 
social construct which is not (and should not be) based on or derived directly from a common 
culture; instead it is a form of identity that is constructed on the basis of shared political 
values. Second, political identity is understood to be a sub-set of group identity. This should 
not be confused with a „collective identity‟, as if there were a superior entity (the community) 
above the individual: in this sense the EU is not a community that possess identity. Instead, 
each citizen has a „European political identity‟ as soon as he/she recognises him/herself 
around a set of social and political values and principles, in the sharing of which he/she feels 
a sense of belonging to the EU political group‟.59At the level of the individual, the 
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construction of „Self‟ (that is a „European political identity‟) is therefore shaped around these 
core values and principles. Furthermore, as Lucarelli highlights, for those values to shape the 
identity of the citizen they need to be interpreted; this is where the culture, history, legal 
practices, institutions and policies of the EU provide a framework for the interpretation of 
those values and principles.
60
 So in keeping with a discursive approach, identity is understood 
not as an essentialised given but instead a process of self-identification in which the roles of 
culture, history, legal practices, institutions and policies, and specifically in this case counter-
terrorism policy are important.  
 
In relation to the EU as an actor, Lucarelli argues that the values of the EU (as a political 
group) are important for the extent to which they have shaped the self-representation of the 
EU as a qualitatively different actor in world politics.
61
 The identification of certain values 
around which a „European political identity‟ can be constructed is therefore central to the 
identity building process. However, what is missing from Lucarelli‟s analysis is a 
consideration of the role of the „Other‟ in the construction of this „European political 
identity‟. David Campbell agrees that the construction of identity, whether individual or 
collective, is a process; it is not fixed by nature, given by God or planned by intentional 
behaviour.
62
 However, he argues that „identity is constituted in relation to difference‟.63 This 
does not mean that difference is fixed by nature, given by God or planned by intentional 
behaviour, simply that „difference is constituted in relation to identity‟.64 What this means (in 
contrast to Wendt‟s argument) then is that the question of identity/difference can contain no 
foundation that is prior to (or outside of) its operation; identity is thus performatively 
constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity can only be achieved through the 
inscription of boundaries, which in turn serve to differentiate an „inside‟ from an „outside‟, a 
„Self‟ from an „Other‟, a „domestic‟ from a „foreign‟.65 Furthermore, Campbell asserts that „if 
all meaning is constituted through difference (an assumption upon which this analysis is 
based), then there can be no declaration about the nature of the self which is totally free of 
suppositions about the other‟.66 This line of thought holds a certain degree of resonance here. 
As Hansen explains, this is not to make an argument that there is never any positive identity 
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construction, what might appear as intrinsic, only that this is constructed through a process of 
differentiation.
67
 So whilst it is true that contrast between „Self‟ and „Other‟ need not 
necessarily lead to the negation or demonisation of the „Other‟; it is true that in the context of 
counter-terrorism policy the logic of identity makes it more readily available to the politics of 
negation and difference through the construction of „otherness‟. 
 
In particular, this is because the construction of a notional „terrorist‟ Other against which a 
„European‟ sense of „Self‟ (understood here as „European political identity‟) is reinforced by 
the language of threat. In the „fight against terrorism‟ the „terrorist‟ Other is constructed as a 
specific type of threat; a threat which is inimical to certain values or principles that have 
shaped the self-representation of the EU‟s political identity. By definition a threat is a „person 
or thing likely to cause damage or danger‟, so it should be considered unsurprising that the 
construction of terrorism as threat lends itself to the negation of the „Other‟.68 Indeed, the use 
of numerous adjectives throughout the EU counter-terrorism discourse to describe the 
„terrorist‟ Other (such as „murderous‟, „heinous‟ or „violent‟) helps to reveal how this process 
of „othering‟ is achieved. 
 
As such, this thesis argues that the process of „othering‟ is a central element of the EU 
counter-terrorism discourse; and that through this process the EU constructs a „terrorist‟ 
Other against which its political identity can be reinforced. In particular, Chapter Four 
demonstrates how the „terrorist‟ Other is conceptualised through three interlinked strands of 
the discourse which construct the terrorist(s) as primarily (and in no particular order) a 
„criminal‟, a „non-state actor‟,  a „new‟ type of terrorist(s) not bound by moral constraint, who 
is committed to „unlimited‟ or  „maximum violence‟. Chapter Five demonstrates how the 
„terrorist‟ Other is conflated with the „migrant‟ Other, through the identification of two 
interlinked discourse strands. The first strand constructs the „globalised‟ or „open‟ society of 
the EU as an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives, which it is argued 
is an implicit construction of the „migrant‟ Other as potential terrorist threat. The second 
strand constructs a series of ever increasingly sophisticated policies, practices and measures 
aimed at the „control‟ of the „migrant‟ Other as part of a strategy designed to „protect‟ against 
further acts of terrorism, which is argued represents an explicit construction of the „migrant‟ 
Other as potential terrorist threat. Whilst Chapter Six argues that the „fight against terrorism‟ 
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discourse implicitly constructs the „Muslim‟, „Islamic‟ or „Islamist‟ Other as a potential 
terrorist threat through a focus on „violent radicalisation‟ as the main cause of terrorism in the 
post-September 11 period. Beyond an explanation of the concept of political identity and this 
process of „othering‟ there is another theoretical concept that needs to be explored: the 
process or theory of „securitisation‟.  
 
 Securitisation: The Securitisation Framework 
 
The theory of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School of security analysts and 
best represented by the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, has been acclaimed as one of 
the most prominent and influential of new approaches to international politics and the field of 
security studies.
69
 Ken Booth has described their approach as a „curious theoretical mixture of 
liberal, poststructural, and neorealist assumptions‟.70 It is a commonly used way of 
understanding how „security‟ is invoked to legitimise the use of special measures, contentious 
legislation, policies and practices that would otherwise have been deemed illegitimate.
71
 At 
this point it is important to outline some of the key elements of this theory. The main idea is 
that security is a „speech act‟. „Security‟ is not treated as an objective condition which can be 
achieved; instead analysts view it as the outcome of a specific social process. In other words, 
there are no security issues in themselves, only issues that have been constructed as security 
issues by certain actors. As Waever explains, „with the help of language theory, we can 
regard "security" as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers 
to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in 
betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security" a state- representative moves 
a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block it‟.72 So not only is the utterance of security a specific 
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type of „speech act‟, it is a discursive act that constructs an issue as an „existential‟ threat. In 
this framework, labelling something as a „security‟ issue gives it a certain sense of 
importance and urgency that legitimises the use of extraordinary measures beyond the norms 
and practices of everyday politics. 
 
However, for the Copenhagen School a successful securitisation „move‟ is dependent upon 
more than the discursive act of presenting something as an existential threat to a „referent 
object‟ of security. First, the securitising actor must have the authority to make such a claim. 
Second, the audience that is the target of the securitisation „move‟ must accept that there is an 
existential threat to that referent object of security. Given the role of the audience in 
legitimising the „speech act‟, we can say that the process of securitisation is inherently inter-
subjective. This need for representation of an issue as an existential threat to a „referent 
object‟ of security reveals that Buzan and Waever retain a traditional understanding of 
security as survival. From this perspective, the process of securitisation is defined as the 
„staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an 
issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as 
security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means‟.73 This then 
is the „traditional‟ view of the theory of securitisation. As such we can say that the focus of 
securitisation studies is „to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitises, on 
what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, 
under what conditions (i.e., what explains where securitisation is successful)‟.74 
 
An essential aspect of the securitisation framework is this idea of a „referent object‟ of 
security. In International Relations (IR) the debate that surrounds the concept of security has 
revolved around an argument that „for too long the field has been dominated by a traditional, 
state and military-centric understanding of security‟.75 This has led to the „broadening‟ and 
the „deepening‟ of the concept of security to include other „referent objects‟, such as 
individuals, communities and societies, from military as well as non-military threats. As early 
as 1983 Barry Buzan, in his book People, States and Fear, made an argument for the 
„broadening‟ of the security agenda from its traditional focus on the military sector to include 
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four new sectors of analysis: political, economic, societal and ecological.
76
 He also argued 
that the focus of discussion on security should be at three levels (the sub-state, the state and 
the international system) with the „referent object‟ of security being the state. This was 
because in his opinion „it is the state that stands at the interface between security dynamics at 
the substate level and the security dynamics operating at the level of the international 
system‟.77 Buzan‟s assertion that the individual could not provide the referent object for 
international security was challenged by Ken Booth and Steve Smith.
78
 Booth in particular 
has argued that the individual should provide the ultimate referent point for security (and not 
the state) for several reasons: not all states are in the business of security (internal and 
external); even those who are in the business represent the means and not the ends; and that 
states are too diverse in character to provide a basis for a theory of security. Martin Shaw in 
turn criticised Booth for his focus on the individual; instead arguing that it was society that 
provided the „missing dimension‟ in security studies.79 For Shaw, the state and the individual 
cannot be understood outside of a sociological context. 
 
These changes in conceptualisation of security, as well as the massive changes in the 
European security environment that occurred at the start of the 1990‟s, made it very difficult 
for Buzan to maintain his stance that the state should provide the referent object for security. 
Together with Waever, Buzan developed the notion of societal security. For the Copenhagen 
School security must now be viewed in its dual form: state security and societal security. As 
Steve Smith explains, this development was a very important one because „whereas state 
security focuses on sovereignty as the core value, societal security focused instead on 
identity, as represented in the ability of a society to maintain its traditional patterns of 
language, culture, religion, national identity and customs‟.80 For Buzan and Waever, societal 
security was seen not as a replacement for state security but as a complementary notion that 
was more in tune with the developments in the contemporary security environment. Societal 
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security therefore referred to the level of collective identities and action taken to defend such 
identities; the logic being that a threat to society only becomes a threat when the possibility of 
a breakdown of society occurs. So in relation to „state security‟ the „referent object‟ of 
security is the state; while in relation to „societal security‟ the „referent object‟ of security is 
the collective identity upon which the legitimacy of the state is derived.  
 
It has been argued thus far that in the „traditional‟ securitisation framework there is no such 
thing as a security issue in itself; only issues constructed as such by actors with the authority 
to claim that something is a threat to security, through what is called a securitising „move‟. 
By claiming that an issue is a security threat the securitising actor also claims the right to use 
„extraordinary‟ measures to deal with that issue. However, for the securitisation process to be 
successful, the relevant audience must also accept the securitising move. Central to this 
framework is the idea of a „referent object‟ of security, which whilst originally focused on the 
military sector has been expanded out to include both the idea of „state‟ and „societal 
security‟. This „traditional‟ theory of securitisation has been the subject of substantial 
criticism. 
 
Critiques of Securitisation 
 
Monica Barthwal-Datta has argued that „despite opening up the security agenda to consider 
security actors other than the state, the conditionality embedded in the securitisation 
framework around who can securitise, what constitutes a securitising move, and the need for 
a sufficient audience to accept the securitisation move for a successful securitisation to occur, 
all effectively work towards limiting the role of the securitising actor to the state‟.81 Indeed, 
Ken Booth has emphasised this point that because securitisation is discourse-centric, and 
because states dominate the discourse of threat construction, it follows that states will remain 
the referent point for analysis. He argues that the language of the Copenhagen School is a 
give away with its focus on „top leaders‟ and „threatened elites‟ but also that „these issues are 
not helped by the failure to distinguish between an agent (which is a comment about relative 
power) and a referent (which is a normative label)‟.82 For Booth, securitisation studies suffer 
from being elitist; what matters are those with the power to set agendas, to make decisions, 
whereas those without discourse-making power are disenfranchised and unable to play a role 
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in the process of securitisation. Booth argues that this top-down perspective is highlighted by 
the limited attention given to human rights in the securitisation literature and as a result this 
perspective, which is supposed to be radical, works in the interests of power because with 
power goes discourse-making potential. Its fundamental flaw is the separation of politics and 
security, with its particular focus on security as an area that will become militarised. 
 
Another substantial criticism of the work of the Copenhagen School has come from Bill 
McSweeny.
83
 He offers three main criticism of their research project. First their 
conceptualisation of society and identity is objectivist and positivist; they conceive of identity 
and society as static independent social realities as opposed to constantly evolving interlinked 
social constructs that change as a result of social processes. Secondly, as a result of their 
fixed view of society they see identity as something „real‟ that exists for any society 
(collective identity is taken as a social fact), whereas McSweeny feels that identity is 
something that must be negotiated not discovered. Third, if society is seen as embodying just 
the one value of identity then this results in a societies identity being taken as a given. Buzan 
and Waever responded to this critique, to which McSweeny offered further criticisms.
84
 Steve 
Smith explains that the core of their disagreements concern the question of whether identity 
can be understood objectively.
85
 He argues that Buzan and Waever consider their approach to 
identity to be pragmatic not objective; yet they claim that over time certain societal 
characteristics remain unchanged and over time become „socially sedimented‟ and can be 
taken as given.
86
 McSweeny fundamentally disagrees with this arguing identity can only ever 
be understood as a process, it can never be taken as given. 
 
Olav Knudsen offers another criticism of securitisation in that the subjective construction of 
threats by politicians and decision-makers, that is „threats are seen as coming mainly from the 
actors‟ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid 
political action‟,  is inappropriate in the post-Cold War era.87 This is because emphasising the 
subjective results in the discounting of an independent existence of whatever is perceived as a 
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threat. Ken Booth has supported this line of argument by stressing that a discourse-centric 
approach misses chunks of reality and is based on a fallacy that threats cannot exist outside of 
discourse.
88
 He points out that the threat of global warming to low-lying island states was a 
physical process long before the discourse of environmental security was invented by its 
proponents and listened to by its audiences. Thierry Balzacq has added his voice to this line 
of reasoning by noting that „threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually 
wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language‟.89 Alongside these 
criticisms of the „traditional‟ framework of securitisation is the question of its suitability for 
analysing processes of securitisation in (or by) the EU.  
 
Securitisation in the EU 
 
The „traditional‟ securitisation framework is not directly applicable to the EU context for a 
number of reasons. First, a securitising „move‟ by the EU institutions cannot be considered in 
exactly the same way as in a national context. This is because while the statements and 
discourses of the EU institutions may be identifiable as securitising „moves‟, the „relationship 
between that discourse and the reception, discussion, legitimation and actualization of policy 
proposals and changes is less clear‟.90 The theory of securitisation focuses heavily on 
discourse and audience which makes the statements of national political leaders and/or 
government ministers a focal point for securitisation studies. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
these statements are widely reported and discussed by the national media, affecting the 
direction of policy. However, when we consider the statements of the EU (its institutions and 
its politicians) the way in which it communicates looks rather different. As Neal explains 
these statements „are not widely reported and they are often little debated beyond a very 
narrow specialist audience‟.91  
 
Second, the lack of a clearly identifiable „European‟ audience to accept any securitising 
„move‟ by the EU is therefore problematic (from a „traditional‟ securitisation perspective). 
What this means then is that the link between a securitisation „move‟ in the EU and the inter-
subjectivity of the European public is much more uncertain than a securitisation „move‟ in a 
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89 Thierry Balzacq, „The Three Faces of Securitization‟, European Journal of International Relations 11:2 
(2005), pp. 171-202, p. 181. 
90 Neal, „Securitization and Risk at the EU Border‟, p. 336. 
91 Ibid., p. 336. 
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national context. This is because not only is it difficult to identify the key securitising actors 
in the complex institutional field of the EU but also the European polity is fragmented. Neal 
argues therefore that „Europe is not a single polity and cannot be treated as one‟. Following 
Waever, he notes that „any sense of „European‟ political identity is still to a large extent 
interpreted differently through different national contexts‟.92 For example, in the context of 
counter-terrorism policy, the Nordic states have not had the same experience of terrorism as 
Britain, Spain, Germany, Italy or France and therefore this may impact on how the threat of 
terrorism is interpreted or even the need for such a policy response. How these issues are 
perceived or represented will vary depending upon the experiences of the different national 
„audiences‟ involved. However, as Neal highlights there is no „methodological prescription 
which says the „audience‟ of security discourses must be „public‟, and in the EU context the 
„audience‟ may well be made up of bureaucrats, experts and political professionals‟.93 The 
key question then, in relation to the traditional conceptualisation of securitisation, is how do 
we identify the „audience‟ of the securitising discourses of the EU institutions, and how do 
they impact on the legitimisation of policy?  
 
Third, there is a question over the extent to which the EU has the constitutional, institutional, 
political or legal capacity to evoke or implement the use of „extraordinary measures‟, to 
„decide on the exception‟ as it were.94 Furthermore, given the nature of the EU as an 
institution whose role is to bind member states to a common set of laws, upheld by European 
courts, would it want to operate in this way? As such the complex institutional structure of 
the EU affects the suitability of securitisation theory for analysing the EU. Indeed, the 
technocratic nature of political, legal and institutional processes and structures „means that 
policy outcomes may not resemble „securitizations‟ along the lines assumed by securitization 
theory‟.95 This question over the adequacy of securitisation theory for application in this 
context necessitates a reconceptualisation of securitisation that captures more accurately this 
idea of securitisation as a process; as well as the „nuances of real security practices and 
discourses‟.96 
                                                             
92 Ibid., p. 336. 
93 Ibid., p. 337. 
94 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985), p. 5. 
95 Neal, „Securitization and Risk at the EU Border‟, p. 337. 
96 Sarah Leonard, „The „Securitization‟ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the 
Copenhagen School‟s Framework‟, Paper presented at the SGIR Sixth Pan-European International Relations 
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A reconceptualisation of the Securitisation Framework 
 
The securitisation framework, which is tied into the traditional „military-political‟ idea of 
security, is based on a limited understanding of security as survival. The problem here is that 
extending the logic of the military sector into all other sectors and „referent objects‟ (such as 
the state, society etc.) may not be appropriate; not all sectors are governed by the same 
security dynamic that characterise the military sector. The first point then is not to follow too 
closely the conceptualisation of „security‟ outlined by the Copenhagen School. The focus on 
survival is also problematic in that it constructs an artificial dichotomy between everyday 
„normal‟ politics and the emergency situation that requires the use of extraordinary measures. 
Actually the securitisation framework fails to „theorise adequately the processes by which an 
issue can move from one category to another - even though it is precisely these processes that 
the securitization framework claims to reveal‟.97 In this sense a more adequate way to 
conceptualise the process of securitisation is to think of security issues moving across a 
continuum; where at one end we have the routine and everyday „normal‟ politics and on the 
other we have the idea of „existential threats‟ and „survival‟.98 It is argued here that the „fight 
against terrorism‟ spans the whole space between the two definitions of securitisation; 
„between exceptional measures and the immediacy of action on the one hand and the ordinary 
administrative, police or insurance measures on the other‟.99 The second point then is to think 
of security measures as part of a continuum; this allows us to locate certain issues at lower 
levels of intensity rather than simply the exceptional, „extraordinary‟ level that a traditional 
conceptualisation of securitisation will allow.  
 
The final point on reconceptualising security relates to the question of non-discursive 
practices. The Copenhagen School accepts that there are instances where „security practices 
are not legitimised in public by security discourse‟, which mean that if we are to use the term 
securitisation in a comprehensive fashion the framework must take into account more than 
just the discursive act but also the impact of non-discursive practices.
100
 Whilst the focus of 
                                                             
97 Ibid., p. 12. 
98 On the idea of a security continuum see: Leonard, „The „Securitization‟ of Asylum and Migration in the 
European Union‟, p. 13; Rita Abrahamsen, „Blair‟s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear‟, Alternatives, 
30: 1 (2005), pp. 55-80, p. 59; Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, 
(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 72. 
99 Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, „Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, 
(un)Knowing the Future‟, European Journal of International Relations 13:1 (2007), pp. 89-115, see p. 98. 
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this thesis will focus primarily on the discursive level (the security discourse of a „fight 
against terrorism‟) and how the production of EU counter-terrorism policy documents is 
contributing to the securitisation of social and political life in Europe (through the discursive 
statements made in each document); there is an awareness that discursive practices cannot be 
wholly separated from non-discursive practices. The point is that there is very little about EU 
security policy, and specifically EU counter-terrorism policy (which it is argued is 
contributing to the securitisation of European social and political life) that can be defined as 
extraordinary or exceptional. As Andrew Neal explains „much of what is being done in the 
name of security is quiet, technical and unspectacular, in the EU intensely so, and just as 
much again does not declare itself to be in the name of security at all‟.101 In fact many of 
„these processes and practices are driven not simply by a logic of crisis, emergency and 
exception, but through the formation of linkages between diverse policy areas, different 
technologies and security professionals of different specializations‟.102 
 
Therefore this thesis is more inclined towards the Paris School‟s conceptualisation of 
securitisation, as outlined by Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukala.
103
 It moves away from the 
„traditional‟ idea of how the securitisation process takes places; in particular, it resists the 
idea that „international security has a specific agenda, that this agenda is about survival, and 
that security can be conceptualised as „beyond normal politics‟ and as a „politics of 
exception‟.104 In agreement with Bigo and Tsoukala, it is understood that the existential threat 
and the politics of terror is not so easy to separate from the simple threat and a more general 
feeling of unease. Instead, as they argue this process of (in)securitisation (as they call it) is 
not limited to the successful political speech act which transforms the decision-making 
process through a politics of exception and the use of extraordinary measures. It is also, 
above all, more about the „mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics, with 
Weberian routines of rationalisation, of management of numbers instead of persons, of use of 
technologies, especially the ones which allow for communication and surveillance at a 
distance through databases and the speed of exchange of information‟.105 From this 
perspective the result of the (in)securitisation process can never be assessed from the will of 
an actor, even a dominant one (such as the EU). Indeed, the actor „never knows the final 
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102 Ibid., p. 352. 
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105 Ibid., p. 5. 
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results of the move they are doing‟ because „the result depends on the field effect of the many 
actors engaged in competition for defining whose security is important, and of different 
audiences liable to accept or not that definition‟.106   
 
It is clear then that in the context of the EU the „traditional‟ framework of securitisation is 
inadequate if we are to understand the complexities of the securitisation process. For this 
reason it has been argued that the framework needs to be reconceptualised. Likewise, it 
should be noted that the aim here is not to explore how securitisation is occurring through 
non-discursive processes; nor is to argue that there is an objectively identifiable link between 
the discursive and non-discursive processes of securitisation. Instead, the aim is more modest, 
it is simply to acknowledge that the process of securitisation has multiple dimensions: that it 
occurs in more than one way. In particular, the thesis focuses on the discursive dimension of 
the securitisation process, using critical discourse analysis to reveal how (the processes by 
which) the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse securitises certain issues by discursively 
constructing them as central elements in the counter-terrorism response. So for the purpose of 
this thesis, an issue was assumed to be discursively securitised when it was reproduced within 
the EU counter-terrorism policy (or more general security policy) documents, given the 
nature of those types of policies. The next section includes a brief overview (Table 2) of the 
documents that were selected for analysis. 
 
 
5. The Documents that were analysed 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, the development and production of EU counter-terrorism 
policy was split into four discernable periods: the pre-September 11 period (November 1999 
to September 2001); the post-September 11 period (September 12, 2001 to March 11, 2001); 
the post-Madrid period (March 12, 2004 to December 2005); and the 2006 until December 
2009 period (January, 2006 to December, 2009). This was done simply for the purposes of 
analysis; in reality the boundaries between each period are relatively fluidic. However, it 
should be noted that the choice of dates for the first three periods coincides with the two main 
terrorist attacks that, for European politicians and EU policy-makers, necessitated the 
development of an EU counter-terrorism policy: the events in New York of September 11, 
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2001 and in Madrid of March 11, 2004. By dividing the formulation of EU counter-terrorism 
policy and the construction of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse in this way, it was 
possible to establish: what the main themes of the discourse were; how the discourse changed 
over the periods analysed and what themes of the discourse remained constant.  
 
In the pre-September 11 period EU internal and external security policy documents made 
little or no mention of terrorism; as such only one document (the Tampere Conclusions) was 
selected for analysis. This document was selected because of its importance in defining the 
reach of the EU‟s internal security programme; the document also provided a basis for 
establishing how the pervasive nature of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse helped to 
construct this internal security programme as a central element in the EU‟s counter-terrorism 
response, despite the fact that terrorism had until that point not been made mention of as 
reason for that programmes development. In the periods following the events of September 
11 2001, a European Council internal security, external security or counter-terrorism policy 
document was selected for analysis if it contained explicit reference to terrorism, the threat of 
terrorism or outlined EU responses to terrorism. As such, the documents selected for analysis 
represent the complete set of European Council policy documents that deal both specifically 
and indirectly with terrorism and responses to terrorism across the period from November 
1999 until December 2009. The only European Council documents excluded from the 
analysis during this period were the numerous „Counter-Terrorism Action Plans‟. These 
documents were excluded for the reason that each Action Plan was simply a way of 
categorising the policy proposals contained in each of the selected policy documents in the 
form of a table. The Action Plans were created in order for the European Council to monitor 
the implementation of each counter-terrorism proposal. Each Action Plan was meant to be 
read in conjunction with either the policy document or the report that accompanied it and 
because the purpose of the Action Plans were simply to reformulate the policy proposals 
contained in the accompanying policy document, in the form of a table, they were not 
selected for analysis. In total the European Council has released twenty documents that are 
related to counter-terrorism policy across the period analysed.    
 
The next chapter will investigate the development of this policy across the four periods 
outlined above, identifying the key European Council documents that have been central to the 
production of the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse and providing justification for their 
suitability for selection and analysis. All of the documents selected are representative of the 
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development of EU counter-terrorism policy across the period identified, and are outlined in 
the table below.  
 
Table 2.1 
 
 
Type 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Document Selected For Analysis 
 
 
Pre-September 11
th
 2001 Period 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
October 
1999 
 
Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October: Presidency 
Conclusions
107
 
 
 
Post-September 11
th
 2001 Period 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
September 
2001 
 
 
Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) 
Brussels, 20 September 2001
108
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
September  
2001 
 
 
Conclusions and plan of action of the extraordinary European Council 
Meeting on 21 September 2001
109
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
December 
2003 
 
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
110
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
December  
2003 
 
A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy
111
 
 
Post-Madrid 2004 Period 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
March 25/26 
2004 
 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism
112
 
                                                             
107 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16th October 1999, 200/1/99. 
108 Council of the European Union, Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels, 20 
September 2001, SN 3926/6/01 REV 6. 
109 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 
September 2001, SN 140/01. 
110 Council of the European Union, EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels 
10 December, 2003, 15708/03. 
111 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 
2003. 
112 European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 15 March 2004, 7906/04. 
  Chapter 2: Method and Theory 
86 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
December 
2004 
 
The Hague Programme
113
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
November 24 
2005 
 
 
The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism
114
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
November 30 
2005 
 
 
A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, 
Security and Justice
115
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
November 30 
2005 
 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy
116
 
 
Report 
 
 
December  
2005 
 
Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
117
 
 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 2006-2009 
 
Report 
 
 
May 2006 
 
 
Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
118
 
 
 
Report 
 
 
November 2006 
 
Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
119
 
 
 
Report 
 
 
November 2007 
 
Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
120
 
 
 
Report 
 
 
May 2008 
 
 
Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
121
 
 
                                                             
113 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, Brussels, 13 December 2004, 16054/04 
114 Council of the European Union, The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 
24 November, 2005, 12781/1/05 
115 Council of the European Union, A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security 
and Justice, 30 November, 2005, 14366/3/05 
116 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30 November, 2005, 
14469/4/05. 
117 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, Brussels, 12 
December 2005, 15704/05. 
118 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, Brussels, 19 May 
2006, 9589/06. 
119 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
Brussels, 15 November 2006, 15266/06. 
120 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
Brussels, 28 November 2007, 15411/1/07. 
121 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
Brussels, 26 May 2008, 9416/1/08. 
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Report 
 
 
November  
2008 
 
Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism
122
 
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
 
December  
2008 
 
 
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - 
Providing Security in a Changing World
123
 
 
 
Report 
 
 
June 2009 
 
Report on the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism
124
 
 
Report 
 
 
November  
2009 
 
EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism
125
 
 
Policy 
Document 
 
December  
2009 
 
The Stockholm Programme
126
 
 
Table 2.1 differs slightly from Table 1.1 (included at the end of Chapter One) in that Table 
1.1 provides a more general overview of the main political developments in the EU, with a 
focus on security policy and counter-terrorism policy specifically. Table 2.1 provides a 
reference point for the discursive analysis of the selected EU counter-terrorism documents 
carried out in the following chapters. In particular, Chapter Three will draw out the main 
continuities and the main changes that have occurred in the discursive construction of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse, across the period analysed and throughout the production 
of EU counter-terrorism policy. It highlights nine discourse strands (rising to ten in the post-
Madrid period) that it is argued when taken together as a whole, constitute the EU‟s „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain why the thesis focuses on the role of 
discourse in the development and production of EU counter-terrorism policy and to 
                                                             
122 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
Brussels, 19 November 2008, 15912/08. 
123 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. 
124 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism, Brussels, 2 June 2009, 9715/1/09. 
125 Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 26 November 2009,  
15358/09. 
126 Council of the European Union, „The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizen‟, Brussels 2 December 2009, 17024/09. 
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demonstrate how the policy was analysed. The chapter began by explaining why discourse 
analysis represents an approach through which to analyse EU counter-terrorism policy which 
is more attentive to often neglected issues like identity, than other approaches which focus on 
historical and legal developments or governance and implementation of that policy. The 
focus of the first section was to elaborate further on the important role of language in the 
practice of counter-terrorism policy and to develop this idea that discourse should be defined 
as a form of „social practice‟. The aim of this was to demonstrate that not only are social and 
textual processes linked but to emphasise that an investigation of the language of EU counter-
terrorism policy discourse is intrinsic to our understanding of the practice of counter-
terrorism policy. Furthermore, it helped to emphasise this idea that discourse and policy are 
mutually constitutive. 
 
The chapter then highlighted why it was appropriate for this analysis to focus solely on the 
policy documents produced by the European Council, as opposed to other sites of discursive 
production (such as the Commission, other high ranking European politicians/policy-makers, 
the media) that have contributed to the development of this distinct European discourse on 
terrorism. Although a number of reasons were explicated, the key reason for the focus on 
these documents is that in the case of the EU they represent the primary source of the 
discourse. Where appropriate the roles of these other sites of discursive production were 
considered in order to analyse the construction of the counter-terrorism policy discourse. The 
next section set out the method that was used to analyse the EU counter-terrorism policy 
documents, a method which can be best described as a form of critical discourse analysis. In 
particular, this section explained how through the use of a three step method of analysis, a 
discursive analysis of the production of EU counter-terrorism policy can reveal the 
knowledge that this discourse is built upon and allow us to reflect upon the social and 
political impact of such a discourse.  
 
The fourth section explored two theoretical concepts which underpin some of the arguments 
made in this thesis: „European political identity‟ and the process of „securitisation‟. In 
relation to the former, it began by investigating the concept of „collective identity‟. This was 
done in order to establish how the process of identity construction is assumed to occur, for 
the purpose of the analysis conducted in this thesis. It highlighted the difference between the 
approaches to the process of identity formation as taken by the most prominent social 
constructivist, Alexander Wendt, and that of the post-structuralist approach taken by Lene 
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Hansen, arguing in favour of the approach adopted by the latter. Having established the 
position from which the process of identity formation was understood to occur, the analysis 
turned to the concept of „European political identity‟. It was argued that „European political 
identity‟ should be understood as a form of identity that is constructed on the basis of shared 
political values. However, it was also argued that identity is constituted in relation to 
difference and for this reason it is important to analyse the process by which „otherness‟ is 
constructed (in this case through counter-terrorism discourse).  In relation to the concept of 
„securitisation‟, it was argued that a reconceptualisation of the process of securitisation is 
needed in order to show how securitising processes work in the EU. In particular, it was 
noted that the focus of this analysis shall remain on the discursive processes by which EU 
counter-terrorism discourse securitises certain issues. The chapter concluded by offering as a 
reference point for the following chapters, a table of the timeline of the key documents 
selected for analysis. The next chapter will focus on providing an overview of the main 
developments in EU counter-terrorism policy; it will do this with specific reference to the 
important role of discourse in the production of that policy. In particular, it will provide a 
justification for the selection of the documents that were analysed and it will identify the 
main discourse strands through which the discourse of the „fight against terrorism‟ is 
constituted.   
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Chapter 3: Constructing the Threat of Terrorism – Continuities and 
Change in the ‘Fight against Terrorism’ Discourse 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There can be little doubt that terrorism is now perceived as one of the most pervasive threats 
to the security of the EU, its member states and its citizens. Speaking in 2008, the EU‟s very 
own Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), Gilles de Kerchove, made this case through his 
argument that „terrorism remains the most significant actual threat facing democratic 
societies‟. De Kerchove went on to use a biological „life‟ metaphor, explaining that „terrorism 
is like a virus... eradicated in some places it is continuing to adapt itself to new conditions and 
draw strength from ineffective measures to control it‟.1 Yet there is a conundrum at the heart 
of this perception: the actual statistical risk of being involved in a terrorist incident, for any 
individual living in a Western democratic country, is extremely low. As Richard Jackson has 
pointed out, a study of the location and nature of terrorist attacks confirms that the actual 
threat posed by terrorism to Americans or Europeans is negligible: „in geographical terms, the 
vast majority of terrorist attacks occur in a very small number of countries – Israel, Russia, 
Colombia, Kashmir, Algeria, Afghanistan and since May 2003, Iraq‟.2 The presumption that 
terrorism represents a quite significant threat to European society is largely a result of the 
events of September 11, 2001 but also the terrorist attacks in Madrid, in March 2004 and 
London, in July 2005. In Europe, these acts have fuelled the perception that terrorism 
represents the most pressing of security concerns. However, while it may be possible to 
establish who was responsible for each incident, including the sequence of events that led to 
each separate attack, their significance is something quite different and open to interpretation. 
It is here, in the space between events and their meaning, that the words and language of 
politicians and policy-makers have come to construct a discourse on terrorism, a „reality‟ that 
at once both legitimises and normalises a series of counter-terrorism policy responses, 
irrespective of how „real‟ or „significant‟ that actual threat is.  
 
                                                             
1 Gilles de Kerchove, „EU Policy in the Fight Against Terrorism – From Formulation to Implementation‟, World 
Summit on Counter-Terrorism: Terrorism’s Global Impact, ICT‟s 8th International Conference, September 8-
11th  (2008), Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/SPEECH_FOR_HERZLIYA_CONFERENCE.pdf 
2 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 93. 
The European Union‟s „Fight against Terrorism‟  Christopher Baker-Beall 
  Loughborough University 
91 
 
The language of threat, danger and risk is one of the most prominent features of the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse. This is conveyed in several ways throughout the production of 
EU counter-terrorism policy and in particular through the frequent use of certain words or 
terms often in conjunction with one another. In the policy documents, which were examined 
in this thesis, the word „threat‟ is used over 100 times, whilst other terms such as „risk‟, 
„vulnerability‟ and „challenge‟ are used to convey the sense that European society is in 
„danger‟, under „threat‟ or at „risk‟ from terrorism. The documents speak of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ as a necessary response to the „threat of terrorism‟ persistently, often linking it to 
other highly emotive words, terms or phrases, such as the threat posed by „terrorists‟ in 
control of/or seeking to use „WMDs‟ or „CBRN materials‟. Given that this thesis focuses 
solely on official policy documents and not the speeches of leaders, prominent officials or 
policy-makers, the frequent use of such language is surprising. Yet it also suggests that these 
words, terms and phrases (this language) play an important role in the justification or 
legitimisation of the policy proposals contained within each document.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main developments in EU counter-
terrorism policy, with specific reference to examples of change and continuity within the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse. Furthermore, the overview will provide justification for 
the counter-terrorism and more general security policy documents selected for analysis, 
which it argued are representative of the main developments in the „fight against terrorism‟. 
First, the chapter focuses on the history of European cooperation on counter-terrorism policy 
to provide the context within which the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse has developed. 
Second, the chapter seeks to identify the different strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse, which will then later be analysed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. This is done 
through an historical analysis of the production of counter-terrorism policy, specifically 
focusing on the role of discourse. This task is undertaken in order to demonstrate how the EU 
has come to construct a common perception of the threat posed by terrorism.  
 
The analysis splits the production of EU counter-terrorism policy into four discernable 
periods entitled: the pre-September 11 period (the Tampere European Council Conclusions, 
November 1999 until September 11, 2001); the post-September 11 period (September 12, 
2001 until March 11, 2004); the post-Madrid period (March 12, 2004 until December 2005); 
and EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 2006-2009 (January 2006 until December 2009). As was 
explained in the previous chapter this split was only made for analytical purposes; whereas in 
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reality the boundaries of each of the periods identified are in fact fluidic (to a certain extent 
they overlap). The reason for doing this is, as stated above, to identify the main discourse 
strands that are central to the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, establishing in 
particular the continuities and the changes within the discourse. This provides a discursive 
backdrop for the analysis of the different discourse strands that will be conducted in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six. These chapters will analyse the different „strands‟ of the „fight against 
terrorism discourse in a thematic way. The chapter will now turn to a historical analysis of 
the production of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
 
The History of European Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
The founding treaties of the European Communities did not give any competences to the 
newly established institutions in the fields of justice and home affairs.
3
 Member states were 
clearly not prepared at this point to hand over sovereignty in an area of such high political 
sensitivity. It was instead another newly formed institution, the Council of Europe, which 
provided the basis for cooperation, more generally, in the field of internal security.
4
 The 
member states‟ experience of the Council of Europe, created in 1949, played a key role in the 
aim of establishing the fundamental elements of a pan-European legal and judicial space, 
with a strong emphasis on the creation of legal instruments for use in the fight against cross-
border crime.
5
 The strictly intergovernmental framework of the Council of Europe provided a 
framework in which they could work towards the establishment of a number of basic 
principles and procedures in areas relevant to internal security. There are a range of Council 
of Europe conventions that the EU considers so important to the development of its internal 
security sphere that they have been defined as part of the acquis communautaire. These 
include the European Convention on Extradition, 1957, and the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, 1977.
6
 Mitsilegas et al. note that these conventions have „become 
points of departure for the more comprehensive measures adopted by the EC member states 
                                                             
3 The European Coal and Steal Community (1951); The European Economic Community (1957). 
4 The Council of Europe is an international organisation that is distinct from the EU. It seeks to develop 
throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and 
other reference texts on the protection of individuals. 
5 See The Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5.V.1949: Article 1a sets out the Council‟s aim to „achieve 
greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideal and principles which 
are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress‟. 
6 See the European Convention on Extradition, Paris, 13.XII.1957; and the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27.1.1977.  
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or (later) by the EU‟.7 Regardless of this progress much stronger incentives were needed for 
the EC member states to move towards a greater level of cooperation. 
    
The incentives arrived during the 1970s in the form of certain transnational challenges, which 
had traditionally been perceived as purely national security problems. Thus, „historically it 
was international terrorism that emerged as the first transnational challenge, leading member 
states to engage in closer cooperation on internal security issues‟.8 The murder of 11 Israeli 
athletes by terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, combined with heightening 
tensions in the Middle East, drastically increased the perceived threat from transnational 
terrorist networks in Europe. At the same time several European countries were dealing with 
internal terrorist threats. The UK faced the threat of a major Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
bombing campaign between 1972 and 1974; in Germany the Baader-Meinhof group was 
prominent in its terrorist activities; in Italy and Spain respectively the left-wing group the Red 
Brigades and the separatist group ETA were problematic; and Breton and Corsican separatists 
provided a challenge to the French. With terrorism pushing itself to the top of the political 
agenda the member states of the EC decided that this threat could no longer be dealt with at 
purely state level.  
   
The development of the TREVI Group, 1970-1990s 
 
The emergence of „international terrorism‟ as a transnational challenge for European 
countries provided the justification for the development of the intergovernmental TREVI 
group designed to deal with issues in the area of justice and home affairs.
9
 An even weaker 
institution than the Council of Europe, and remaining outside of the EC institutional 
structure, it operated on a purely intergovernmental basis. It consisted initially of only two 
groups: TREVI I, dealing with „international terrorism‟; and TREVI II, dealing with public 
order and the training of police forces. The TREVI group had its own telex system separate 
from European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the foreign ministries, for circulation among 
interior ministries, police forces and the security services.
10
 The TREVI group initially met 
                                                             
7 Valsamis Mitsilegas, Jorg Monar and Wyn Rees, The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the 
People? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 20.  
8 Ibid., p. 22.  
9 The TREVI group was formally established by the Justice and Home Affairs ministers of the EC member 
states following a resolution on Luxembourg on 29 June 1976. 
10 Geoffrey Edwards and Christoph O. Meyer, „Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), p. 9. 
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biannually during each Council Presidency but failed to reach consensus on any of the more 
fundamental issues. Although initially set up to deal with „international terrorism‟ and to help 
facilitate cooperation amongst European governments and their police forces, other sets of 
concerns found their way onto the TREVI agenda. In the 1980s a third group was added 
(TREVI III) and set up to tackle drug trafficking and organised crime. By the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s the question of international migration had also found its way onto the 
TREVI agenda.  
 
Edwards and Meyer argue that despite the widening of the TREVI agenda and an increasing 
degree of talk on a common European judicial area, there was little advance on basic issues 
such as a common definition of terrorism, improved extradition processes, refugee or asylum 
policies.
11
 They note that differences between member states in threat perception and judicial 
systems accounted for the slow progress in establishing this common European judicial 
space. In late 1993 the TREVI group was subsumed into the K4 committee, established under 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), giving it for the first time an institutional 
basis.
12
 In the TEU, where it makes reference to terrorism, it does so as part of one „area of 
common interest‟, below asylum and immigration policy, control of external borders and 
judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, and as part of „police cooperation for the 
purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international crime‟.13 Where terrorism was mentioned, it was not considered to be 
unique or to warrant its own policy provision, it was mentioned instead as but one of a 
number of problems of common interest in justice and home affairs (JHA).  
 
An analysis of the 1995 Madrid European Council Conclusions helps to strengthen this line 
of argument. They set out some of the „challenges‟ that the EU would face in order to reach 
its goal of „ever closer union‟.14 These included a number of „internal and external 
challenges‟ which would „stem in particular from: changes in the international situation; 
economic globalization and its consequences for employment, competitiveness and job 
creation within the Union; terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime; migratory 
                                                             
11 Ibid., p. 9. 
12 John Benyon, „Policing the European Union: The Changing Basis of Cooperation on Law Enforcement‟, 
International Affairs, 70:3 (1994), pp. 497-517. 
13 The Treaty on European Union, 1992, Article K. 1. 
14 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council, 16 December 1995. 
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pressure; ecological imbalances‟.15 In the section entitled „A Union closer to its citizens‟ the 
document stated that „European citizens pay growing attention to Justice and Home Affairs‟, 
as such the EU should seek to „strengthen control‟ of its „external frontiers‟ as well as 
„ensuring better protection of the Union's citizens against international crime, in particular, 
terrorism and drug trafficking‟.16 These developments gave credence to Monica Den Boer‟s 
assertions that the work of TREVI had by now become absorbed into the „executive-driven 
Third Pillar hierarchy‟ and that „terrorism was demoted to a position amidst other internal 
security concerns, [alongside] illegal immigration and organised crime‟.17 At least in terms of 
a perception of threat „within Europe‟ at this point „the issue of terrorism had temporarily 
disappeared from the stage‟.18 
 
Constructing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 1997-onwards 
 
As we have seen above, cooperation in the field of internal security policy was very much a 
part of the European Council agenda prior to the events of September 11, 2001. The 
construction of an area of freedom, security and justice to reinforce progress in the third 
pillar, justice and home affairs, had already begun. As was also highlighted above, in the 
initial development of this policy area, counter-terrorism policy was not included, nor was the 
perceived threat of terrorism used to justify the developments that had occurred in this policy 
area prior to the events of September 11, 2001. The Amsterdam Treaty set out the objective 
of providing „citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and 
justice‟ through cooperation in police, judicial and criminal matters.19 The Treaty also stated 
that in order to meet this objective preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, 
was essential, including such misdemeanours as „terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and 
fraud‟.20 Terrorism was also mentioned once more in relation to efforts to increase judicial 
cooperation but again was identified as one of a number of problems that include „organised 
crime‟ and „drug trafficking‟.21  
                                                             
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Monica Den Boer, „9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment‟, Notre 
Europe Policy Paper, No. 6 (2003), p. 1. 
18 Ibid., p. 1. 
19 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997, p. 16. 
20 Ibid., Article K. 1, p. 16. 
21 Ibid., Article K.3 (e), p. 18. 
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It is therefore clear that the driving factor behind these developments in JHA was not 
terrorism. Instead, the policy documents released before September 11, 2001, continually 
emphasised the need to combat „organised crime‟ and better coordinate policy relating to 
„criminal matters‟ as the reason for the construction of an AFSJ. Terrorism was almost 
completely excluded from the narrative; whereas this discursive focus on „organised crime‟ 
remained central to the EU‟s internal security policy agenda. Analysing the December 1998 
Presidency Conclusion from the Vienna Council, adds further credence to this line of 
argument in that whilst they set out the plan of action to be taken to ensure the successful 
development of the ASFJ, they did not mention terrorism as a key issue in the development 
of this policy area.
22
 The document established „judicial cooperation‟, migration policy, 
„police cooperation‟ and „the fight against all important forms of organised crime‟ as 
important issue areas but terrorism was not considered a central concern to the overall 
direction of policy. It did however highlight the importance of the European Council summit 
at Tampere in terms of evaluating progress and giving guidance for further developments in 
JHA. 
 
 
The Pre-September 11 Period:  The Tampere European Council Conclusions, 
November 1999 to September 11, 2001  
 
The Tampere Conclusions, October 1999 
 
The Tampere Presidency Conclusions, from October 1999, was the first document selected 
for analysis because it provided a conceptual basis for the EU‟s internal security programme, 
with many of the measures later being adapted to form a central part of the EU‟s counter-
terrorism policy.
23
 The main aim of the Council was the creation of an „Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice‟ (AFSJ) which would provide a common European environment for 
action in the areas of policing, judicial cooperation, migration and asylum policy. The 
opening articles of the document argued that „from its very beginning European integration 
has been firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, 
democratic institutions and the rule of law…the challenge…is now to ensure that freedom, 
                                                             
22 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Vienna European Council, December 10-11th 1998, 00300/1/98 
REV. 
23 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16th October 1999, 200/1/99. 
From here on in the Tampere Conclusions will be referred to as the Tampere Programme. 
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which includes the right to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of 
security and justice accessible to all‟.24 The document set out a whole range of policy 
proposals including: a common EU asylum and migration policy; policy instruments for 
creating a genuine area of justice; a Union wide fight against crime; and recognition of an 
external dimension to these internal policies. These proposals were discursively constructed 
as essential to ensuring the aim of creating an environment of security and justice for all. It is 
interesting to note that terrorism was not mentioned in this document until article 43 and was 
highlighted only in relation to the Union‟s fight against crime; with a specific focus on the 
creation of joint investigative teams to combat human trafficking, drug trafficking and 
terrorism. Indeed, this is the only time terrorism is mentioned in the whole document. 
Terrorism at this point was little more than an afterthought for the EU both at the level of 
policy formation and at the discursive level. 
 
The Presidency Conclusions from the December 1999 Helsinki European Council help to 
confirm this line of argument.
25
 At this point the Council agenda focused on a number of 
internal policy provisions that would have a „direct impact on citizens‟. These included „the 
fight against organised crime and drugs‟ and, following on from the Tampere Programme, 
the document advocated the development of a strategy for „preventing and combating 
organised crime‟, as well as encouraging the relevant institutions to report on the 
implementation of the „European Union Drugs Strategy‟. Once again terrorism, or the 
perceived threat of terrorism, was most conspicuous by its absence. The document did not 
indicate counter-terrorism policy to be a central concern in the development of the AFSJ nor 
did it use the perceived threat of terrorism to justify the proposed developments in JHA. This 
was characteristic of the development of policy in the period before September 11, 2001. In 
this period, the EU discursively constructed „illegal immigration‟ and „organised crime‟ as 
the key policy priorities necessitating the development of an internal security programme. 
The events of September 11, 2001, had a transformative effect both on the production of 
security policy (both internal and external) necessitating (a perceived need for) the 
development of an EU counter-terrorism policy but also at the discursive level where the 
language of a „fight against terrorism‟ played a role in the justification or legitimisation of 
both counter-terrorism policy and security policies more generally. As Monica Den Boer 
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25 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10-11th 1999, 00300/1/99. 
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highlights „terrorism was resurrected with all its political salience after this date, especially 
after a meeting of the Extraordinary Council‟.26    
 
In this pre-September 11 period developments in EU internal security policy, including the 
creation of an AFSJ, were justified through a discourse which invoked the „threat‟ or 
„challenge‟ of „organised crime‟ or „illegal immigration‟ respectively, providing legitimacy 
for cooperation in the field of internal security. Terrorism was at this point not perceived to 
be a major problem and the phrase „fight against terrorism‟ had yet to enter the EU 
vocabulary. However, it is clear that during this period cooperation on internal security 
matters had been progressing at the level of policy formation; and that accompanying this 
was a discursive assertion that combating „organised crime‟ or responding to the challenge of 
„illegal immigration‟ made these developments essential. The next section identifies the key 
counter-terrorism policy documents released in the post-September 11 period, explaining 
how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse was constructed in this period.     
 
 
The Post-September 11 Period: September 12, 2001 until March 11, 2004 
 
The Extraordinary Council Meeting and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, September 2001 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, the EU met in 
the form an extraordinary session of the European Council.
27
 It was at this point that the 
phrase the „fight against terrorism‟ first entered the EU vocabulary. The conclusions of the 
meeting, on 21 September 2001, would form the basis of the EU‟s Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism. As such the next document selected for analysis was The Extraordinary Council 
Meeting, September 2001. The policy document identified terrorism as „a real challenge to 
the world and Europe‟ and used the political momentum for cooperation that had built up in 
the wake of the attacks to advance the EU‟s new found counter-terrorism agenda.28 Terrorism 
had shot to the top of the EU political agenda and was now a clear policy priority. The 
Council identified four elements that would constitute the EU‟s initial response to combating 
terrorism. First, was to encourage solidarity and cooperation with the US. Second, a 
                                                             
26 See Den Boer, „9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-Terrorism Policy‟, p. 1. 
27 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 
September 2001, SN 140/01 
28 Ibid., p. 1.  
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European policy to combat terrorism would need to be formulated. Third, the Council 
highlighted the importance of defining the EU‟s role in the world. Finally, an evaluation of 
world economic prospects would be needed. In relation to the development of a perception of 
the threat posed by terrorism, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse at this point made two 
key moves. First, it established the threat as primarily an external one, stating that any 
counter-terrorism response by the US to the New York attacks would be justified, with the 
EU supporting action „directed against States abetting, supporting or harbouring terrorists‟.29 
Second, terrorism remained ill-defined beyond its presentation as a threat to the Union‟s 
„common values‟ and its „open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies‟.30 
 
Of the four policy priorities outlined above, the development of an initial European Action 
Plan to Combat Terrorism was undoubtedly the most important. The plan identified seven 
broad measures to be adopted under five key objectives: enhancing police and judicial 
cooperation, developing international legal instruments, putting an end to the funding of 
terrorism, strengthening air security, and coordinating the European Union‟s global action. 
The headline goals were the completion of a European arrest warrant (EAW) and the 
adoption of a common definition of terrorism. In addition to this the European Council called 
upon the Justice and Home Affairs Council to „implement as quickly as possible the entire 
package of measures decided on at the European Council meeting in Tampere‟ that had been 
scheduled to be reviewed at the end of 2001.
31
 Given that terrorism had barely featured in 
either the policy documents central to the construction of AFSJ or the accompanying 
narrative of a „fight against organised crime‟, this assertion that the measures contained 
within the Tampere policy document would need to be implemented „as quickly as possible‟, 
in response to just one terrorist attack, reflected an EU predilection towards „matching pre-
existing policy proposals to new problems‟.32 
 
The JHA Council Conclusions, September 2001 
 
As Raphael Bossong has highlighted, the focus of the specialised policy-making actors in late 
2001 appeared not to be so much about the strategic dimension of combating terrorism as a 
                                                             
29 Ibid., p. 1. 
30 Ibid., p. 1. 
31 Ibid., p. 2. 
32 Raphael Bossong, „The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1 
(2008), pp. 27-48, see p. 36. 
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focus on agenda-expansion of EU counter-terrorism policy.
33
 The key step in this process was 
the extraordinary JHA Council that was held on 20 September 2001, the day before the 
extraordinary European Council met, which made significant progress on many of the 
measures that have since come to form the basis of EU counter-terrorism policy.
34
 The aim of 
the Council was to develop „the necessary measures to maintain the highest level of security 
and any other measures needed to combat terrorism‟.35 The language was quite clear; this was 
about more than just the prevention of terrorism but instead maintaining „the highest level of 
security‟. It was at this meeting that significant progress was made on the implementation of 
the EU‟s Framework Decision on Terrorism and the creation of the EAW. A whole range of 
other measures were also agreed upon, including the use of Europol and pro-Eurojust, the 
setting up of the EU Police Chiefs Task Force, improvements in intelligence cooperation, the 
development of an annual report on terrorism within the EU area the Terrorism Situations and 
Trends Report (TE-SAT), and proposals intended to disrupt terrorist funding, to name but a 
few. Beyond this there was also agreement reached on measures to be taken at EU borders. 
For example, the document constructed the strengthening of border control, through 
surveillance measures (which were provided for in the Schengen agreement) and the 
tightening of procedures for the issue of travel documents into the EU (such as visas), as 
necessary elements in the counter-terrorism response. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse at this early stage 
in the policy process was the deployment of the language of emergency. The conclusions 
from the extraordinary meeting stated that as well as needing to „implement as quickly as 
possible‟ the entire Tampere programme; a specialist anti-terrorism team within Europol 
should be „set up as soon as possible‟; a need for „all existing conventions on the fight against 
terrorism (UN, OECD etc) to be implemented as quickly as possible‟; and a call for „all 
member states to ratify as a matter of urgency the United Nations Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism‟.36 This language was also reflected in the 
Conclusions adopted by the Council (JHA) which stated that the „seriousness of recent events 
has led the Union to speed up the process of creating an area of freedom, security and 
justice‟. In particular the document emphasised the need for member states to „take all the 
                                                             
33Ibid., pp. 35-40. 
34 Council of the European Union, Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels, 20 
September 2001, SN 3926/6/01 REV 6. 
35 Ibid…Paragraph 1. 
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necessary steps‟ to ensure the Framework Decisions on both the EAW and terrorism would 
enter into force by January 1
st
 2002.  
 
Throughout the Conclusions adopted by the Council (JHA) we can identify examples where 
measures that had tenuous links to the counter-terrorism response were continually 
constructed as essential. For instance, it stated that „all measures be taken to ensure that the 
Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member 
States of the European Union is ratified as soon as possible‟; or that the „Council has decided 
to speed up the linking of the European Judicial Network's contact points to the secure 
electronic network‟.37 Throughout the construction of EU counter-terrorism policy during this 
early period, phrases such as „at the earliest opportunity‟, „speed up‟, „as soon as possible‟, 
„implement as quickly as possible‟, are commonplace and contributed to this sense of 
emergency, a perception that required the development of a coordinated response to the threat 
of terrorism including the immediate adoption and implementation of those measures deemed 
central to the counter-terrorism response. 
 
As was noted above, beyond the need to respond to the threat of terrorism exactly what this 
threat consisted of was (at this point) less well defined. Progress on the question of defining 
terrorism in the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse was established first through the EU 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002, which established a common EU legal 
definition of terrorism for the first time.
38
 Second, having established a common legal 
definition of terrorism the first policy document to offer a more comprehensive assessment of 
terrorism, identifying it as an explicit security threat, was the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), 2003.
39
 The ESS identified terrorism as one of five key threats to the security of the 
EU, the others being proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state 
failure and organised crime.  
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38 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, (2002/475/JHA), Official Journal 
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The European Security Strategy, December 2003 
 
This document contributed to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse in several important 
ways. First, it defined these threats as „new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and 
less predictable‟.40 In relation to terrorism, the document argued that it „puts lives at risk‟, „it 
imposes large costs‟, it impacts upon „the openness and tolerance of our societies‟ and that it 
„poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe‟.41 Although this strand of the 
discourse, which defines terrorism as a „new‟ and „growing‟ threat, will be analysed in 
greater detail in Chapter Four, there is an important point to be made here in relation to the 
development of policy. In conjunction with the narrative of emergency, which at this point 
stated that all new and pre-existing counter-terrorism measures needed to be implemented „as 
soon as possible‟, this strand of the discourse which constructed terrorism as a „new‟ and 
more dangerous threat, invoked through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, only served to 
exacerbate the perception that European society was under attack and so further provide 
justification for the construction of EU counter-terrorism policy. The document also 
introduced for the first time another discourse strand that was (and still is) linked to this 
perception of terrorism as a „new‟ and dangerous threat; that actual or potential terrorist are 
seeking to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter Four, this assertion plays a key role in the „othering‟ process.   
 
The second important contribution to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse was in the focus 
of the document on the „root causes‟ of terrorism. It stated that the „current wave‟ of 
terrorism was „global in scope‟ and related to „violent religious extremism‟, importantly it 
stated that this type of terrorism „arises out of complex causes‟ which include „the pressures 
of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people 
living in foreign societies‟, this type of terrorism is recognised as being „part of our own 
society‟.42 This recognition that terrorism could be „home-grown‟ not only pre-empted the 
attacks that were to follow in London, in 2005, which were considered to be an example of 
home-grown terrorism, but also provided significant policy relevance. This is because when 
we define something as „home-grown‟ terrorism a number of problems arise. In particular, it 
is almost impossible to estimate how many individuals or groups there are or how imminent 
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the threat posed by these groups or individuals is, but also because it is difficult to both 
politically and socially, differentiate potential terrorists from people with a range of radical 
views and sympathies. Crucially, it also collapses the distinction between the internal and the 
external dimensions of counter-terrorism policy, reinforcing the perception that joined up 
policy-making (policies that traverse the distinction between internal and external security) is 
both necessary and urgent. 
 
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2003 
 
Two days before the ESS was released, the European Council had released another 
document: the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2003.
43
 
The document expanded on the assumptions (made later in the ESS) that actual or potential 
terrorists were seeking to acquire and use WMD (including CBRN materials). It stated that 
„weapons of mass destruction... are a growing threat to international peace and security‟, 
whilst „the risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or fissile 
materials and their means of delivery adds a new critical dimension to this threat‟.44 The 
document articulated a fear that the proliferation of WMD might lead to „their acquisition by 
terrorist groups who could conduct actions aimed at causing large-scale death and 
destruction‟.45 It also more specifically drew attention to the threat of terrorists with 
biological weapons, stating that biological weapons „are particularly difficult to defend 
against‟ and as such „they may have particular attractions for terrorists‟. Furthermore, the 
document stated that „the possibility of WMD being used by terrorists present a direct and 
growing threat to our societies in this respect‟.46 It is clear that in the post September 11 
period, the counter-terrorism discourse made a number of clear references to the threat of 
terrorism as potentially an existential threat to European society. The next section will argue 
that this assumption, that actual or potential terrorists were (and still are) seeking to acquire 
and use WMD, is one of nine discourse strands that remain constant throughout the 
production of EU counter-terrorism policy, across the period analysed. 
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A Common Threat Perception: Continuity and Change in the ‘Fight against Terrorism’, post-
September 11  
  
It is pertinent to clarify how the EU counter-terrorism discourse, the „fight against terrorism‟, 
constructed a common European perception of the threat of terrorism in this first stage of the 
production of EU counter-terrorism policy (September 12, 2001 until March 11, 2004). At 
this point the discourse consisted of a number of themes or strands, which constituted a 
common EU perception of the threat of terrorism and how best to respond to it. The discourse 
strands identified below remain constant throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism 
policy, across the entire period analysed (agreement on Amsterdam, October 1997 until 
Stockholm, December 2009).  
 
(1) Terrorism is defined as a threat not just to the citizens of the EU but also to its 
„values‟. In particular to the „democratic, tolerant and multicultural‟ nature of EU 
society.  
(2) Terrorism is considered to be a criminal act. 
(3) Terrorism is an act perpetrated primarily by non-state actors. 
(4) The discourse identifies „the current wave of terrorism‟ as „new‟, it constructs it as 
„global in scope‟, posing „a growing strategic threat‟, „willing to use unlimited 
violence to cause massive casualties‟ and having links to „violent religious 
extremism‟. 
(5) The threat of terrorism is considered to have both an „internal security‟ and „external 
security‟ dimension; this in turn necessitates the creation of security policies that 
traverse the internal/external divide. 
(6) The „openness‟ of EU society is an environment that actual or potential terrorists seek 
to take advantage of, which in turn precipitates the need for security technologies of 
„surveillance‟ and „control‟ of EU borders.  
(7) Although there is a religious dimension to the threat posed by terrorism, the EU 
rejects any assertion that this represents a clash between the „West‟ and the „Muslim 
world‟. 
(8) Actual or potential terrorists are seeking to acquire and use WMD (including CBRN 
materials) and as such measures designed to improve „civil protection‟ and „protection 
of critical infrastructure‟ are considered to be central objectives of EU counter-
terrorism policy.  
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(9) In responding to this threat the EU must engage in or expand „judicial‟ and „police 
cooperation‟, facilitate „intelligence cooperation‟ and seek to combat „the funding of 
terrorism‟. 
 
The one real change that occurred in this first period was a move away from the language of 
emergency, a discursive trait that was a central characteristic of the first few documents 
adopted by the European Council. The documents begun to adopt a more technocratic 
language that emphasised the importance of the measures contained within the counter-
terrorism policy as a common-sense response to the threat of terrorism. Although these 
strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse remained constant, there have been instances 
of slight change or evolution throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
Indeed, certain „strands‟ of the discourse became more complex throughout this initial period. 
For example, in the pre-September 11 period, where terrorism was mentioned it was done so 
as part of a more general „fight against organised crime‟. In the post-September 11 period, the 
„fight against terrorism‟ entered the EU‟s political discourse for the first time and at this point 
in the construction of the policy discourse both the „fight against organised crime‟ and „the 
fight against terrorism‟ were separated out as individual policy priorities. It will be argued in 
the next section (as well as in greater detail in Chapter four) that throughout the evolution of 
the counter-terrorism policy these two approaches have become discursively fused with one 
another.  
 
Another important change during this period was that the EU perception of terrorism evolved 
from one that viewed terrorism, in the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, 
2001, as primarily an external security threat, to a perception that the „current wave‟ of 
terrorism was now „part of our own society‟, and therefore had important implications for 
internal security.  Finally, although both discourse strands are identified as continuities, the 
assumptions that actual or potential terrorists were (and still are) seeking to acquire and use 
WMD or CBRN materials, and that actual or potential terrorists are taking advantage of the 
EU migratory system and thus abusing the „openness‟ of European society to pursue their 
own objectives, were introduced as central to the EU perception of the terrorist threat. These 
discourse strands, in particular, have become ever more complex throughout the production 
of EU counter-terrorism policy and have played a key role in the legitimisation of a number 
of measures aimed at the objectives of providing enhanced „border security‟ and „civil 
protection‟. 
  Chapter 3: Continuities and Change in the  
  „Fight against Terrorism‟ Discourse   
106 
 
The Post-Madrid Period: March 12, 2004 until December, 2005  
 
The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004 
 
In the wake of the March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the production of counter-
terrorism policy continued apace. However, by this point there were a number of concerns 
developing amongst policy-makers over the direction in which that policy was heading. Only 
three days before the bombings in Madrid, the EU‟s foreign and security policy chief, Javier 
Solana, had finished an internal report on the EU‟s counter-terrorism efforts. The report 
identified three principle areas of concern in relation to counter-terrorism policy: member 
states were failing to implement EU agreements such as the arrest warrant; the EU was 
lacking the resources to play an effective role in combating terrorism; and coordination 
between EU officials working in the fields of law enforcement, foreign and defence policies 
was poor.
47
 Although the Madrid attacks did not directly lead to greater or quicker 
implementation of policy, they did have an effect in terms of refining the shared perception of 
threat that has provided the framework for the development of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
As such, the first document released in the aftermath of the attack, the Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism, aimed to improve policy cohesion and present a clearer unity of 
purpose. The document did this by developing the EU counter-terrorism policy in three key 
ways.  
 
As a direct result of the bombings in Madrid, the first development set out in order to tackle 
these problems was the creation of a solidarity declaration. This was intended to achieve the 
aim of enhancing the political legitimacy and cohesiveness of the EU‟s counter-terrorism 
efforts. The solidarity clause constituted a commitment by the member states to mobilise all 
the instruments at their disposal, including military resources, in order to „prevent the terrorist 
threat in the territory of one of them; protect democratic institutions and the civilian 
population from any terrorist attack; and assist a member state or acceding state in its 
territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack‟.48 The next 
development, in response to the Madrid attacks, was in the form of the establishment of the 
position of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC). The role of the Counter-Terrorism 
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Coordinator was (and remains), in conjunction with the Council Secretariat, to co-ordinate 
the work of the Council in combating terrorism, paying due regard to the responsibilities of 
the Commission, and maintaining an overview of the instruments at the disposal of the EU, 
offering regular reporting to the Council on the implementation of Council decisions. The 
CTC had no coordination role with the Commission or other EU bodies. Since its inception, 
the role of CTC has been assumed by two men Gijs de Vries (2004 to 2007) and Gilles de 
Kerchove (2007 to present). Importantly, the CTC has contributed to the evolution of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse with the release of eight reports on progress in the 
development and implementation of EU counter-terrorism policies.
49
 These documents (the 
CTC reports) have also been selected for analysis and the reason for this explained below. 
The third development was to extend and revise the anti-terrorism Action Plan that provided 
the cornerstone of the EU‟s counter-terrorism policy.50 This consisted of the reorganisation of 
the EU‟s Action Plan to Combat Terrorism around seven new strategic objectives: to deepen 
the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism; to reduce 
the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources; to maximise the capacity within 
EU bodies and member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent 
terrorist attacks; to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems 
of border control; to enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to 
deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; to address the factors which contribute to 
support for, and recruitment into, terrorism; and to target actions under EU external relations 
towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to 
combating terrorism needed to be enhanced.
51
 
 
These developments also contributed to the construction of a common EU perception of the 
terrorist threat. Importantly, the document began to reinforce a number of the dominant 
discourse strands that have been central to the development of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse. In particular, the section on „strengthening border controls and document security‟ 
helped to construct the increasingly popular idea that: actual or potential terrorists are seeking 
to abuse the „open‟ environment of the EU and take advantage of the EU asylum and 
migration regime in order to pursue their objectives. Furthermore, there was a renewed focus 
on the „consequences of any terrorist attacks‟ involving CBRN materials, which contributed 
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to the construction of another discourse strand, one which assumes that terrorists are actively 
seeking to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. Again there was reference to the 
synergies that exist between internal and external security policies, with the document stating 
that the EU must „target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries 
where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be 
enhanced‟.52    
 
The Hague Programme, December 2004 
 
At the end of 2004 the European Council adopted the Hague Programme as its new internal 
security programme designed to replace the Tampere Programme. Since the Tampere 
Council in 1999 significant progress had been made in relation to the development of the 
EU‟s policy in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The Tampere conclusions provided the 
foundations for a common asylum and immigration policy, the harmonization of border 
controls, improved police cooperation, and laid the groundwork for judicial cooperation on 
the basis of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements. However, the real 
driving force, the motor behind increased cooperation in this field, had, since the events of 
September 11, 2001, undoubtedly been the spectre of further terrorist attacks. The opening 
preamble of the document stated that:  
 
The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new 
urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 
September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly 
expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms 
and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as 
illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and 
organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof.
53
 
 
The focus on terrorism as a key justification for the need for the Hague Programme was in 
marked contrast to the arguments put forth in support of the Tampere Programme. 
Discursively the focus had shifted from problems such as „organised crime‟ or „illegal 
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immigration‟, which although still important had been downgraded, to a focus on the threat of 
terrorism. Terrorism was elevated to a central concern within the internal security 
programme, with the document stating that „a key element in the near future will be the 
prevention and suppression of terrorism‟, indeed developing a cross-border approach to 
„repress‟, „prevent‟ or „suppress‟ the threat of terrorism was mentioned several times in the 
introduction to the document.
54
 There were also a number of measures put forward under the 
section on „strengthening security‟ that dealt specifically with terrorism, a change that was in 
contrast to the Tampere Programme, which as noted previously made only passing reference 
to terrorism. The document advocated the use of „all the instruments available‟ to the EU in 
its „fight against terrorism‟, explicitly stating that with respect to the roles of the General 
Affairs and External Relations councils, „the JHA Ministers within the Council should have 
the leading role‟.55 
 
The Hague Programme marked several important changes in relation to the evolution of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse. It began to expand on and reinforce this discourse strand 
that the internal and external aspects of security policy should be considered as mutually 
constitutive. It stated that in „the field of security, the coordination and coherence between the 
internal and the external dimension has been growing in importance and needs to continue to 
be vigorously pursued‟.56 The document went on to make the argument that the EU 
considered „freedom, justice, control at the external borders, internal security and the 
prevention of terrorism‟ to „henceforth be considered indivisible within the Union as a 
whole‟.57 It also stated that it would continue to „further strengthen its efforts being directed, 
in the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice, towards the fight 
against terrorism‟.58 Beyond the claim that the security of the Union has „acquired a new 
urgency‟ there was a move away from the language of emergency, to a more all-
encompassing approach which recommended  „a clear need for adequate and timely 
implementation and evaluation of all types of measures in the area of freedom, security and 
justice‟.59  
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The document also contributed significantly to the discursive meshing of the perceived threat 
of terrorism with the need for more substantial migration and border control policies. The 
entire first section on „strengthening freedom‟ was dedicated to measures designed to 
improve border security and control the flow of migration into the EU, and although 
terrorism was not mentioned explicitly in that section, it was clear from the structure of the 
document that the perceived threat of terrorism provided an ancillary justification for further 
progress in the policy area. The second section on „strengthening security‟ provided the 
discursive link between border control and terrorism. In the context of this discourse strand, 
which constructs a threat from actual or potential terrorists that are seeking to take advantage 
of the „open‟ or „globalised‟ EU environment, the document recommended setting up „in 
conjunction with Europol and the European Border Agency a network of national experts on 
preventing and combating terrorism and on border control‟.60 
 
Another change brought about by the Hague Programme was that it was the first time a more 
general security policy document placed an emphasis on developing security policies that 
would be developed with „respect for the basic values of the European Union and 
fundamental human rights‟.61 In late 2005 the EU released three more documents within the 
space of six days including: The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, 
Security and Justice and The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, all of which have played a 
significant role in the development of a common perception of the „threat of terrorism‟.62 
These documents were selected for analysis because they marked a clear maturation point, 
post-Madrid, in the production of counter-terrorism policy and the evolution of the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse. 
 
The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, November 2005 
 
First, The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005 
provided us with a clear understanding of what the EU assumed to be the predominant type of 
terrorist threat facing the EU in the post-September 11 period and the post-Madrid period, as 
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well as the best way to respond to that threat through preventative measures.
63
 As part of the 
restructured Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, contained in the Annex to the Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism, 2004, the EU had already highlighted the need to identify and address 
„the factors which contribute to recruitment to terrorism‟. Indeed, the first time a policy 
document mentioned the phrase „radicalisation and recruitment‟ was in December 2004 in 
which The Hague Programme, 2004, stated that „the Council should, by the end of 2005, 
develop a long-term strategy to address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and 
recruitment for terrorist activities‟.64 However, the new Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment, 2005, was the first time the Council documents made 
reference to combating „radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism‟ in any great detail. 
Importantly, the policy document reiterated a discourse „strand‟ that had been (and remains) 
central to the development of the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse: the EU should 
resolve to refrain from defining the threat of terrorism as primarily a problem inherent to 
„Islam‟ or the „Arab and Muslim world‟ (or „Muslim communities‟ within Europe). In the 
present context however there is a contradiction at the heart of this narrative, one that shall be 
explored and analysed further in Chapter Six. However, to briefly summarise, this 
contradiction exists in the form of two main assumptions. First, that „terrorism perpetrated by 
Al-Qa‟ida and extremists inspired by Al-Qa‟ida has become the main terrorist threat to the 
Union‟.65 Second, that the most prescient way to tackle this form of terrorism is through the 
engagement of the „Muslim community‟ either through „empowering moderate voices‟ or 
correcting „unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims‟ within Europe. The „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse quite clearly frames the problem of terrorism in the post-
September 11 period as predominantly a problem for (or with) the „Muslim community‟ 
regardless of statements to the contrary.   
 
A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and 
Justice, November 2005 
 
Second, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, 2005, played an important role in 
the evolution of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, and in particular, it played a central 
role in the construction of the threat of terrorism as a phenomenon which made necessary the 
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development of security policies which traverse the internal/external divide. It is argued 
throughout that the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security is 
characteristic of the EU response to terrorism. The document stated, for example, that in 
order to meet the security „threats of terrorism, organised crime, corruption and drugs and the 
challenge of managing migration flows‟ the EU must „make JHA a central priority in its 
external relations‟.66 The document argued that the development of the AFSJ can only truly 
be successful „if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these issues which 
includes strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for human rights and 
international obligations‟.67 With specific reference to terrorism the document stated that  
„recent terrorist atrocities in Bali, Madrid, London, and Amman underline the fact that it is no 
longer useful to distinguish between the security of citizens inside the European Union and 
those outside, and that terrorism is increasingly international in nature‟.68 This perception of 
the threat posed by terrorism led the EU to conclude that it should pursue all elements of its 
counter-terrorism policy both „inside and outside its borders‟. As such, the threat of terrorism 
is invoked in order to legitimise the extension of JHA measures into EU external relations on 
the basis that „engaging with third countries on JHA issues‟ is essential if the EU is „to 
respond to the needs of its citizens‟.69 Indeed, the document made quite clear, that „countries 
should be aware that the nature of their relationship with the EU will be positively affected by 
their level of co-operation, given the central importance of these issues for the EU and its 
Member States‟.70  
 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, November 2005 
 
Third, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, redefined the strategic objectives of EU 
counter-terrorism policy, incorporating elements of both the Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism and the Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 
including many of the measures developed thus far, under four headings „Prevent‟, „Protect‟, 
„Pursue‟, and „Respond‟.71 Within the document we can identify a number of the continuities 
outlined above, and which are central to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. The 
introduction reiterated the strand of the discourse that not only did terrorism pose „a serious 
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threat to our security‟ but also that it represented a threat to „the values of our democratic 
societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens‟.72 There was also a reference to the 
threat coming from the „openness‟ of European society, with the statement that the EU was 
(and still is) „an area of increasing interdependence, allowing for free movement of people, 
ideas, technology and resources‟, the document constructed this  „environment‟ as one „which 
terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives‟.73 As such, the document argued that „the internal 
and external aspects of security are intimately linked‟.74 The introduction also rearticulated an 
external dimension to the „threat of terrorism‟ stating that „the current international terrorist 
threat affects and has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU‟.75 
 
Each of the strategic objectives contained within the strategy was based upon a number of 
these discourse strands, which are intrinsic to the constitution of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse. The „Prevent‟ dimension of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy essentially reproduced 
the main arguments set out in the Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism, reinforcing the framing of the threat posed by terrorism as implicitly a problem 
for (or with) the „Muslim community‟ within Europe. The language of preventing and 
„combating radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism from this point on (post-Madrid 
period) becomes a central feature of the fight against terrorism‟ discourse and is mentioned a 
number of times throughout the Counter-Terrorism Strategy; within this narrative 
„prevention‟ of terrorism is only deemed to be achievable if we tackle the factors that lead to 
„radicalisation and recruitment‟. The „Protect‟ dimension of the strategy referred to the 
objective of protecting both citizens and infrastructure from terrorist attack, yet its main 
achievement was to reinforce two of the main discourse strands that have remained constant 
throughout the construction of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. First, the document 
stated that the EU must seek „to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder 
for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU‟, rearticulating an 
assumption that actual or potential terrorists are taking advantage of the EU migration and 
asylum system.
76
 Second, the assumption that terrorists were (and still are) seeking to acquire 
and use CBRN materials was strengthened, with the document stating that the EU must 
continue to enhance measures related to civil protection, the protection of „critical 
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infrastructure‟ and the protection of „crowded places and other soft targets‟ from attack, 
through measures which include „the non-proliferation of CBRN materials and small 
arms/light weapons‟.77 The concept of „protection‟ is therefore constructed as primarily 
achievable through border security, with a specific focus on the security of critical 
infrastructure. 
 
The „Pursue‟ dimension of the strategy emphasised the need for cooperation and coordination 
of policy alongside the effective implementation of policy proposals and legislative measures. 
In particular, the „pursue‟ objective focused on developing „cooperation in law enforcement‟, 
„exchange of information and intelligence‟, „mutual recognition of judicial decisions‟, 
surveillance through the „development of new IT systems‟ and the „retention of 
telecommunications data‟ and „tackling terrorist financing‟.78 What was interesting was that 
although many of these policy proposals could be found in the more general internal security 
programmes, the Tampere Programme and Hague Programme, they were now being 
reproduced as central elements of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, with the „fight against 
terrorism‟ providing the discursive justification for their inclusion as counter-terrorism 
measures. Furthermore, the „Respond‟ dimension of the strategy focused on EU measures to 
respond to a successful terrorist attack. Interestingly, the document stated that „the response 
to an incident will often be similar whether that event is natural, technological or man-made, 
hence the response systems in place to manage the consequences of natural disasters may also 
be used to alleviate the effects on citizens in the aftermath of a terrorist attack‟. 79 Again the 
document reinforced the need for „information sharing‟ and „coordination‟ between any 
member states that may have been affected by such an incident.  
 
The one main change in the counter-terrorism discourse, which could be identified from an 
analysis of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, was at this point in its evolution the renewed 
focus on the production of counter-terrorism policies with respect for „human rights‟. Indeed, 
the document stated that the strategic objective of EU counter-terrorism policy would 
henceforth be „to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe 
safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice‟.80 
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A Common Threat Perception: Change and Continuity in the ‘Fight against Terrorism’, post-
Madrid 
 
During the post-Madrid period the production of EU counter-terrorism policy reached a clear 
maturation point; whilst the accompanying political discourse, the „fight against terrorism‟, 
continued to evolve. In particular, the nine discourse strands identified above as central to the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse remained stable across the production of counter-terrorism 
policy in the post-Madrid period. However, some of the discourse strands began to evolve 
with differing degrees of complexity. Most notably, the perception that terrorism was in the 
post-September11/post-Madrid period somehow „new‟, that it was (and still is) committed to 
causing maximum casualties and is as such more „violent‟ than other forms of terrorism was 
again reified; this was achieved during this period through the constant re-articulation of an 
assumption that terrorists were (and still are) seeking to acquire and use WMD or CBRN 
materials. This discourse strand emphasised a specific perception of the terrorist threat 
(„new‟, extreme or existential) which has played a central role in legitimising and normalising 
the measures contained within the counter-terrorism policy documents as a common-sense 
approach to counter-terrorism.  
 
There were three main changes that occurred in the evolution of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse during this period. First, whilst the EU defined terrorism as a „criminal act‟, the 
over-arching discourse(s) of a „fight against terrorism‟ and a „fight against organised crime‟ 
began to be treated as mutually constitutive policy goals. The counter-terrorism policy 
documents began to refer to „terrorism and organised crime‟ as problems that were 
synonymous with one another. This reflected the way in which the issues of „terrorism‟ and 
„organised crime‟ were treated by the EU (as just two of a number of internal security issues 
of common interest) in the pre-September 11 period. The discursive meshing of these two 
distinct areas of internal security, presented a number of problems that shall be analysed 
further in Chapter Four. The second change related to this strand of the discourse which 
emphasised that although there is a religious dimension to the threat posed by terrorism, the 
EU rejects any assertion that this represents a clash between the „West‟ and the „Muslim 
world‟. Although this assertion was repeated, the discourse began to focus primarily on 
„violent radicalisation‟ and the threat posed by „Al-Qaida and those inspired by Al-Qaida‟ as 
the main terrorist threat to the EU. In particular, the language of „radicalisation and 
recruitment‟ to terrorism and the ways in which countering this problem are articulated (e.g. 
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„engaging‟ the „Muslim community‟ to „combat terrorism‟) appeared to be in contrast to this 
stated aim of not equating Islam with terrorism. This strand of the discourse will be analysed 
in greater detail in chapter five. The third change was the introduction of a new strand of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse; the focus on „respect‟ for „human rights‟ and „fundamental 
freedoms‟ in the production of EU counter-terrorism policies. This strand of the discourse 
will be analysed in greater detail in the concluding chapter (Chapter Seven). The next section 
focuses on the main developments in EU counter-terrorism policy between January 2006 and 
December 2009.  
 
 
EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 2006-2009 
 
The Reports of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, December 2005- November 2009 
 
Since the end of 2005 there have been eight reports by the CTC on the implementation of the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism; three under the first 
CTC Gijs de Vries and five under the current CTC Gilles de Kerchove. These documents 
were selected for analysis in that although they are designed to clarify the progress of the 
implementation of the counter-terrorism measures set out in the European Council policy 
documents, they also help to chart and contribute significantly to the continued evolution of 
the different strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. As such, they have played a 
key role in the construction of an EU perception of the threat posed by terrorism and 
contributed significantly to the construction of the EU counter-terrorism discourse. Each 
report contained four main sections, all corresponding to the strategic objectives set out in the 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy: „Protect‟, „Prevent‟, „Pursue‟ and „Respond‟, with the most 
recent report including a fifth section on „International Cooperation‟. The aim of each 
document was to provide the Council with regular reports on the ongoing activities in the 
field of combating terrorism in the EU. The documents focused on many of the activities 
carried out by each of the EU institutions (in particular the Council and the Commission) and 
the member states.   
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The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, December 2008  
 
The aim of the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, was to 
set out how the EU could be „more capable‟, „more coherent‟ and „more active‟, as an 
external provider of security, in a global environment characterised by „increasingly complex 
threats and challenges‟. Whilst the focus of the document was primarily on progression of the 
implementation of the original ESS, it contributed to the discourse of a „fight against 
terrorism‟ in two significant ways. First, the claim that terrorists were (and still are) seeking 
to acquire and use WMD or CBRN materials was strengthened considerably. Of the five 
threats identified in the original European Security Strategy, 2003, as of most concern to the 
EU, proliferation of WMD was now considered the most pressing. In particular, the Report 
on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, stated that in the past 5 years 
the potential threat from terrorists acquiring WMD „has increased‟.  The document explicitly 
reiterated the fear that Europe may be targeted by terrorists in possession of „CBRN 
materials‟ and in response stated that coordination mechanisms for handling such an incident, 
such as „the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism‟, should 
be tightened. By this point in the construction of the „fight against terrorism‟, the EU counter-
terrorism policy 2006-2009 period, this strand of the discourse which assumed a „new‟ 
terrorist threat and was itself intertwined with the fear of the potential devastation that could 
be caused by terrorists in possession of WMD or CBRN materials, had assumed a prominent 
place in the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse.  
 
Second, whilst terrorism was constructed throughout the evolution of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse as a criminal act, it was in the post-September 11 period treated as a 
separate concern from the „fight against organised crime‟ (yet many of the measures 
promoted to combat both challenges were either strikingly similar or the same). Indeed, as 
noted earlier, the problems discursively invoked (as most prescient) by the EU to justify the 
creation of the Tampere Programme, 1999, and the Hague Programme, 2004, were 
„organised crime‟ and „terrorism‟ respectively. In the process of constructing the Tampere 
Programme terrorism was perceived to be a secondary concern to organised crime, yet both 
were treated as similar policy goals. Since the post-Madrid period, what has occurred is a sort 
of discursive meshing of the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ and its „fight against organised 
crime‟ such that each is now considered synonymous with the other. This is similar to how 
the EU perceived both „threats‟ in the pre-September, 11 period. The Report on the 
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Implementation of the Security Strategy, 2008, represented a completion of this process in 
that the discourse now treated „terrorism and organised crime‟ as but one of a number of 
„new‟ threats. This is hardly surprising given that many of the measures (and the 
accompanying arguments used to legitimise those measures) contained within the counter-
terrorism policy were already being advocated as part of the internal security programme 
before the events of September 11, 2001, simply finding themselves reproduced as counter-
terrorism measures thereafter. The implications of this meshing of terrorism and organised 
crime will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter (Chapter Four).  
 
The Stockholm Programme, December 2009 
 
The Stockholm Programme was the final document selected for analysis and was adopted by 
the European Council in December 2009.
81
 The purpose of the document was to set out „a 
new agenda‟ for the AFSJ, building on the contribution of the Tampere Programme and the 
Hague Programme to cooperation in the field of internal security, which would enable „the 
Union and its member states to build on the achievements and to meet future challenges‟.82 
Although the overall aim of the policy document was to set out how the EU would continue 
to contribute to the provision of security for its citizens, in a number of policy areas related to 
internal security, it also contributed to the continued evolution of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse. The document identified six main „political priorities‟ that the EU would face in 
the „years to come‟. Theses priorities included: „promoting citizenship and fundamental 
rights‟; „a Europe of law and justice‟; „a Europe that protects‟; „access to Europe in a 
globalised world‟; „a Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in migration and 
asylum matters‟; and „the role of Europe in a globalised world – the external dimension‟.83 
The first thing that we notice about these „political priorities‟ is that they are also a set of 
interrelated discourses that we finds reiterated and reflected throughout the production of 
counter-terrorism policy and security policy more generally.  
 
Terrorism was dealt with primarily under the section on „a Europe that protects‟. The 
headline policy goal of this „political priority‟ was the creation of  „an internal security 
strategy [that] should be developed in order to further improve security in the Union and thus 
                                                             
81 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Protecting the 
Citizen, Brussels 2nd December 2009, 17024/09. 
82 Ibid., p. 2. 
83 Ibid., pp. 3-5.  
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protect the lives and safety of European citizens and tackle organised crime, terrorism and 
other threats‟.84 The document envisaged the development of this „internal security strategy‟, 
that was similar in concept to the European Security Strategy (dealing with predominantly 
external threats), which would play a key role in the enhancement of action at European 
level. The document stated that the new internal strategy would be essential in protecting 
against transnational threats (which are perceived as having predominant internal dimensions) 
such as „terrorism and organised crime, drug trafficking, corruption, trafficking in human 
beings, smuggling of persons and trafficking in arms‟.85  
 
One of the more noticeable discursive traits within the document was that it frequently 
referred to the threat posed by „terrorism and organised crime‟, as well as reiterating the 
importance of the „fight against organised crime and terrorism‟. The syntactic structure of the 
document continuously placed these two problems either directly next to each other or treated 
them as problems that were synonymous with one another. As such, the perceived threat of 
„terrorism and organised crime‟ became a powerful discursive tool in the justification or 
normalisation of the policy proposals contained within the document.  The Stockholm 
Programme marked a maturation point in this discursive meshing of the two distinct 
phenomena. Importantly, the document also outlined, for the very first time, a number of 
proposals that expanded on how the EU would promote the „fundamental rights‟ of its 
citizens in relation to the measures that have been (and measures that are still to be) adopted 
(in the periods identified and) since the events of September 11, 2001 (in the field of internal 
security). This strand of the discourse, which has articulated respect for the „human rights‟ or 
„fundamental rights‟ of citizens and non-citizens alike, has been constantly reiterated 
throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy (and security policy more 
generally); yet the policy documents released to this point offered little evidence of how these 
aims would be met. As noted above, this development will be analysed in greater detail in the 
concluding chapter (Chapter Seven). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
84 Ibid., p. 4. 
85 Ibid., p. 35. 
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A Common Threat Perception: Change and Continuity in the ‘Fight against Terrorism’, EU 
Counter-Terrorism Policy January 2006- December2009 
 
During this period the European Council did not release any specific EU counter-terrorism 
documents, however the reports of the EU CTC played a key role in the continued evolution 
of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. Importantly, the EU released two new more general 
security documents, one focused on external security , the Report on the Implementation of 
the Security Strategy (or the „new‟ External Security Strategy), 2008, and one focused on 
internal security, the Stockholm Programme, 2009, each with specific sections dedicated to 
terrorism and counter-terrorism responses. There were no changes to the main discourse 
strands during this period; although the policy documents released during this period 
continued to reinforce the ten discourse strands already identified.  At this point in the 
evolution of EU counter-terrorism policy the main assumptions that underpin the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse had already been set. These different strands of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse will be analysed thematically in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was two-fold. First, it was to trace the production of EU counter-
terrorism policy and the evolution of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, in order to 
identify the main counter-terrorism policy documents that have provided the basis for the 
discourse analysis conducted in this thesis. Second, it was to identify the different themes or 
discourse strands contained within the policy documents that when taken together constitute 
the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. These different discourse strands are the focus of the 
empirical analysis that will be conducted in greater detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six. In 
particular, an argument was made that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse consists of nine 
main discourse stands (rising to ten in the post-Madrid period); all of which contribute to a 
common EU perception of the threat posed by terrorism, including how best to respond to 
that threat.  
 
Through a historical analysis of the production of EU counter-terrorism policy, which focuses 
specifically on the role of discourse, it becomes clear that the EU has constructed the threat of 
terrorism as predominantly an internal security issue; albeit with important external 
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dimensions. As such, although the threat of terrorism in the aftermath of the events of 
September 11, 2001, was initially perceived to be an external security threat, the response to 
terrorism in the EU has focused primarily on the internal dimension of security responses to 
terrorism. One reason for this can be traced back to the historical experiences of European 
governments such as France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK (the leading member states) 
which have all dealt with a number of different internal terrorist threats. As a result it was the 
interior ministers from the member states who have played a leading role in shaping both the 
production of counter-terrorism measures and the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse at the 
European level. It is worth reiterating that the Hague Programme, 2004, enshrined this 
leading role by stating clearly that „the JHA Ministers within the Council should have the 
leading role‟, in counter-terrorism matters.86  
 
However, discourses cannot be traced back to any fixed or stable source, so while the JHA 
ministers have played a key role in the construction of EU counter-terrorism policy, many of 
the strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse are simply a reflection of a number of 
pre-existing words, terms, phrases, labels and assumptions that constitute accepted 
knowledge about who is terrorist or what is terrorism. The remaining chapters shall now turn 
to an analysis of these discourse strands in order to map how this common perception of the 
threat posed by terrorism is constructed (through the different discourse strands); and to 
analyse how they make sense of the world for world for policy-makers, politicians, 
academics and others influenced by anti-terrorist or counter-terrorism discourses, as well as 
the novel interpretations they provide for understanding and explaining EU counter-terrorism 
policy. Furthermore, it will also be argued that through this process of charting and analysing 
the evolution of this discourse of insecurity, the „fight against terrorism‟, the ways in which 
the identity of the EU is constructed through its opposition to a notional „terrorist‟ Other, as 
well as the ways in which the counter-terrorism discourse discursively „securitises‟ certain 
issues, will be revealed. The next chapter will focus on three of these discourse strands. It 
will demonstrate how they contribute to a specific EU conceptualisation of terrorism and in 
particular the construction of the „terrorist‟ Other. 
 
                                                             
86 European Council, „The Hague Programme‟, p. 21. 
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Chapter 4: An EU Conceptualisation of Terrorism - Discursively 
Constructing the ‘Terrorist’ Other 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter identified nine discourse strands, within the over-arching discourse of a 
„fight against terrorism‟, which contribute to, and are simultaneously reflective of, a 
particular understanding of the nature and causes of terrorism (or knowledge about 
terrorism). The chapter focused on how these nine discourse strands have remained stable 
across the three periods analysed since the inception of EU counter-terrorism policy (the 
post-September 11 period; the post-Madrid period; and EU counter-terrorism policy 2006-
2009). Although, it was also argued that throughout the development of EU counter-terrorism 
policy, certain strands of the discourse have become more complex. This chapter takes the 
overview conducted in the previous chapter further by analysing three of these discourse 
strands in a thematic manner. This is done in order to demonstrate: how these three discourse 
strands contribute to a specific EU conceptualisation of terrorism; and how they play a central 
role in the discursive construction of the „terrorist‟ Other. It should be noted that although the 
three discourse strands analysed in this chapter are analytically separable, in reality the 
boundaries between each overlap. As such, although this chapter analyses the three discourse 
strands in a thematic manner, it should also be noted that they incorporate elements from the 
other discourse strands identified in Chapter Three. It is argued that when taken (or invoked) 
together they form a specific conceptualisation of terrorism. This conceptualisation of 
terrorism makes the discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ performative in the sense that it 
shapes the type of policy that the EU conducts in response to the perceived threat of 
terrorism.    
 
The first discourse strand is possibly the most prevalent feature of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. This strand constructs terrorism as primarily a „criminal act‟. It is 
argued that although the EU defines terrorism as crime, there are certain aspects of this 
discourse strand that go beyond the mere definition of terrorism as crime. One aspect of this 
is that since the post-Madrid period, the „fight against terrorism‟ has become blurred with 
another policy priority (and interrelated discursive formation) the „fight against serious and 
organised crime‟, a move which it is argued is problematic for a number of reasons. Another 
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aspect is that the EU counter-terrorism documents use emotive words, terms, phrases and 
labels to describe the „terrorist‟ Other, thus constructing terrorism as more than just a 
criminal act. As such this discourse strand indicates the underlying identity constructions at 
work in the evolving „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. The second discourse strand is one 
which constructs terrorism as an act that is perpetrated by non-state actors against the state 
and/or its interests. It is argued that although the EU is not a state, the EU perception of 
terrorism is state-centric. The „fight against terrorism‟ discourse therefore has a tendency to 
preclude the state from the label of „terrorist‟. Again, these discursive constructions are 
central to the „othering‟ process through which „European political identity‟ or an EU sense 
of Self is reinforced. The third discourse strand analysed in this chapter constructs the „most 
recent wave of terrorism‟ as somehow „new‟ and therefore different to „old‟ or „traditional‟ 
forms of terrorism. Linked to this is an assumption that „new‟ terrorists are seeking to acquire 
and/or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This discourse strand is based on an 
assumption that the „new‟ terrorism requires a very different type of policy response. This 
idea that terrorism is „new‟, in the context of EU counter-terrorism policy, refers specifically 
to acts of terrorism perpetrated by groups such as Al-Qaida, including groups that are 
inspired by Al-Qaida, and is identified (within the discourse) as the main threat to the EU. It 
is argued that not only is the perception that terrorism is „new‟ debateable, it rests on an 
assumption that Al-Qaida is representative of the „new‟ terrorism (and as such, is the main 
terrorist threat to the EU). 
 
A word on the structure of the chapter is in order at the outset. Each of the three discourse 
strands identified for analysis here are introduced in a thematic manner: terrorism as crime; 
terrorism as an act committed by non state-actors; and the „new‟ terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). With respect to the technique of analysis introduced in chapter 
two, the chapter proceeds by first mapping out how each discourse strand is constructed by 
identifying the key words, terms, phrases and labels (language), as well as the main 
assumptions contained within each of the texts. Second, it then thematically analyses how the 
different strands of the discourse structure the meaning, logic and policy response to 
terrorism, how the discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self against a notional „terrorist‟ 
Other and the practices which are normalised and/or legitimised by the discourse. 
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Terrorism as Crime 
 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse has 
constructed the response to terrorism as a „fight against terrorism‟, a phrase which is used to 
signify a crime and justice-based approach to counter-terrorism policy. Given that the „fight 
against terrorism‟ is the label given to the EU counter-terrorism response, it is rather 
unsurprising that the phrase „fight against terrorism‟ appears consistently throughout the 
counter-terrorism policy documents identified and across the entire period analysed. It is 
quite different from the „war on terror‟ label used by the US to describe its response to 
terrorism, which is focused primarily on an external, war-based, approach to counter-
terrorism policy. The first strand of the EU counter-terrorism discourse analysed here, which 
it is argued contributes to a specific EU conceptualisation of terrorism and the construction of 
the „terrorist‟ Other, is also one of the most prevalent features of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse. It is that which constructs an act of terrorism as primarily a criminal act. Terrorism 
in the EU is constructed both legally and politically as a criminal offence. This discourse 
strand remains constant throughout the development of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
However, it is also argued that this strand of the discourse goes beyond simply constructing 
terrorism as crime. First, there is the use of emotive words, terms and phrases to describe the 
terrorist(s), and the acts of violence they commit. It is argued that this use of emotive words 
plays a role in the discursive construction of terrorism as more than just a criminal act; it 
plays a key role in the „othering‟ process by constructing terrorism as a threat to the „values‟ 
of the EU. Second, we can identify a blurring of the distinction between organised crime and 
terrorism that has occurred with ever more frequency throughout the production of EU 
counter-terrorism policy. The next section will demonstrate how this strand of the discourse 
is constructed drawing out the main words, terms, labels and phrases from the key counter-
terrorism documents, as well as identifying the assumptions that underpin this narrative. 
 
The Discursive Construction of Terrorism as Crime through the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Policy Documents 
 
If we analyse the counter-terrorism policy texts produced by the EU we can identify 
numerous examples of the way in which the documents construct terrorism as a criminal act. 
In the post-September 11 period the Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home 
Affairs), 2001, focused on using member states „criminal laws‟ to establish a „common 
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definition of a terrorist act‟.1 The document elucidated a series of measures linked to „judicial 
cooperation‟ that constructed the „fight against terrorism‟ as primarily a criminal matter. The 
document also made reference to certain measures that would need to be taken in the „fight 
against organised crime‟. However, at this point these two „challenges‟ were invoked as 
distinct problems, which (although interrelated) would require specific policies to combat 
each threat. Similarly the Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European 
Council Meeting, 2001, also focused on „enhancing police and judicial cooperation‟ to 
combat and respond to acts of terrorism, notably through the „introduction of a European 
arrest warrant‟ and „the adoption of a common definition of terrorism‟.2 The social 
construction of terrorism as a criminal act within EU policy was reinforced by the legal 
institutionalisation of this discourse strand in the EU Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism, 2002.
3
 For example, paragraph 5 of the framework decision identified efforts 
taken by the EU to „deal with crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of 
terrorist activities against life, limb, personal freedom or property‟.4 The decision also 
identified a list of intentional acts that would be „defined as offences under national law‟ 
thereby criminalising those offences deemed to be acts of terrorism.  The European Security 
Strategy, 2003, further reinforced this discourse strand by identifying „terrorism‟ and 
„organised crime‟ as two of five interrelated „global challenges‟, or „key threats‟, that Europe 
faces in the 21
st
 century.
5
 Another clear example of the discursive construction of terrorism as 
an act of criminality could be found in the introduction to the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, 2005, which stated that „terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any 
circumstances‟.6 In particular, notice the way in which the policy documents continually refer 
to terrorism through terms such as „crime‟ or „criminal‟, including the assumption that 
terrorism is primarily a „criminal act‟. 
 
The European Security Strategy, 2003, released in the post-September 11 period, constructed 
the challenges of „terrorism‟ and „organised crime‟ as interrelated, although at this point they 
                                                             
1 Council of the European Union, Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels 20 
September 2001, SN3926/6/01 Rev6. 
2 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary Meeting on 21 September 2001, 
SN140/01. 
3 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, L 164/3 
4 Ibid., p. 1, paragraph 5. 
5 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 
2003. 
6 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30 November 2005, 
14469/4/05, p. 6. 
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remained to a certain extent separate both as policy goals and as distinct discursive 
formations. The one main change that occurred over time is that from 2004 onwards, from 
the post-Madrid period until present, the discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ became ever 
more discursively fused with the discourse of a „fight against serious and organised crime‟. 
This discursive fusing of the two approaches can be identified in a number of subsequent EU 
counter-terrorism policy texts. The Hague Programme, 2004, for example identified a need 
for a more effective, cross-border, EU approach to „terrorism and organised crime‟, as well as 
guaranteeing „fundamental rights‟ and „access to justice‟ in order to „fight organised cross-
border crime and repress the threat of terrorism‟.7 Analysing The Hague Programme we 
notice the way in which the syntactic structure of the sentences within the document 
constructed terrorism and organised crime as problems that were (and still are) synonymous 
with one another.  The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 
2008, demonstrated clearly this discursive fusing of terrorism and organised crime that has 
occurred over time.
8
 It identified „terrorism and organised crime‟ as the second most 
pervasive „global challenge‟ or „key threat‟ that was currently facing the EU. The two 
problems were by this point treated as one, with the document stating that „terrorism within 
Europe and worldwide, remains a threat to our livelihoods... Organised crime continues to 
menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside 
international fraud and money-laundering‟.9 Again, this discursive fusing of „terrorism‟ and 
„organised crime‟ can be found in the Stockholm Programme, 2009, which made reference to 
„the fight against organised crime and terrorism‟ or the „fight against terrorism and 
transnational crime‟.10 This fusing of terrorism with organised crime is representative of an 
EU assumption that the policies needed to combat one are also adequate for combating the 
other. 
 
Alongside this strand of the discourse that constructs terrorism as primarily a criminal act and 
the subsequent discursive fusing of the „fight against terrorism‟ with the „fight against serious 
and organised crime‟, we can detect another layer of complexity within the counter-terrorism 
policy discourse. This relates to the use of emotive language to describe acts of terrorism or 
                                                             
7 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 13 December 2004, 16054/04, p. 3. 
8 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a 
Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. 
9 Ibid., p. 4. 
10 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizen‟, Brussels 2 December 2009, 17024/09. 
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the terrorist(s) themselves. The use of this language plays a key role in constructing terrorism 
as something more than just a criminal act; it constructs terrorism as inimical to the values of 
European societies. Therefore it becomes an exercise in identity formation and central to the 
construction of a „European political identity‟ (Self) defined in opposition to the „terrorist‟ 
(Other). It is argued that throughout the production of the policy discourse „terrorism‟ and 
those who commit acts of terrorism are subject to a process of „othering‟. This is achieved 
through the application of language that emphasises the negative, the illegitimate and the 
inhuman nature of their actions. This is in contrast to the use of a more positive range of 
words, terms and phrases that linguistically construct a „European‟ sense of Self which stands 
in stark contrast to the „terrorist‟ Other.    
 
It is this use of language which gives credence to the argument that the discursive 
construction of „terrorism‟ goes beyond simply constructing terrorism as crime. In particular, 
this exercise in identity reinforcement or formation is achieved through the application of a 
number of emotive words, terms or phrases, which are used to describe acts of „terrorism‟ or 
the „terrorist(s)‟ themselves. In the post-September11 period, the initial set of counter-
terrorism policy documents produced by the EU, such as the Conclusions and plan of action 
of the extraordinary European Council Meeting and the European Security Strategy, 
described the „terrorist(s)‟ as „fanatical‟, „perpetrators‟, „sponsors‟, „accomplices‟, „criminal‟, 
a „threat‟, a „risk‟, „willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟ and „ever 
more dangerous‟, to name but a few of the more prominent descriptions. Acts of terrorism, 
with specific reference to the attacks in New York but also to acts of terrorism in a more 
general sense, were described in these documents as „deadly‟, „an assault‟, „a challenge to the 
conscience of each human being‟, „barbaric‟, a „scourge‟, „heinous‟, „new‟, and 
representative of „a growing strategic threat‟. Other words, terms and phrases that have 
appeared in the periods since include  „deadly‟,  „can never be justified‟, „murderous‟, 
„dangerous‟, „devastating‟, „lethal‟, „ruthless‟, „horrific‟, „violent‟, „criminal‟, „unjustifiable‟, 
„abuse‟, „distort‟, „incitement‟, „indiscriminate‟, „menace‟ and „extremist‟.  
 
It should be highlighted that the use of this emotive language has a tendency to occur and is 
more prevalent, in the policy discourse in the immediate aftermath of an attack. For example, 
in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism described 
the acts of terrorism as „outrages‟, using the phrase „callous and cowardly‟ to describe the 
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terrorists themselves.
11
 It should also be noted that in the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 2006-
2009 period, the use of emotive words, terms and phrases to describe terrorism appear in the 
counter-terrorism policy texts with less frequency. However, this does not mean that such 
language has completely disappeared from the discourse, only that the EU has become more 
restrained in the use of such language in the official policy documents. For example, the 
Stockholm Programme, released in 2009, referred to terrorists as „heinous criminals‟. The use 
of this type of emotive language remains more prevalent in the speeches of EU politicians 
and policy-makers; however, as it has been shown, this language has filtered into the policy 
documents produced by the EU. What this demonstrates then is that the meaning, logic and 
policy response to terrorism is partly dictated by events (or terrorist acts) themselves, as well 
as the temporal distance between a terrorist act(s) and the production of policy documents. 
Another explanation for why this language is more prevalent in the immediate aftermath of 
an attack relates back to the „othering‟ process. As Stuart Croft explains, when violence 
occurs and „lives are lost... both “we” and “they” may blame the other, and engage in 
absolution of responsibility‟.12 As such, the „creation and expansion of such constructions 
[Self and Other] is mostly played out in and through a crisis, and it is crises that are the 
engines of radical discursive change‟.13   
 
Therefore, one of the main continuities throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism 
policy has been that the EU and its allies are constructed in binary opposition to the 
terrorist(s). This is achieved through the use of a number of different words, terms and 
phrases that carry positive connotations; and which construct the EU as a particular type of 
community, with a number of qualities, which the „terrorist‟ Other threatens. The 
Conclusions and plan of action of the extraordinary European Council Meeting described the 
events of September 11, 2001, as an attack on „our open, democratic, tolerant and 
multicultural societies‟.14 The document assumed a need for the creation of a „global coalition 
against terrorism‟, consisting of any country ready to „defend our common values‟. Similarly, 
the European Security Strategy, 2003, described Europe today as a place that „has never been 
so prosperous, so secure nor so free‟; terrorism is presented as a dialectical threat to that 
                                                             
11 European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 15 March 2004, 7906/04, p. 1. 
12 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 1. 
13 Ibid., p. 1. 
14 European Council, „Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary Meeting‟, p. 1. 
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prosperity, that security and that freedom.
15
 Terrorism is constructed as a phenomenon that 
seeks to undermine „the openness and tolerance of our societies‟ and one that „poses a 
growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe‟16. This discursive construction of a 
„European‟ sense of Self that stands in contrast to the ideals of the terrorist(s) continued in the 
post-Madrid period. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, presented terrorism as a 
threat to the „values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our 
citizens‟.17 The text emphasised the perception that because of these values the EU has a 
particular „vulnerability to attack‟. The term „vulnerability‟ has appeared with frequency 
throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy and is used to express an 
assumption that terrorism represents both a material and an ideational threat to the EU. The 
strategic commitment outlined in the document stated that the EU shall aim „to combat 
terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its 
citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice‟.18 
 
We notice how the policy documents describe the EU as a provider of „freedom‟, „security‟ 
and „justice‟.  The documents use terms such as „supportive‟, „open‟, „democratic‟, „free‟ 
„multicultural‟, „tolerant‟, „energetic‟, „peaceful‟, „vigilant‟, „prosperous‟ and „secure‟, to 
convey this sense of identity that is challenged by the threat of terrorism. As such, they 
provide one half (the „good‟) of a binary distinction, leaving the other half (the „bad‟) implied 
and ascribed to the terrorist(s) and „others‟ who do not share the values of the in-group. 
Indeed, the discursive construction of Europe as being „vulnerable‟ to, at „risk‟ of, or a 
„target‟ for further acts of terrorism was highlighted because it draws attention to the 
important ideational role of this discourse. The material reality is that terrorism is a risk or a 
threat to Europe. However, to argue or to state that it threatens certain values such as 
„freedom‟ or „tolerance‟ is to over-emphasise the actual threat posed by terrorism. The appeal 
to „values‟ such as „democracy‟ or „justice‟, values that are central to the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse, plays an important role in legitimising or justifying the development of 
many of the measures that are presented as essential aspects of counter-terrorism policy. This 
strand of the discourse takes the discursive construction of terrorism beyond a focus on 
terrorism as crime. It is blurred with responses to organised crime and constructs terrorism as 
not just a material threat but an ideational one too, a threat that challenges the identity of the 
                                                             
15 European Council, „European Security Strategy‟, p. 2.  
16 Ibid., p. 5. 
17 Council of the European Union, „The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟, p. 2. 
18 Ibid., p. 6.  
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EU and Europe in general. The next section will analyse this strand of the discourse, focusing 
on certain assumptions about the causes and nature of terrorism which it rests upon, offering 
a critical analysis. 
 
Analysing the Discursive Construction of Terrorism as Crime 
 
By discursively constructing terrorism as crime the EU structures the meaning of terrorism, 
whilst simultaneously establishing the logic and policy response to terrorism by placing it 
(and responses to it) within the criminal justice framework. The EU discourse on terrorism 
creates a „reality‟ in which terrorists are treated as „criminals‟ and „justice‟ can be sought for 
the victims of terrorism by holding those responsible for acts of terrorism to account in a 
court of law. In contrast, the US „war on terror‟ discourse normalises a war-based narrative 
that has allowed for the legitimisation of policies that include pre-emptive military strikes, 
coercive interrogation and extraordinary rendition (supported by some EU member states, 
e.g. Britain).
19
 The discursive practice of the „war on terror‟ has enabled an environment in 
which labels, such as „enemy combatant‟, have been created and used to circumnavigate 
established legal practices. Discursive practices that legitimise or justify responses to 
terrorism such as these threaten to undermine the legal practices which are the cornerstone of 
any democracy. They also provide a challenge to the protection of human rights and respect 
for international law. By constructing terrorism as primarily a criminal act, the EU‟s „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse brings responses to terrorism into an established legal domain 
and seeks to avoid the worst excesses of those counter-terrorism responses made possible by 
the „war on terror‟ discourse. This is not to argue that the boundaries between the discourses 
do not overlap in the respective „war on terror‟ or „fight against terrorism‟, instead it is 
simply to highlight what makes each approach distinct.    
 
Whilst constructing terrorism as primarily a criminal act helps to avoid the worst excesses of 
a war-based narrative, it should be remembered that there is something unique about acts of 
terrorism that distinguish it from other criminal acts. Even at the most basic level of analysis, 
that characteristic which distinguishes terrorism from other types of crime (murder, rape, 
drug trafficking etc.) is the political dimension to the terrorist‟s behaviour. As John Horgan 
                                                             
19 See Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, „Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, 
(un)Knowing the Future‟, European Journal of International Relations, 13:1 (2007), pp. 89-115, see p. 91 and 
p. 104. 
The European Union‟s „Fight against Terrorism‟  Christopher Baker-Beall 
  Loughborough University 
131 
 
argues „generally speaking, what we think of terrorism involves the use or threat of use of 
violence as a means of attempting to achieve some sort of effect within a political context‟.20 
This assertion is one that is supported by Bruce Hoffman.
21
 He argues that the difference 
between a „criminal‟ and a „terrorist‟ is quite substantial: a criminal is not concerned with 
influencing public opinion, he/she just wants to accomplish his/her mercenary task in the 
quickly and easiest fashion in order to „enjoy the fruits of his [or her] labour‟; a terrorist by 
contrast aims to „change the system‟, a goal which the ordinary criminal could not care less 
about.
22
 As such, the application of the term terrorist should always be understood within the 
political context within which it is being used.  
 
For example, Charles Townshend points out that the difficulty in finding an appropriate 
definition of terrorism revolves around the problem of labelling, in that „terrorist‟ is a 
description that has almost never been voluntarily adopted by an individual or group.
23
 It is a 
label that is applied to them by others, first and foremost by the governments of the states 
they attack. For Townshend, this explains why „states have not been slow to brand violent 
opponents with this title, with its clear implications of inhumanity, criminality, and – perhaps 
most crucially – lack of real political support‟.24 This is an assertion supported by Michael 
Stohl who has argued that the narrative that constructs terrorism as „the activity of criminals‟ 
can also be interpreted as a myth related to the psychological explanations of terrorism, 
which is subscribed to and promoted by virtually all governments.
25
 For Stohl, the purpose of 
this myth is to deny insurgents „legitimacy‟ by placing their actions outside of the political 
process and arguing that they are actually for personal rather than political gain. This is not to 
argue that terrorism should never be defined as a criminal act; only that when governments 
define who and what is terrorist, the application of the label criminal can serve to delegitimise 
the actions of groups or individuals who are engaged in what may be acceptable or legitimate 
dissent. The application of the label „criminal‟ or „terrorist‟ (or both in conjunction) plays an 
important role in the „othering‟ process. Furthermore, we only need consider the use of terms 
such as „barbaric‟, „murderous‟, „callous‟, „cowardly‟ or „horrific‟ in relation to the terrorist 
                                                             
20 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 1. 
21 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
23 Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
24 Ibid., p. 3. 
25 Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988), pp. 11-13; Michael Stohl, „Old 
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themselves, that can be found throughout the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse, to 
realise that the production of counter-terrorism policy is neither an objective or neutral 
activity. Deconstructing this language then, it becomes apparent that the EU counter-
terrorism policy discourse is also an exercise in identity formation.  
 
Hence the description of the EU as a place of „freedom‟, „security‟ and „justice‟ in opposition 
to the „odious‟ or „heinous‟ terrorist who provides a challenge to those ideal or values. The 
effect of such language then is to give moral legitimacy to the counter-terrorism policy 
responses of the EU, while simultaneously delegitimising the actions of the terrorist(s). The 
construction of a „terrorist‟ Other which stands in direct opposition to a „European‟ sense of 
Self occurs is a central aspect of each of the discourse strands identified in chapter three, and 
which run throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy. For example, the idea 
of terrorism as a criminal act is conflated and discursively meshed with the other discourse 
strands that when taken together constitute the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. This 
narrative of terrorism as crime is thus transformed by the use of emotive words, terms and 
phrases to describe the terrorist(s) and the acts of terrorism they commit. It is also 
transformed through a blurring of the responses to terrorism with the responses to other 
threats such as „organised crime‟, a discursive practice that shall be considered briefly in the 
next section. 
 
The Blurring of Terrorism with Organised Crime 
 
As was explained above, one of the features of the strand of the discourse which constructs 
terrorism as crime is that throughout the development of EU counter-terrorism policy, there 
has been a sort of discursive meshing together of the „fight against terrorism‟ with the „fight 
against organised crime‟. Importantly, this practice (the discursive blurring of terrorism and 
organised crime) structures the meaning of terrorism and organised crime (the „terrorist‟ and 
the „organised criminal‟ are considered the same), whilst simultaneously structuring the logic 
and policy response to each challenge (both will need a similar response), as well as 
legitimising or normalising certain practices. This blurring of terrorism with organised crime 
reflects a quite substantial academic literature in support of a convergence thesis between 
organised crime and terrorism, mirrored by the idea of what is referred to in the literature as 
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the „crime-terror nexus‟.26 However, this assumption that terrorism and organised crime are 
the same, which has come to form (and still forms) a central part of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse in the post-Madrid period is contested and open to other forms of 
interpretation. 
 
Alex P. Schmid, who has written extensively on the relationship between organised crime 
and terrorism, accepts that there is some evidence of a „degree of cooperation‟ between 
certain organised crime groups and certain terrorist groups, and furthermore, that there is also 
evidence that some terrorist groups and some criminal groups have shown signs of 
metamorphosis, „degenerating into predominantly criminal-groups towards the end of their 
life-cycles‟. 27  However, he argues that it is imprudent to lump these two distinct phenomena 
together, pointing out that „there are links... but there are also important motivational and 
operational differences between terrorist groups and organised crime groups‟.28 Bovenkerk 
and Chakra support this assertion by arguing that the examples used to support this idea (of 
convergence) in the literature are often repeatedly „the same example, such as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in 
Peru, guerrilla fighters in Chechnya, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan‟.29 Furthermore they contend that „it is striking that most of them 
fail to provide a thorough empirical analysis of any of these cases and the evidence cited 
never goes much deeper than a good media account‟.30 John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler 
concede that the links between organised crime and terrorism are difficult to identify or 
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confirm; such evidence as does exist is „limited anecdotal evidence [which] largely serves as 
the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections‟.31 
 
The point of drawing attention to this area is not to dispute the assertion that terrorism or 
organised crime poses a threat to European states in their own right. The reason is to critically 
analyse the discursive fusing of the „fight against terrorism‟ with the „fight against serious 
and organised crime‟, which has become a feature of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse. It is also to draw our attention to the types of policies and practices that are 
normalised or legitimised by such a discourse. As Wyn Rees explains, it is quite possible that 
governments (including the EU which is a system of governance) will use counter-measures 
designed for one area and apply them in another; policies designed to tackle one issue may be 
introduced and justified according to quite unrelated criteria.
32
 Rees notes, as an example, 
that „there may be a significant impact upon civil liberties if new criminal measures are 
brought into effect on the grounds of fighting terrorism‟.33 In such a situation he contends that 
it will be „more difficult to maintain accountability over security policies if a mutually self-
sustaining discourse of domestic and international threats becomes deeply entrenched‟.34 
 
Summarising the Discursive Construction of Terrorism as Crime 
 
With the meshing together of all these different discourse strands, something else happens. 
The discourse becomes performative in the sense that it creates a „reality‟, which is both 
legitimised and normalised by the discourse, that provides the basis for new and ever more 
intrusive counter-terrorism policy responses, which are being developed as a direct response 
to the „new‟ threat posed by these „heinous criminals‟ (who engage in acts of terrorism). 
Whilst an approach that assumes terrorism is crime may avoid the worst excesses of a war-
based narrative, this does not mean that it is without consequence. First, it has the implicit 
effect of reifying the discourse strand, analysed in greater detail below, that terrorism is an 
act perpetrated solely by non-state actors. This strand is underpinned by an assumption that a 
state cannot be guilty of an act of criminality, as defined by the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse. Defining terrorism as a criminal act, both socially and legally, institutionalises this 
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discourse strand and reinforces the assumption that the state cannot be guilty of an act of 
terrorism. However, this discourse strand is but one of many alternative interpretations that 
are possible.  
 
Second, by constructing terrorism as more than crime, by using emotive words, terms and 
phrases to describe the terrorist(s), the discourse delegitimises the aims and the actions of the 
terrorist(s) by invoking morality. The construction of the „terrorist‟ Other as a threat to the 
„values‟ of the state (or in this case the EU) is a direct appeal to the identity of those 
perceived to be threatened and reflects a claim to the moral high ground. This discourse 
strand can be considered somewhat dubious however when we consider certain governments 
have „engaged in terrorist activities‟ and been caught not only „consorting with organised 
crime operatives but also perpetrating “political” acts that surely appear “criminal” to their 
populations‟.35 The third point relating to the performative nature of this discourse strand is 
the impact that defining terrorism as crime has when it is conflated with an assumption either 
that actual or potential terrorists are taking advantage of the EU migratory system (the threat 
of the „migrant‟ or „immigrant‟ Other), or that the current „wave‟ of terrorism is primarily a 
problem for (or with) the „Muslim community‟ (the threat of the „Muslim‟ Other). These 
ideas will be explored in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six. However, it should be 
highlighted here that when these two strands (the threat of the „migrant‟ Other/the threat of 
the „Muslim‟ Other) are invoked as part of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, the effect is 
to securitise issues regarding Islam or migration/immigration through their treatment as 
possible counter-terrorism issues. The final point to be made is that from the analysis carried 
out above (of this narrative that terrorism is crime) it becomes clear that the discourse of a 
„fight against terrorism‟ has a state-centric bias. This provides a starting point from which to 
analyse the second of these interlinked discourse stands: terrorism as an act committed solely 
by non-state actors. 
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Terrorism as an Act Committed Solely by Non-State Actors 
 
The second strand of the discourse which it is argued contributes to a specific EU 
conceptualisation of terrorism is one which constructs terrorism as primarily an act 
committed by non-state actors. As such, the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse contains a 
state-centric bias. This is because in the process of constructing terrorism as an act committed 
primarily by individuals or groups, it simultaneously denies the possibility that terrorism can 
also be an act that is committed by the state. It is one of the more obvious discourse strands 
that can be identified within the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse. This state-centric bias 
should be considered unsurprising given that much of EU counter-terrorism policy is agreed 
upon at the level of the European Council; thus it reflects the interests of the leading member 
states. It is argued in this section that this discourse strand is constructed: first, through a 
continual reference to sub-state actors as the main terrorist threat to the EU; and second, by 
denying space within the discourse for defining and analysing acts of state terrorism. The 
discourse also places an emphasis on the threat posed by state-sponsored terrorism. However, 
it only defines this form of terrorism with reference to the threat posed by those state-
sponsors who support acts of terrorism directed against the EU and its allies. Furthermore, the 
discourse also constructs those state-sponsors as „failed states‟, thus helping to „Other‟ them 
as illegitimate in the first place. There are several illustrations of how this strand of the 
discourse is constructed throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy, which 
shall be drawn out in the next section.  
 
The Discursive Construction of Terrorism as Non-State through the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Policy Documents 
 
In the post-September 11 period, the policy document outlining the Conclusions adopted by 
the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), from September 2001, referred to the importance of 
national state intelligence agencies in relation to the „fight against terrorism‟, particularly 
with regard to „disclosing possible terrorist threats and intentions of terrorists and terrorist 
groups at an early stage‟.36 The document referred to the development of „national anti-
terrorist arrangements‟, identifying lists of „terrorist organisations‟ as well as working with 
the United States to assess „the terrorist threat‟ and „in particular the identification of terrorist 
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organisations‟. The Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council 
Meeting, 2001, also contributed to the construction of this discourse „strand‟ through a 
number of similar statements. The document identified cooperation with America as a 
priority in order to identify „presumed terrorists in Europe‟ as well as the „organisations 
supporting them‟ so that a list of „terrorist organisations‟ could be drawn up.37 We can 
however identify an added layer of complexity within the policy discourse in that the 
discourse also articulated a potential threat from state-sponsored terrorism. For example, the 
document stated that „punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices‟ of the September 
11 terrorist attacks through taking action that „must be targeted and may also be directed 
against States abetting, supporting or harbouring terrorists‟.38 There is also reference to a re-
evaluation of EU relations „with third countries in the light of the support which those 
countries might give to terrorism‟; as well as the need to develop „an in-depth political 
dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into 
being‟.39 The language of the policy document quite clearly constructed state-sponsored 
terrorism as a threat to the EU and its allies, in much the same way that it individualised the 
terrorist threat and constructed it as an act that is committed by sub-state actors against the 
state.  
 
What is quite clear from analysing the EU counter-terrorism policy documents released in the 
post September 11 period is that it is the EU and its allies, most notably the US, that have 
defined the terms of the debate in relation to who or what is defined as terrorist or terrorism. 
This state-centric narrative has in turn found itself reproduced in EU law. Article 1 of the EU 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002, identified a number of intentional acts, 
defined as terrorist, that may „seriously damage a country or an international organisation‟ 
when committed with the aim of „seriously intimidating a population‟, or „unduly compelling 
a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act‟, 
or „seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or an international organisation‟.40 Given that the acts defined 
within European law by the framework decision (as „terrorist‟) are only considered to be 
„terrorist‟ acts when they are targeted against a population, a government or an international 
organisation by an individual or group suggests that the state cannot be seen as „terrorist‟. 
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The legislation constructs what constitutes a „terrorist group‟, yet what remains silent and is 
never dealt with is the concept of state terrorism. As such, it is the „terrorist‟ Other who is 
constructed as the only actor that has the potential to commit acts of terrorism; by way of 
contrast the state (or in this case the EU) is precluded from such a label. 
 
The European Security Strategy, 2003, continued to reinforce this strand of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse.41 The document stated that as a result of the geopolitical environment 
that Europe faces in the post Cold War era, whereby „open borders‟ are increasingly more 
common and globalisation is occurring apace, „these developments have also increased the 
scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs‟.42 The document emphasised 
the notion that the „most recent wave of terrorism‟ was characterised by „terrorist 
movements‟ that have been „well-resourced‟ and are „connected by electronic networks‟; it 
also focused specifically on a particular terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, noting that „logistical 
bases for Al Qaeda have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium‟.43 
Therefore the EU advocated that „concerted European action is indispensable‟ if the threat 
posed by such sub-state actors is to be tackled effectively. The document also contended that 
if sub-state terrorist groups were able to ascertain WMD then „in this event, a small group 
would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies‟.44 
The language contained within the policy discourse effectively constructed the threat posed 
by sub-state terrorist actors as the main threat to the EU and its member states but denied 
space within the discourse or refused to engage with the question of state terrorism or support 
for acts of state terrorism by EU member states. 
 
Again the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004, revealed this discourse strand once 
more wherein it stated that „the threat of terrorism affects us all... a terrorist act against one 
country concerns the international community as a whole... no country in the world can 
consider itself immune‟, the effect of such language is to once more construct terrorism as an 
act that is committed against a country or state.
45
 Throughout the entire production of EU 
counter-terrorism policy, during all the periods analysed, the language of the discourse 
changed little over time. Each policy document reinforced the previous in respect of this 
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discourse strand that terrorism is an act committed solely by non-state actors. The Strategy 
for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005 for example stated clearly 
in its opening sentence that „terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples‟ focusing on 
the threat posed by „terrorist networks‟ and sub-state terrorist actors such as Al Qaeda.46 The 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, repeated the very same sentence, that „terrorism is a 
threat to all States and to all peoples‟, in the introduction to the policy document.47  
 
However, one significant change in the discourse was identified across the periods analysed. 
In the initial policy documents, the EU was quite clear in its statements that not only were 
certain states sponsoring acts of terrorism against the EU‟s allies but state sponsors of 
terrorism would be brought to „justice‟ and „punished‟. Over time the policy discourse moves 
away from such inflammatory rhetoric, toning down the language. For example, the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy stated that because „the current international terrorist threat 
affects and has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU, co-operation with and the 
provision of assistance to priority third countries – including in North Africa, the Middle East 
and South East Asia – will be vital‟.48 The „Pursue‟ objective of the strategy contributed to 
this change by stating that „much of the terrorist threat to Europe originates outside the EU... 
assistance will be provided to priority countries to help them introduce and implement the 
necessary mechanisms to disrupt terrorism‟.49 The effect of this change in the discourse was 
to move away from accusing third countries of supporting or abetting terrorist groups or 
movements and instead to support them through cooperation and coordination of policy in 
tackling terrorism. It is possible to understand this change as a reflection on how the EU 
perceives itself as an actor. For example, as a „provider‟ of „assistance‟ and an actor 
committed to „cooperation‟ and „help‟ (not to „punish‟) in attempts by the other third 
countries to combat terrorism. Again, this analysis of language helps to reveal the processes 
by which „European political identity‟ is constructed. What remains constant is the 
implication that terrorism remains an act of violence primarily perpetrated by non-state 
groups or actors; as such, the „terrorist‟ Other is constructed as a non-state actor. Within this 
strand of the discourse, when acts of state sponsored terrorism do occur, they are assumed to 
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be supported by state actors working either directly or indirectly against the interests of the 
EU and its allies.   
 
Constructing the State as Victim 
 
What is clear from analysing the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse is that it constructs 
terrorism as an act of political violence primarily carried out by sub-state actors (individuals 
or groups) against the state. Where the official policy documents engage with the question of 
state-sponsored terrorism they do so only to convey the threat that state-sponsored terrorism 
poses to the EU and its allies. As Jackson has highlighted, the notion that states may employ 
terror as an instrument of foreign or domestic policy – state terror – is absent not just from the 
US but the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse as well.
50
 Within the counter-terrorism 
policy discourse terrorism is „understood very narrowly as referring primarily to forms of 
illegitimate violence committed by individuals and small groups, and not as a repressive form 
of governance or counterinsurgency by state actors‟.51 Furthermore, the counter-terrorism 
policy discourse constructs the threat posed by sub-state terrorist actors as, if not an 
existential threat then at the very least, an extreme threat to European society and in particular 
EU citizens.  
 
Both of these assumptions are based upon a rather narrow understanding of the nature, 
characteristics and causes of terrorism. As Jackson has argued, in the first instance the policy 
discourse ignores or fails to acknowledge the problem of state terrorism. Indeed, Jackson 
contends that if we understands terrorism as „violence directed towards or threatened against 
civilians designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons, then it can be 
argued that state terrorism is arguably a much greater security issue than dissident or nonstate 
terrorism‟.52 Without seeking to pass judgement on the policy discourse, it is possible to 
acknowledge that this narrow conceptualisation of terrorism plays a key role in constructing 
or conditioning the type of policy responses advocated for combating terrorism. Michael 
Stohl supports this proposition by arguing that while the primary purpose of terrorism, as 
practiced by those who seek to challenge governmental authority, is the production of chaos 
to accelerate social disintegration and demonstrate the inability of government to govern. He 
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states that „it remains the case that the most persistent and successful use of terror both in the 
past and the modern era has been demonstrated by governments for the purpose of creating, 
maintaining, and imposing order‟.53  
 
Morality and the De-legitimisation of the ‘Terrorist’ Other 
 
The construction of the state as the primary victim of terrorism, within the policy discourse, 
also serves to de-legitimise the actions of the „terrorist‟ Other. This can be partly explained 
by the fact that to accept under any circumstances the use of terrorism as a tactic for 
furthering political goals would challenge the state‟s monopoly on the use of violence. It 
would also challenge the sovereignty of the state through a demonstration that it can no 
longer guarantee the basic security of its citizens. This is not however the end of the matter, 
the further point being that EU counter-terrorism policy discourse places the EU and its 
member states on the moral high ground. The discourse constructs terrorism as a challenge to 
the fundamentals of the political and social order, to certain morals and principles that the EU 
is seeking to defend. As Primoratz has noted in his discussion of the ills of terrorism, it is true 
that it „challenges some of our fundamental moral beliefs and rides roughshod over some 
highly important moral distinctions. Therefore, opposition to terrorism can and indeed should 
be motivated, above all, by moral concern‟.54 However this is not the only condition required 
for holding the moral high ground; the other is moral standing. As Primoratz points out, a 
murderer would not have the moral standing to condemn murder or opine on the sanctity of 
life. Therefore „by the same token, a state which has made use of terrorism, or sponsored it, 
or condoned it, or supported governments that have done any of the above – in a word, a state 
which has itself been involved in or with terrorism to any significant degree – lacks the moral 
standing required for bona fide moral criticism of terrorism‟.55 Indeed, one reason for the 
absence of state terrorism from the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse can be explained 
by Alexander George‟s assertion that „the term „terrorism‟ has been virtually appropriated by 
mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West‟.56 „Terrorism‟ is a 
term which is never used to describe the action of Western governments or their proxies.  
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However, as Ruth Blakely has demonstrated, northern democracies have a long history of 
complicity in repression, including state terrorism, through the provision of military or 
financial support to highly repressive governments or terrorist groups. She offers numerous 
examples of instances where this has occurred. First, the US, Britain and Australia all backed 
the Indonesian government as it engaged in the widespread repression of the people of East 
Timor. Likewise, the British government allowed for British forces to make use of tactics that 
included repression and torture, in Northern Ireland, as well as providing tacit support for acts 
of Loyalist violence. Indeed, „for a long period, official British policy was to intern, without 
charge or trial, the suspected members of paramilitary groups‟.57 Thirdly, the French have 
also made extensive use of torture against large numbers of the Algerian population both in 
Algeria itself (by political forces) and in France. Blakely claims that the French justified the 
use of torture not only because the circumstances demanded it but military necessity dictated 
it. She also argues that in the context of the counter insurgency campaign, French troops 
would employ „torture not simply as a means to secure intelligence about imminent threats to 
French forces... but as an attempt to undermine the morale of the leaders and supports of the 
Algerian insurgency.‟58 
 
From the analysis above there can be little doubt that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
contains a state-centric bias. The discourse constructs terrorism as primarily an act committed 
by sub-state actors (individuals or groups) against the state and its interests. Although the EU 
counter-terrorism policy contains many references to what terrorism is considered to be, there 
is no attempt to engage with or define the concept of state-terrorism. The failure to engage 
with this issue is problematic in a sense that the EU can be left open to accusations 
surrounding its use of the term „terrorism‟. It is also possible that this continual process of 
„othering‟ provides an insight into the fact that member states know that the knowledge upon 
which their response is built is contested and open to multiple interpretation. In this sense 
discourse analysis tells us as much about the speaker as it does the spoken about.  As Duvall 
and Stohl explain, states in general (and because the policy discourse is reflective of the 
interests of the leading member states, the EU is included in this) only enact the term 
„terrorism‟ to label the repugnant and/or violent actions of designated “bad actors”, 
simultaneously they collapse conceptual boundaries by failing to refer to the term when 
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actions satisfy denotative criteria but the actors or the context of the actions do not engender 
the appropriate emotional response.
59
 Tied into this state-centric conceptualisation of 
terrorism is a third strand of the „fight against terrorism discourse, which constructs terrorism 
as „new‟ and therefore different to other „old‟ forms of terrorism. This strand is also central to 
the counter-terrorism discourse; as such, its importance in the construction of an EU 
conceptualisation of terrorism will now be considered. 
 
 
The ‘New’ Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 
The third strand of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which contributes to a specific EU 
conceptualisation of terrorism and the construction of the „terrorist‟ Other, is that which 
assumes the „current wave‟ of terrorism to be somehow „new‟ and different to „old‟ forms of 
terrorism. The EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is replete with words, terms, phrases 
and labels such as „new‟, „violent radicalisation‟, „weapons of mass destruction‟ (WMD), or 
„chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials‟ (CNRN). This strand of the 
discourse is also underpinned by another assumption which conflates these different ideas: 
the „new‟ terrorist(s) are seeking to acquire and/or use WMD or CBRN materials. 
Furthermore, the idea of a „new‟ terrorism in the post-September 11 period is also tied into 
other strands of the discourse; in particular, it is assumed to have a religious dimension. The 
next section will demonstrate how this strand of the discourse has been constructed 
throughout the development of EU counter-terrorism policy, drawing out the key words, 
terms, phrases, labels and assumptions (knowledge about terrorism) that it is built upon. 
 
The Discursive Construction of Terrorism as ‘New’ through the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Policy Documents 
 
Although the first two counter-terrorism policy documents released in the aftermath of the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Conclusion adopted by the Council (Justice and Home 
Affairs) and the Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council 
Meeting, identified the possibility of further major terrorist incidents they did not discursively 
construct terrorism as something that was fundamentally „new‟. The first instance in which 
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the EU explicitly revealed that its response to terrorism was influenced by the „new‟ terrorism 
thesis, a thesis which is prevalent within the academic literature of terrorism studies, was in 
the European Security Strategy, 2003.
60
 The document constructed „the most recent wave‟ of 
terrorism as a fundamentally „new‟ phenomenon through a series of statements on the nature 
of the threat that is posed by the „new‟ terrorists. Whilst traditional forms of military conflict, 
defined as „large-scale aggression‟ against any of the member states, was seen as 
„improbable‟, it was argued that „Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less-
visible and less predictable‟.61 The document identified terrorism, weapons of mass-
destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime as the most prevalent of these 
„new‟ threats, of which terrorism was interpreted as the most pervasive.   
 
It stated that „increasingly, terrorist movements are well resourced, connected by electronic 
networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟.62 The threat 
of this „new‟ terrorism was portrayed as „global in scope‟, posing „a growing strategic threat‟ 
and having links to „violent religious extremism‟. The „new‟ terrorism was described as 
„dynamic‟; it was argued that „left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more 
dangerous‟.63 The document also linked this „new‟ form of terrorism to the threat posed by 
WMD. It stated that „we are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period‟ in which a 
proliferation of these weapons may occur‟, and furthermore „the most frightening scenario is 
one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction‟.64 Indeed, the document 
linked all of the five aforementioned threats together through a specific statement that 
revealed the assumption, an assumption of „newness‟, which drives the development of EU 
counter-terrorism policy. It stated that „taking these different elements together – terrorism 
committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised 
crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be 
confronted with a very radical threat indeed‟.65  
 
Central to the „new‟ terrorism thesis is the assumption, articulated within the European 
Security Strategy itself, that the „new‟ terrorists are predominantly inspired by „violent 
religious extremism‟. The Hague Programme, 2004, identified for the first time the need for a 
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policy response to this „new‟ form of terrorism in the guise of a „long-term strategy to address 
the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist activities‟.66 Whilst 
the question of religion and terrorism within the EU counter-terrorism documents will be 
dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Six, there is a need to highlight the way in which the 
interpretation of the threat posed by „violent religious extremism‟ was used to support the 
assumption that the threat of terrorism in the present context was somehow „new‟ and more 
„dangerous‟.  The assumption here then was that the religious extremism of the „terrorist‟ 
Other freed them from any valid motivational constraints. The religiosity of the „new‟ 
terrorism means that the „new‟ terrorist(s) see their struggle as one of „good‟ against „evil‟, 
thus allowing for a process whereby the „new‟ terrorist is able to dehumanise their victim, 
making indiscriminate violence not only morally acceptable but a necessary and righteous 
obligation. They are seen as being driven by millenarian aims. The EU focus on the specific 
threat represented by terrorist groups influenced by religious doctrine is reflected in the 
statement contained within the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism that although „Europe has experienced different types of terrorism in its history... 
the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qaida and extremists inspired by Al-Qaida has become the 
main terrorist threat to the Union‟.67 The „new‟ terrorism, the threat of Al-Qaida and „violent 
religious extremism‟ are within the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse mutually 
constitutive. 
 
Similarly to the use of the prefix „new‟ to describe the „most recent wave‟ of terrorism, the 
use of terminology surrounding weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as the perceived 
threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials (CBRN), did not enter 
the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse immediately. It should be noted that in the post-
September 11 period, the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002, 
specifically identified the „manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of 
weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, 
and development of, biological and chemical weapons‟ as a terrorist act. However, it was not 
until the end of 2003 when the first European Security Strategy (12 December) and the EU 
Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (10 December) were released, 
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that the conflation of the threat of terrorism with the threat of WMD occurred.
68
 For example, 
the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction stated quite clearly 
that in relation to the proliferation of WMD, „the risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, 
biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery adds a new critical 
dimension to this threat‟.69 Subsequent policy documents released in the post-Madrid period 
have only served to reify this link between the „new‟ terrorism and WMD, reinforcing the 
assumption of a possible threat posed by terrorists in control of/or seeking to acquire WMD.  
 
In the post-Madrid period, the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse began to focus more 
closely on the possibility of terrorist attacks involving CBRN materials. Article 11 of the 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism which outlined „measures to protect transport and 
population‟, focused on the need for „further action... to strengthen capacity within Member 
States to alleviate the consequences of attacks on the civilian population, including in the 
areas of health security and civil protection, building on existing EU Health and Security and 
CBRN programmes‟.70  Objective 5 of the Revised Plan of Action for combating terrorism 
stated that the EU must work to „ensure the full implementation of the EU Health Security 
and CBRN programmes‟.71 This assumption that potential or actual terrorists were (and still 
are) seeking to gain access to and would be willing to use CBRN weapons against the 
„civilian population‟ of the EU gained ever more traction throughout the development of EU 
counter-terrorism policy. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy reinforced this assumption 
through a number of statements on the threat posed by WMD.
72
 The „Protect‟ objective of the 
strategy identified the need for an international commitment to working „with partners and 
international organisations on transport security, and non-proliferation of CBRN materials 
and small arms/light weapons‟ in order to protect against the perceived likelihood of use of 
such materials in future terrorist attacks.
73
 The „Pursue‟ objective of the strategy highlighted 
one of the key priorities of counter-terrorism policy as being the need to „tackle terrorist 
access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for home-made explosives to 
CBRN material‟.74  
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The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, continued to 
emphasise the perceived threat posed by the „new‟ terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.75 
It stated that „terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within 
our own societies‟.76 Whereas in the original European Security Strategy terrorism was 
identified as the main threat to the EU and proliferation of WMD was identified as the second 
most prevalent threat, the positions were reversed in the new strategy, demonstrating how 
central WMD and control of WMD had become not only to counter-terrorism policy but 
security policy in general. The document stated that in relation to WMD „proliferation by 
both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as “potentially the greatest threat to EU 
security”. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework 
under pressure‟.77 The language contained within the document not only reinforced the 
assumption of a link between terrorism and WMD but constructed the threat posed by these 
interlinked „global challenges‟ as ever increasing. Whilst non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was identified within the document as the most important objective, the assumption 
that potential or actual terrorist were (and still are) seeking to acquire and use WMD remains 
as a key discursive construct identifiable within the text of the document. It stated that whilst 
the EU has done much to „protect our societies against terrorism‟, this should not stop the EU 
from tightening „co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in 
particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism material, on the basis of 
such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection 
Mechanism‟.78  
 
It was explained in the previous chapter that the reports of the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator (CTC) have played an important role in the evolution of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. All eight of the reports released by the CTC have contributed to the 
reinforcement of this perceived link between terrorism and WMD, in terms of an assumption 
that terrorists are seeking to acquire and use WMD. To take but one example, the report from 
November 2008, on the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism 
speaks of adopting proposals that address „chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
risks‟, „bio-preparedness‟ and the prevention of and response to „CBRN threats and risks 
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under an all-hazards approach, while giving priority to the terrorist threat‟.79 The document 
continually referred to „Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risks‟ as well as a 
need to address the „prevention, detection and response to, biological, radio-nuclear and 
chemical threats‟ through the development of a „CBRN Task Force‟, which could help the 
Commission to „develop a policy on CBRN‟ and work towards the „identification of good 
practices and recommendations on response to CBRN incidents and security of CBRN 
substances‟.80 Indeed, the much vaunted EU phrase to describe the EU response to terrorism, 
„the fight against terrorism‟, was appropriated and modified within the document wherein it 
focused on a „fight against radiological and nuclear terrorism at the European level‟.81   
 
Finally, the causes of the „new‟ terrorism were related to a number of factors both internal 
and external to European society that it was argued could lead to individuals becoming 
involved (the phrase used is „easily radicalised‟) in terrorism. The EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, 2005, identified a number of factors that it suggested are not generally present but 
may exist within certain segments of the population, including „poor or autocratic 
governance; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; lack of political or economic prospects and 
of educational opportunities‟. The document stated that in order to counter this, „outside the 
Union we must promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as 
well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict revolution‟.82 The 
implication of this narrative is quite clear: internally, certain segments of the population 
facing discrimination and poor economic prospects are more susceptible to the allure of 
terrorist activity; and externally, that weak and failing states represent a possible terrorist 
threat to the EU through the hospitable environment that they provide for terrorist 
organisations. 
 
Challenging the ‘New’ Terrorism 
 
This narrative that the world is confronted with a „new‟ form of terrorism, a form of terrorism 
without historical antecedent and representing a complete break from terrorism of the past, 
has been produced and reproduced by a triumvirate comprised of politicians and policy-
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makers, academics and the media.
83
 This narrative has not only found itself articulated within 
the EU counter-terrorism policy, it is the main driving force behind the subsequent 
development of a number of the EU counter-terrorism policy responses. Indeed one of the 
key assumptions contained within the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse is that „the 
current wave of terrorism‟ is „new‟, it is „global in scope‟, it poses „a growing strategic 
threat‟, it is „willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟ and has links to 
„violent religious extremism‟, therefore making it fundamentally different to other forms of 
terrorism that have occurred throughout history.
84
  
 
The formulation of this „new‟ terrorism thesis presupposes that much of the pre-existing 
research into the „old‟ forms of terrorism should be considered irrelevant, obsolete, 
anachronistic, and even harmful to the aim of preventing terrorism, that „the old paradigms 
should be discarded and replaced with a new reframed understanding‟.85 For example Ian O. 
Lesser suggests that the „new‟ terrorism, with its potential for destruction, its commitment to 
the acquisition and use of CBRN materials, its increased lethality, „renders much previous 
analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete, and complicates the task of 
intelligence-gathering and counter-terrorism‟.86 Martha Crenshaw argues, on the contrary, 
that the claims made by the „new‟ terrorism thesis needs to be systematically examined rather 
than taken as self-evident. Crenshaw contends that the departure from the past is not quite as 
pronounced as many accounts make it out to be and that today‟s terrorism is not a 
fundamentally or qualitatively „new‟ phenomenon but is instead grounded in an evolving 
historical context.
87
 Instead it can be argued that contemporary terrorism shares many of the 
characteristics of the terrorism of the past, dating back to the nineteenth century, and as such 
the „new‟ terrorism thesis is based on an „insufficient knowledge of history and [a] 
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misinterpretation of contemporary terrorism‟.88 Crenshaw argues not that there has been no 
change to terrorism but that these changes need to be precisely identified and that they are not 
necessarily attributable to religious motivations. As such, the articulation of a „new‟ threat 
environment is as much about competing readings of contemporary history as it is about the 
need to provide security.  
 
Crenshaw speculates that one reason for the development of the „new‟ terrorism thesis is that 
it supports the case for major policy change: it represents „a justification for a war on 
terrorism [or in the case of the EU a „fight against terrorism‟], a strategy of military 
preemption, and homeland security measures that restrict civil liberties. It is a way of 
defining the threat so as to mobilise both public and elite support for costly responses with 
long-term and uncertain pay-offs‟.89 The articulation within the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse of the possible threat posed by terrorists in possession of CBRN materials, 
contributes to a perception that the threat posed by the „current wave of terrorism‟ is at the 
very least an extreme, if not existential, threat to the EU. Again by constantly reproducing 
and reinforcing this discourse strand the EU provides legitimacy for many of the other 
measures contained in the EU counter-terrorism policy. The constant reproduction of this 
narrative also contributes to a normalisation or acceptance of the gravity of this threat 
amongst policy-makers and politicians even though there is little evidence to support such a 
perception. 
 
As such a consequence of the „new‟ terrorism thesis is that it helps to structure the meaning, 
logic and policy response to the threat of terrorism in the post-September 11 period. Not only 
has it helped to legitimise many of the new counter-terrorism measures that have been 
developed in the EU since September 11, 2001; in effect it also works to prevent the 
emergence of alternative counter-terrorism responses, such as policy reform and dialogue 
with terrorist groups. This is because the „new‟ terrorism narrative constructs the „new‟ 
terrorists as groups or individuals who are: irrational „violent religious extremists‟; seeking to 
commit massive and indiscriminate violence; seeking to acquire and use WMD or CBRN 
materials; or whose ideology prevents the possibility of engaging in such dialogue. As 
Jackson points out one potential outcome of discursively constructing terrorist(s) as religious 
fanatics who cannot be reasoned with, is to automatically rule out entering into dialogue with 
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such groups about the source of their grievances. While it is true that the EU counter-
terrorism policy advances a number of measures designed to prevent terrorism, at no point 
does it advocate engagement or dialogue with terrorist groups, leaving one to conclude, as 
does Jackson, that „such options appear nonsensical and unreasonable within the discursive 
confines of the moral absolutism of the discourse‟.90Furthermore, it can also be understood in 
terms of identity construction; with the EU representing the „rational‟ Self, in opposition to 
the „irrational terrorist‟ Other. 
 
This assumption that the „new‟ terrorists are seeking to acquire and use WMD or CBRN 
materials seems misplaced. The fear that terrorists might seek to use CBRN materials gained 
momentum with the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway as well as a 
result of the Oklahoma City bombing and these examples are often cited as demonstrative of 
the link between the „new‟ terrorism and WMDs.91 Spencer argues that „the possible use of 
WMDs as a characteristic of new terrorism is debateable‟ noting for example the limited use 
of chemical weapons by groups representative of the „old‟ more traditional forms of 
terrorism.
92
 Crenshaw supports this line of argument highlighting that the Aum Shinrikyo 
attack on the Tokyo subway remains the only example of the deliberate use of chemical 
weapons against a civilian population. She also points out that „terrorists have not used 
nuclear or radiological weapons despite official concern over the prospect since at least 
1976‟.93 This assumption that terrorists are seeking to acquire and use WMD or CBRN 
materials is based not only on a lack of evidence but also a limited amount of empirical 
studies; like the discourse strand that is based on an assumption that organised crime and 
terrorism are intertwined, this discourse strand is based on a limited number of examples that 
are constantly cited as evidence of its truth. 
 
Indeed, the focus of the EU counter-terrorism policy on the possible terrorist threat 
represented by weak and failing states is also contestable for the same reasons. Stewart 
Patrick has argued that policy-makers and experts have presumed a blanket connection 
between weak governance and transnational threats such as terrorism, leading to the 
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development of new initiatives designed to combat that threat.
94
  He notes that it is „striking, 
however, how little empirical evidence underpins these sweeping assertions and policy 
developments... they have rarely distinguished among categories of weak and failing states or 
asked whether (and how) certain types of developing countries are associated with particular 
threats.‟95 For Patrick it appears that too often anecdotal evidence or individual examples, 
such as the success of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, influence an entire range of Western policies. 
It may be true that weak states do nurture such threats but the connection is far from 
universal. There is also an inherent „othering‟ process at work here, the assumption that other 
states are „weak‟ or „failing‟ and that they are as such more amenable to terrorist groups (or 
individuals) helps to construct an Other against which a „European‟ sense of Self is 
reinforced. Furthermore, the self-representation of the EU as a „promoter‟ of „good 
governance‟ and/or „human-rights‟ plays a powerful role in legitimising EU intervention and 
development assistance in third countries. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse conceptualises terrorism and construct the „terrorist‟ Other. It has been argued that 
this is achieved through three interlinked discourse strands that run throughout the historical 
production of EU counter-terrorism policy. These discourse strands can be understood as 
continuities within the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse; although they all evolve with 
varying degrees of complexity. It is a main contention of this thesis that the conceptualisation 
of terrorism revealed here shapes or influences the EU counter-terrorism response. These 
three strands of the discourse construct terrorism: first, as a criminal act; second, as an act 
committed primarily by non-state actors (the state is the primary victim, never the 
perpetrator); and third, in the post-September 11 period, as „new‟ and different to „old‟ forms 
of terrorism. It has been argued that they also tie into other discourse strands, including: 
terrorism as a threat to the „values‟ (identity) of the EU; and the fear that actual or potential 
terrorists are seeking to acquire and/or use WMDs. With respect to the technique of analysis 
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identified in Chapter Two, this method of analysis allows us to map how these different 
discourse strands have been constructed. 
First, it was argued that not only does the discourse construct terrorism as crime; the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse constructs terrorism as something more than crime. The 
discourse does this in two ways: it blurs the distinction between terrorism and organised 
crime; and it contains emotive language, including a number of different words, terms, 
phrases and labels which are used to describe the „terrorist‟ Other and the acts of terrorism 
they commit. As such, the discourse shapes or influences the meaning, logic and policy 
responses to terrorism. In the first instance the blurring of organised crime and terrorism (and 
responses to both these problems) means that measures designed for one area may be applied 
in another; this in turn may have significant impact upon civil liberties. In the second 
instance, while the use of emotive language plays a powerful role in delegitimising the aims 
or the actions of the terrorist(s), it may also obscure what is in some instances legitimate 
political protest. This ties into the second argument made in this chapter, which is that the EU 
counter-terrorism policy discourse has a state-centric bias. The analysis revealed that this 
discourse strand is constructed through a continual reference to sub-state actors as the main 
terrorist threat to the EU and by denying space within the discourse for defining and 
analysing acts of state terrorism. As such, „the terrorist‟ Other is always constructed as a non-
state actor. As well as this, the discourse also places an emphasis on the threat posed by state-
sponsored terrorism. However, it only defines this form of terrorism with reference to the 
threat posed by those state-sponsors who support acts of terrorism directed against the EU 
and its allies. Furthermore, the discourse also constructs those state-sponsors as „failed 
states‟, which also plays a role in the „othering‟ process by drawing attention to their 
legitimacy.  
 
Third, it was argued that discourse is based on an assumption that the „current wave‟ of 
terrorism is somehow „new‟ and different to „old‟ forms of terrorism. The method used here 
allowed us to identify the different words, terms, phrases and labels, such as „new‟, „violent 
radicalisation‟, „weapons of mass destruction‟ (WMD), or „chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear materials‟ (CNRN), that are central to this discourse strand. It was also argued that 
this strand of the discourse is underpinned by another assumption which conflates these 
different ideas: the „new‟ terrorist(s) are seeking to acquire and/or use WMD or CBRN 
materials against the EU, its member states and/or its citizens. In particular, the focus on 
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terrorism as „new‟ helps to structure the meaning of terrorism in the post-September 11 
period, as well as the logic and appropriate policy response required to combat that type of 
terrorism. Finally, the analysis also hinted at an argument that will be made in the Chapters 
Five and Six. When responses to terrorism become discursively meshed with other issues, 
such as immigration and Islam in Europe, a number of problems arise. It will be argued that 
the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse has contributed to the construction of a condition of 
perceived insecurity within Europe. This is in part an effect of the construction of immigrant 
or Muslim communities (the threat of the „immigrant‟/„Muslim‟ Other) as a potential or 
actual source of the terrorist threat, through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. This in 
turn has led to the securitisation of issues that surround immigration and/or Islam through 
their treatment as part of the counter-terrorism response. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
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Chapter 5: Constructing the ‘Migrant’ Other, Globalisation, Securitisation 
and Control 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will engage in an investigation of how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
constructs issues regarding migration and border control as central to the EU counter-
terrorism response. In particular, it will focus on how the discourse constructs the „migrant 
other‟; a social construct which is then conflated with the perceived terrorist threat. The 
chapter does this through the identification and analysis of two strands that are prevalent 
within the counter-terrorism policy discourse: terrorism and the threat posed by a „globalised‟ 
or „open‟ society; and a discourse of „surveillance‟ and „control‟. 
 
The first of these strands constructs the „migrant‟ Other as a threat to the „globalised‟ or 
„open‟ society of the EU by conflating migration with terrorism. The chapter proceeds by 
mapping how this discourse strand is constructed; it draws out the key words, terms, phrases 
and labels (knowledge) that it is based upon. Through this process of analysis the chapter 
then reveals the assumptions that underpin this discourse strand. In particular, it is argued that 
there are two main assumptions that are central to this strand of the discourse. The first is that 
potential or actual terrorists are able to take advantage of the environment provided by a 
„globalised‟ or „open‟ society, such as that of the EU, in order to achieve their objectives. The 
second is based on the conceptualisation of terrorism outlined in the previous chapter. As was 
explained in Chapters Three and Four, in the post-September 11 period, terrorism is assumed 
to be somehow „new‟ or different to „old‟ terrorism‟. This has led to the construction of the 
„terrorist‟ Other as an individual (or group) committed to „maximum violence‟. In turn the 
acts of terrorism they commit are constructed as „new‟ forms of terrorism which are 
„indiscriminate‟ and target „innocent‟ individuals with the aim of causing „massive 
casualties‟. These two assumptions taken together construct a specific type of terrorist threat: 
a „new‟ terrorist, committed to „maximum violence‟, who takes advantage of the EU 
migratory system to carry out acts of terrorism in an „open‟ or „globalised‟ society. This 
strand of the discourse provide the rationality for the subsequent development of a number of 
EU counter-terrorism policies that focus on the control of EU borders, though restriction or 
  Chapter 5: Constructing the „Migrant‟ Other, 
  Globalisation, Securitisation and Control 
 
156 
 
denial of entry to the EU area, and the exclusion of those deemed a threat to the EU and its 
citizens.  
 
The chapter seeks to demonstrate how the policy documents make sense of the social reality 
of terrorism. It is argued that this discourse strand has the implicit effect of constructing the 
„migrant‟ Other as a potential or actual terrorist threat, whilst simultaneously conflating 
issues regarding migration and border control with issues that surround the response to the 
perceived threat of terrorism. The chapter also highlights how the notion that terrorism 
represents an extreme or existential threat to European society is constructed, analysing the 
language contained within the policy documents. It also argues that there is a relationship 
between the language contained within the discourse and the construction of „European 
political identity‟, explaining that  at a deeper ontological level, the conflation of the 
perceived threat of terrorism with the „migrant‟ Other leads inexorably to the negation of the 
„migrant‟ Other and his/her construction as a security threat. 
 
The second strand explicitly links migration and asylum policy to counter-terrorism policy 
through the construction of a discourse of control. The EU counter-terrorism policy 
documents continually advocate the use of ever increasingly sophisticated policies, practices 
and measures aimed at the control of the „migrant‟ Other as part of a strategy designed to 
„protect‟ against further acts of terrorism. Whilst it is true that the question of migration had 
before pre-September 11 period, occupied a central place on the agenda of EU member states 
in the development of a common internal security policy; the events of September 11, 2001, 
reinforced a perception that migration control should form a central part of EU security 
policy and had a far reaching impact on the framing of the debate over migration (and 
immigration) in the EU. 
   
This section begins by mapping how this strand of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, 
which emphasises „control‟ of the „migrant other‟, is constructed throughout the production 
of EU counter-terrorism policy, before engaging in a contextual analysis of the discourse 
strand. The analysis seeks to demonstrate how this assumption, that the EU migratory system 
is being abused by potential or actual terrorists, is constructed. It then explains how this 
discourse of control is changing how the EU conceptualises „freedom‟. The chapter then turns 
to the question of whether the EU migratory system is being securitised through the 
discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism policy. This analysis supports the wide-
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spread perception of many commentators on EU policy in this area that the discursive linking 
of terrorism to migration, which occurred in the wake of those events, is representative of a 
trend that was already underway: the securitisation of EU migration policy.
1
 In particular it is 
argued that this has been achieved in two interlinked ways. First, through the articulation of a 
security discourse that emphasises the migrant „other‟ as a potential terrorist threat; second, 
through non-discursive practices such as the extensive application of instruments of 
migration control, instruments which have been constructed as essential tools in the „fight 
against terrorism‟.2 The chapter concludes by arguing that this discourse of control is 
continually evolving and that there is a biopolitical dimension to the securitisation of 
migration within the EU. The next section shall focus on how the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse conflates the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by an „open‟ or „globalised‟ 
society.  
 
 
Terrorism and the Threat Posed by a ‘Globalised’ or ‘Open’ Society 
 
At the outset of the analysis of this particular strand of the discourse, it is important to explain 
that the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse does not construct the „migrant‟ Other as a 
potential terrorist threat in explicit way; for example, through the direct linkage of the 
concept of „terrorism‟ with the terms „migrant‟, „migration‟, „immigrant‟, „immigration‟, 
„asylum-seeker‟ or „refugee‟. Instead, the perceived threat of the „migrant other‟ is articulated 
in a more subtle way: it is expressed first through a number of implicit references to the 
problems associated with a „globalised‟ or „open society‟; and second, it is achieved through 
a focus on the need for „border control‟ and the „surveillance‟ of border crossers. This first 
section will focus on the way in which the „migrant‟ Other has been implicitly constructed as 
a potential terrorist threat. Having analysed the security documents produced by the European 
Council (across the period 1997-2009) it is striking how many references there are that 
                                                             
1Jef Huysmans, „Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of “Securitizing” Societal Issues‟ in Miles, R. and D., 
Thränhardt (eds.) Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, (London: 
Pinter, 1995), pp. 53-72; Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and the Securitization of Migration‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 38:5 (2000), pp. 751-777; Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration 
and Asylum in the EU, (London: Routledge, 2006); Georgios Karyotis, „European Migration Policy in the 
Aftermath of September 11 :The security-migration nexus‟, Innovation: The European Journal of Social 
Science Research, 20:1 (March 2007), pp. 1-17; Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, „The Securitisation of 
Migration in Western Societies‟, Alternatives, 27 (2002), pp. 21-39. 
2 Migration control consists of numerous policies that are designed to exclude irregular migrants and other 
unwanted foreign nationals through restrictions on entry, border controls, detention and deportation. 
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explicitly link the threat posed by „terrorism‟ to the problems associated with a „globalised‟ 
or „open‟ society. However, in the pre-September 11 period, other security problems were 
initially discursively constructed as central to this strand of the discourse.   
 
Before the events of September 11, 2001, the construction of the „migrant‟ Other, as a 
potential threat to European society and therefore European identity, was a central theme of 
the EU‟s internal security policy.3 The Tampere Conclusions, 1999, which set out the policy 
priorities that would be central to the completion of the EU‟s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), argued that „European integration... [is] rooted in... a shared commitment to 
freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law‟, as well as 
„common values‟, „securing peace‟ and „developing prosperity‟.4 With specific reference to 
migration, the document stated that the very existence of the EU „acts as a draw to many 
others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom union citizens take for granted‟ and it 
would therefore go against European traditions „to deny such freedoms to those whose 
circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our territory‟.5  The document described 
the main aim of the Tampere Conclusions as „an open and secure European Union, fully 
committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human 
rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity‟.6 
However the syntactic ordering of sentences implied that this aim of „openness‟, „openness‟ 
being a characteristic of European society itself, also represented a significant risk to the 
security of the EU and its citizens. As was explained in Chapter Three, the semantic structure 
of the European Council policy documents produced in the pre-September 11 period, focused 
primarily on the threat posed by „serious organised and transnational crime‟ and the challenge 
represented by „illegal immigration‟, as interlinked „internal‟ and „external‟ security problems 
for the EU. In this period it was the perceived threat of „transnational crime‟ and the 
challenge posed by „illegal immigration‟ (and not terrorism) that played a significant role in 
the reinforcement of this strand of the discourse, which constructed the „openness‟ of 
                                                             
3 It should be noted here that the concept of European identity is extremely ambiguous and that assuming 
European identity equals European society is not unproblematic. The point here then is that in the discursive 
construction of EU counter-terrorism policy, the construction of a terrorist threat to society that is interlinked 
with the constructed threat of the „migrant‟ Other plays a role in the constant reconstruction of „European 
political identity‟.  
4 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15th and 16th October 1999, 200/1/99, 
paragraph 1. 
5 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
6 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
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European society as representing a significant challenge to the EU and its developing role in 
the provision of security for its citizens.   
 
The discursive construction of the „openness‟ of European society as a potential security 
threat was strengthened in the period following the events of September 11, 2001. However, 
it was no longer the threat of crime or the problem of immigration that was invoked to 
support this idea that the „openness‟ of the EU area was problematic; instead it was the threat 
of terrorism. The Extraordinary Council Meeting of the European Council, on September 21, 
2001, defined the attacks as „an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural 
societies‟ and as such a „challenge to the conscience of every human being‟.7 The EU 
promised to „cooperate with the United States in bringing to justice and punishing the 
perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts‟ whilst simultaneously 
respecting „the fundamental freedoms which form the basis of our civilization‟.8 The 
introduction and use of terms such as „civilization‟ and „barbaric‟ (to describe the EU and the 
terrorists respectively) are particularly interesting given their socio-cultural origins. In this 
initial phase the attacks were construed as an attack on all countries with those similar values 
of openness, democracy, tolerance and respect for all cultures. The initial European Council 
documents released in September 2001 also succeeded in constructing the threat from „the 
scourge of terrorism‟ as an external one. They did this by focusing on the need to engage in 
„in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism 
comes into being‟; as well as re-evaluating the EU‟s relationship with third countries „in light 
of the support which those countries might give to terrorism‟.9 The implicit assumption 
contained in such phrases had the effect of constructing terrorism at this early stage as a 
phenomenon whose origins were (and to a certain extent remain) external to the EU. It is also 
clear that by constructing the threat of terrorism, in this early stage of counter-terrorism 
policy, as an external one, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse strengthened the perception 
that a „globalised‟ or „open‟ society represented an inviting target for further acts of 
terrorism.    
    
The European Security Strategy, 2003, built on this strand of the discourse by stating that the 
environment of which the EU is part of is „one of increasingly open borders in which the 
                                                             
7 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary Meeting on 21 September 2001, 
SN140/01. 
8 Ibid., p. 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 3. 
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internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked‟.10 It stated that those who 
engage in acts of terrorism seek „to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies‟. 
Globalisation was presented as both an opportunity and a threat to Europe, in that „flows of 
trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have 
brought freedom and prosperity to many people‟. However, the discourse also identified a 
negative side in that „others have perceived globalisation as a cause of injustice‟.11 The EU 
interpreted the process of globalisation as having „increased the scope for non-state groups to 
play a part in international affairs‟ as the document argued „they have increased European 
dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, 
information and other fields‟.12 This again contributed to the construction of the „openness‟ of 
European society as a threat to security. There was however a move away from the discursive 
construction of the terrorist threat as one that was defined by the civilized/barbarian 
dichotomy, to a policy discourse focusing on terrorism as a threat to society. This subtle shift 
from civilisation to society is important in that by portraying the threat of terrorism as an 
extreme threat to European society, and thus European identity, the discourse played a key 
role in both justifying and normalising the whole range of policy responses that the EU 
sought to implement as appropriate methods of combating terrorism.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Madrid train attacks, the European Council released the 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004, containing the Strategic Objectives to Combat 
Terrorism (or the Revised Plan of Action). In this period, there was a shift from an EU 
perception of terrorism as something that was primarily constructed as an existential threat to 
civilisation, to an EU perception of terrorism as something more akin to an extreme threat to 
society and its values. For example, the document stated that the „callous and cowardly 
attacks served as a terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism to our society‟ and that 
acts of terrorism „are attacks against the values on which the Union is founded‟.13 The 
document also strengthened the notion that the threat of terrorism has important external 
dimensions. It focused on targeting external relations priorities at „Third Countries where 
counter terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced‟ as 
well as „addressing counter-terrorism concerns into all relevant external assistance 
                                                             
10 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 
2003. 
11 Ibid., p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p. 3. 
13 European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 15 March, 2004, 7906/04, p. 1. 
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programmes to promote good governance and the rule of law‟.14 The perception that there 
was an external threat posed by terrorism was thus used to promote forms of intervention and 
development assistance in Third Countries. It should also be noted that the construction of an 
external dimension to the terrorist threat remained central to the legitimisation of this 
discourse strand that the „openness‟ of EU society was also a counter terrorism issue.  
 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, November 2005, maintained this process of defining 
terrorism through the prism of identity; as a threat to „the values of our democratic societies 
and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens‟.15 It reinforced the discursive construction of 
the „openness‟ of the EU area as problematic; as an environment which terrorists use 
advantageously in order to pursue their objectives. The document stated that: the „European 
Union is an area of increasing openness, in which the internal and external aspects of security 
are intimately linked‟; furthermore „it is an area of increasing interdependence, allowing for 
free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources‟; this environment was described 
as „an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives‟.16 The document also 
reinforced this idea of „new‟ terrorism by describing terrorists in the present context as 
willing to engage in „indiscriminate‟ targeting of „innocent people‟. This needs to be 
understood in the context of earlier EU pronouncements on the „terrorist‟ Other as an actor 
„willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟.17 The assumption of the 
„terrorist‟ as an individual or group willing to engage in „indiscriminate‟ acts of violence 
against „innocent people‟, in order to cause „massive casualties‟, has been a major driving 
force behind the development of EU counter-terrorism policy. As such, it is argued that when 
the inherent dangerousness of the „new‟ terrorism is combined with this assumption that 
actual or potential terrorist are seeking to take advantage of the „openness‟ of the EU area, the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse becomes performative. It plays a powerful role in the 
legitimisation and normalisation of policies designed to restrict that „openness‟ because it is 
based on a perception that they are needed to ensure the safety of EU citizens.  
 
Whilst the EU had by November, 2005, begun to focus on terrorism as primarily an internal 
threat to European society, through a focus on so called „home-grown‟ terrorist groups (the 
                                                             
14 Ibid., p. 9-12. 
15 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30 November, 2005, 
14469/4/05, p. 6. 
16 Ibid., p. 6. 
17 European Council, „European Security Strategy‟, p. 3. 
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majority of which it is argued are inspired by an extremist Islamist ideology), the EU had also 
continued to construct the threat of terrorism as part of a wider external threat to European 
society. Indeed, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, stated quite clearly that not only 
does „much of the terrorist threat to Europe originate outside the EU‟ but „the current 
international terrorist threat affects and has its roots in many parts of the world beyond the 
EU‟; the strategy went on to argue that this threat can only be responded to through „co-
operation with and the provision of assistance to priority third countries – including in North 
Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia‟.18 The effect of this discursive construction is to 
reinforce the perception of the „terrorist‟ Other, as an individual or group, abusing a 
„globalised‟ and interdependent society; a society in which people, including potential or 
actual terrorists, can migrate from all regions of the world into the EU area.   
    
The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment, 2005, also contributed to 
this strand of the discourse by arguing that there are several practical steps one must take for 
an individual to become engaged in terrorism. The document stated that „the ability to put 
ideas into action has been greatly enhanced by globalisation: ease of travel and 
communication and easy transfer of money means easier access to radical ideas and 
training‟.19 More recently, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, 2008, helped to reinforce the discursive construction of globalisation as both an 
opportunity and a threat to Europe, emphasising that „globalisation has brought new 
opportunities‟ but simultaneously „globalisation has also made threats more complex and 
interconnected‟.20 Using a biological „life‟ metaphor, the document stated that the „arteries of 
our society‟ within Europe are increasingly „vulnerable‟ and that the threat of terrorism 
continued to provide the basis for increased cooperation in order to „protect our societies 
against terrorism‟.21 Globalisation in particular was constructed as impacting upon identity in 
that it was „accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values‟.22 Although the 
Stockholm Programme, 2009, does not make any explicit links between the „openness‟ of 
European society and terrorism, the debate over „access to Europe in a globalised world‟ 
                                                             
18  Council of the European Union, „The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟, see p. 14 and p. 7. 
19 Council of the European Union, The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24 
November 2005, 12781/1/05, p. 3. 
20 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changing World, Brussels 11 December, 2008, S407/08, p. 1. 
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
22 Ibid., p. 1. 
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remain a central concern.
23
 The document acknowledged that while access to EU territory for 
those with a legitimate interest should be made more effective and efficient, the EU must also 
„guarantee security for its citizens‟; an objective it is argued should be achieved through 
„integrated border management and visa policies‟.24 The construction of an external 
dimension to the threat of terrorism remained central to the discourse, with the document 
continuing to advocate cooperation with third countries in order to more effectively combat 
terrorism. 
 
From the analysis carried out above, it is possible to argue that this strand of the discourse 
which focuses on the threat posed by a globalised or „open‟ society is one of the central 
elements upon which the construction and development of EU counter-terrorism policy has 
been formulated. It is tied into other assumptions, outlined in the previous chapter, about the 
nature and causes of terrorism. This discourse strand rests upon an acceptance that terrorism 
represents a major external threat to the EU. This in turn is linked to the belief that effective 
border controls should form a key part of the counter terrorism response. Before explaining 
how this discourse of „surveillance and control‟ is constructed, this chapter shall focus on 
analysing the assumptions and deconstructing the language of this strand of the discourse that 
proclaims the „openness‟ of EU society to represent a possible terrorist threat. It will do this 
in three sections: first, it will analyse the notion that terrorism is an extreme threat to an 
„open‟ or „globalised‟ society; second, it will deconstruct the language of threat that is 
reproduced throughout the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse; and third, it will analyse the 
relationship between migration, „European political identity‟ and the discursive construction 
of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Analysing the Notion that Terrorism represents an Extreme Threat to an ‘Open’ or 
‘Globalised’ Society 
 
The construction of an external dimension to the perceived (current) terrorist threat is 
understandable given the identity of those who committed the acts of terrorism in New York 
in 2001. Those initial attacks on September 11, that inspired the creation of an EU counter-
terrorism policy, were committed by foreigners who had entered the US legally on regular 
                                                             
23 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizen, Brussels 2 December 2009, 17024/09. 
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
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visas and had typically overstayed their visa permits. They had also arrived from Muslim 
countries. As Mario Zucconi highlights, these facts about the people behind the attacks of 
September 11, has resulted in it becoming more „commonplace to establish a relationship 
between that new sort of international terrorism and globalisation, and especially the greatly 
intensified movement of people across borders‟.25 The perceived threat of this „new‟ 
terrorism, a form of terrorism committed to „maximum violence‟, combined with a perception 
that the current environment (a „globalised‟ or „open‟ society)  is one which terrorists can 
abuse, has led to an interpretation that the „new‟ terrorism represents an extreme threat (if not 
an existential threat) to (Western) civilisation or society. For example, in the early stages of 
the development of EU counter-terrorism policy (the post-September 11 period) there was a 
shift from the interpretation of the terrorist threat through the use of the civilised/barbarian 
dichotomy, to the focus on the terrorist threat as a threat to society as a whole (the post-
Madrid period). The interpretation of the terrorist threat in this manner is not without 
consequence. 
    
First, the construction of terrorism as a threat to (Western) civilization or, less alarmingly, 
simply a threat to (Western) society is extremely problematic. John Mueller has argued that 
in purely statistical terms terrorism has limited direct effects.
26
 The hyperbole that 
accompanies the discursive construction of terrorism, as a threat to civilization, society or 
„our way of life‟, is challenged by the rather limited number of people who die as a result of 
international or domestic terrorism every year (generally several hundred) and is tiny 
compared to the number of people who die in civil wars or even automobile accidents. 
Second, in agreement with Jackson, what distinguished the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 from other acts of political violence is not the suffering that it caused, in reality the 
number of deaths that day was far from exceptional, but the way in which those attacks were 
interpreted.
27
 Regardless, the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse, the „fight against 
terrorism‟, is still based on an assumption that terrorism poses a very real threat to the fabric 
of European civilization/society; an assumption which is but one of a number of alternative 
                                                             
25 Mario Zucconi, „Migration and Security as an Issue in US – European Relations‟, in John Tirman (ed.) The 
Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11, (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 143. 
26 John Mueller, Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 17 (2005), 
pp. 487-505. 
27 See Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005),  p. 37. 
Jackson identifies the conflicts in Rwanda, 1994, that left 800,000 dead; the 3 million estimated to have died in 
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998; or the tens of thousands of civilians killed by 
terrorists in the last few years in Algeria, Chechnya, Israel and Sri Lanka; as examples of political violence 
much greater in scale than that which occurred on September 11, 2001. 
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interpretations as to the threat posed by terrorism. This is not to argue that terrorism does not 
pose some kind of threat, it is real and it takes lives; only that the interpretation offered by the 
EU is based on an assumption as to the gravity of that threat. In turn, this assumption 
influences the meaning, logic and policy responses to terrorism made possible by the counter-
terrorism discourse. 
    
Deconstructing the Language of ‘Threat’ in EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
Building on this analysis of the notion that (in the post-September 11 period) terrorism 
represents an extreme or existential threat to civilisation or society; it is important to highlight 
the impact of certain words, terms and phrases in the construction of the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. The use of the words „barbaric‟ and „civilisation‟ conjure up the image 
of an ongoing struggle between civilisation and barbarism which in terms of „European 
political identity‟ is inextricably linked to Europe‟s Graeco-Roman heritage and in particular 
is associated with a conflict between Christendom and the Islamic world.
28
 The meta-
narrative of this struggle also has a long genealogy in international relations.
29
 The image of 
the terrorist as today‟s barbarian, as a danger, risk or threat to Europe‟s „open‟ society, is a 
particularly powerful one. Richard Jackson argues that in another sense globalisation has 
come to be seen as the late-modern, sociological term for the „civilising process‟ and in that 
respect „terrorism, as a form of barbarism, can be seen as a challenge to international order 
and the civilizing process of globalisation‟.30 As such, the irrational „terrorist‟ Other can be 
understood as a challenge to the norms and values that underpin the rational EU 
representation of Self. Although the terms „barbaric‟ and „civilisation‟ are used only 
sparingly in the counter-terrorism documents produced by the EU (they are only used in the 
Conclusions and plan of action of the extraordinary European Council Meeting from 
September 2001) this language does not disappear from the EU discourse on terrorism 
completely. For example, in a speech to the Israeli International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT), in September 2008, Gilles de Kerchove, the EU CTC, invoked this type of 
language once more.
31
 He spoke of the „terrorist‟ threats facing Israel, arguing that in 
                                                             
28 Roberta Guerrina, Europe: History, Ideas, Ideologies, (London: Arnold, 2002). 
29 See Jackson, „Writing the War on Terrorism‟; Mark Salter, Barbarians and Civilization in International 
Relations, (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 
30 Richard Jackson, „Writing the War on Terrorism‟, p. 48. 
31 Gilles de Kerchove, „EU Policy in the Fight against Terrorism - From Formulation to Implementation‟, World 
Summit on Counter-Terrorism: Terrorism‟s Global Impact, September 8-11, ICT’s 8th Annual International 
Conference, Herzliya, Israel (2008). 
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response the Israelis had chosen the path of „democracy‟, „respect for individual rights‟ and 
„the freedom of conscience and belief‟.32 He went on to state that „these are the liberties 
which have permitted the great flowering of our civilisation‟.33 He also argued that when 
using military force, to combat these threats, it is vital that Israel or the EU „must ensure that 
this is done in accordance with the standards which the civilised world has set itself following 
the bitter experiences of our history‟.34 The use of this type of language reveals something 
explicit about the EU‟s perception of itself; and likewise, something implicit about its 
perception of the „terrorist‟ Other.  
 
Notice also the way in which the „Other‟ is constructed as having explicitly mis-„perceived‟ 
globalisation as a „cause of injustice‟.35 This narrative implies that globalisation has 
essentially positive effects with the way in which it claims „development‟, „democracy‟, 
„freedom‟ and „prosperity‟ as central to processes of globalisation. It also servers another 
function in that it simultaneously denies space within the narrative for the negative effects of 
globalisation, such as underdevelopment and an increasing gap between rich and poor 
societies, through the assertion that the other has inaccurately „perceived‟ globalisation as a 
cause of „injustice‟. The narrative that constructs the threat of the terrorist „other‟ as a threat 
to the „open‟ and globalised societies of the West is thus strengthened. It also plays a role in 
constructing the „terrorist‟ Other as backward, irrational or reactionary; they seek to 
challenge or undermine a process (globalisation) which is portrayed as a positive process.  
    
In Richard Jackson‟s analysis of US counter-terrorism discourse in Writing the War on 
Terrorism, he argues that this interpretation of the „terrorist‟ Other as a threat to globalisation 
was not inevitable. He contends that a different rendering of globalisation could have 
explained the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as „a manifestation of globalisation‟s 
dark side: the attackers, representing a constituency blighted by the global economic system, 
attacking the symbols of that system by turning the vulnerabilities of a globalised society 
against itself‟.36 Indeed, Stuart Croft has argued that the „decisive intervention‟ that followed 
the events of what he calls the „second American 9/11‟ could have been interpreted through a 
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multitude of different narratives (not necessarily the „war on terror‟).37 This critique can also 
be applied to the discursive construction of globalisation in the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse. This strand of the discourse, in which the uncivilised terrorists launched attacks 
against and continue to pose a threat to „civilisation‟ itself, can be reinterpreted. Sakamoto 
remarks that pondering the „roots of terrorism‟, as distinct from „terror‟ itself, raises the 
question as to whether Western civilisation, which claims to represent liberty, security and 
justice, „is not anti-civilisational‟ insofar as it remains indifferent to the global structure of 
appalling inequity and oppression. It is in this sense that terror is a „challenge to civilization‟ 
and the „justice‟ of democracies of the north is coming under question.‟38 The question 
Sakamoto raises then is one of Western hypocrisy when it comes to interpreting terrorism. 
What this tells us then is that the EU response to these events, the „fight against terrorism‟, 
was based on a particular interpretation of the meaning of those events (e.g. a challenge to the 
values of „European civilisation‟; a challenge to the values of „European society‟). 
  
In support of this line of argument we should consider Asafa Jalata‟s study of state terrorism 
in Ethiopia and Sudan. He reveals how Western governments have demonstrated a degree of 
hypocrisy in terms of support for an Ethiopian regime that has engaged in acts of state 
terrorism and massive human-rights violations, while simultaneously supporting the struggle 
for self determination by non-state actors in southern and western Sudan.
39
 These acts of 
violence are not only tolerated through the political support of Western governments but 
through the continued financial support of the Ethiopian government by international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which embody 
the principles of globalisation that the EU argues are central to its conception of freedom, 
peace and prosperity. 
 
The discursive meshing of globalisation with indiscriminate violence and extremist or 
religiously inspired terrorism will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Six, where it will 
be argued that terrorism in the post-September 11 period is constructed as primarily a 
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phenomenon linked to „violent radicalisation‟. However, in terms of the EU‟s discursive 
construction of the „openness‟ of a „globalised‟ society as a social formation that is inherently 
susceptible to the threat of terrorism, there is another point to be made. Adrian Guelke 
highlights the argument that is sometimes made by policy-makers, officials or political 
leaders, which one can detect in the EU counter-terrorism policy documents, that the 
perpetrators of terrorism seek to engage in acts of unlimited violence. Guelke argues that this 
argument fails to take into account the relationship between the scale of violence a sub-state 
group may seek to inflict and its political goals.
40
 For Guelke, the process of globalisation 
and its influence has been greatly over-exaggerated, noting that human beings continue to 
live in societies that are relatively independent of one another, consequently most sub-state 
political actors, including sub-state actors engaged in terrorism or political violence, seek 
primarily to influence events at that level. The construction of terrorism as an external threat 
to a political community is not new. As Guelke points out „the attribution of responsibility for 
acts of violence to outsiders is to be found throughout the history of violence‟.41 Similarly, 
this strand of the discourse which emphasises the potential threat posed by globalisation or an 
„open‟ society cannot be understood outside of a number of pre-existing discourses associated 
with the „resident‟ or „migrant‟ Other, discourses which shall be analysed in greater detail in 
the next section.  
    
The Relationship between Migration, ‘European Political Identity’ and the Discursive 
Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
Following Peter van Ham‟s assertion, one can argue that „Europe‟s narrative identity is not 
authored by “Europe” alone, but is written and continuously rewritten and reread by ordinary 
people and political elites both “inside” and “outside” Europe‟s fuzzy boundaries‟.42 
European identity is constructed and reconstructed through contact and interaction with the 
„other‟. Ham argues that the millions of (illegal) immigrants and denizens within Europe, that 
constitute a great number of the many minority groups within its borders, have been 
perceived as injuring the cultural and social cohesion of Europe itself. The „resident‟, the 
„migrant‟ or the „immigrant‟ Other is never quite comfortably enough, spatially distant from 
„us‟. They can live in close proximity to „us‟, confronting „us‟ with different ideas and values, 
                                                             
40 Adrian Guelke, Terrorism and Global Disorder, (I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
41 Ibid., p. 15. 
42 Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity, 
(Routledge: London), 2001, p. 194-195. 
The European Union‟s „Fight against Terrorism‟  Christopher Baker-Beall 
  Loughborough University 
169 
 
and challenging the dominant hegemonic cultural patterns of the host population. As van 
Ham argues, „immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are the new “peripheral peoples” of 
Europe; they can be ex-colonials, usually second-class citizens, who are adding to the cultural 
hybridness of western nation-states‟.43 These immigrants have continued to settle in „post-
imperial Europe‟, often assuming dual-citizenship as permanent residents or naturalised 
citizens, whose „experience of citizenship remains ambiguous and who have mixed the liberal 
democratic narrative of political and civil society with their own often confused and 
confusing experiences and cultural backgrounds‟.44 For some their presence raises serious 
questions about pluralism and representation within Europe and helps to instil doubts about 
already established frameworks of civil society.  
    
These questions surrounding the position of the „migrant‟ Other in a „globalised‟ or „open‟ 
European society, an „open‟ society which lest we forget the terrorist(s) abuse for their own 
purposes, give rise to concerns over „migration control‟. As such the issues of migration 
and/or immigration have proved susceptible to rival attempts at framing. Christina Boswell 
argues that this is for two reasons.
45
 First, the problem of observing migratory patterns makes 
irregular entry, stay and employment difficult phenomena to measure, meaning assessments 
of the scale of the „problem‟ are difficult to verify and open to competing claims. Second, the 
policy area is open to populist forms of framing because although governments are keen to 
demonstrate their level of control in this policy area, the kind of control demanded by 
populist sentiment is impossible in western liberal-democratic states. As such, she asserts that 
„irregular migration‟ is thus utilised by different actors, for different goals and purposes.  
    
Boswell argues that at the risk of simplification, this framing of migration control in Europe 
takes three forms. The first focuses on uncontrolled entry, the notion of hordes of illegal 
migrants entering the European territory from the early 1980‟s onwards. The second concerns 
the economic and social impact of irregular migration, abuse of the welfare system and 
undercutting of the domestic labour force. The third of these patterns of framing concerns the 
trafficking of people by international criminal networks engaged in forced labour, drugs and 
armament smuggling. This pattern of framing in particular has been central to the 
development of European security policy. Identifying these pre-existing discourses associated 
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with control of the „migrant other‟ helps to explain the context within which the assumption, 
that actual or potential terrorists are abusing the EU migratory system to pursue their 
objectives, has developed. Carl Levy explains that this reality helps to explain the fraught EU 
policy of promoting the freedom of movement whilst simultaneously seeking to create a 
harmonized system of asylum and refugee policy based on „restrictionist‟ first principles.46 It 
also helps to explain why these deep-rooted discourses associated with fear or suspicion of 
the „migrant‟ Other, as a possible security threat, have been reproduced in EU counter-
terrorism discourse. 
    
To these different images of the „migrant‟ Other, be it the hordes of immigrants or the 
welfare scrounger, is added the label of „criminal‟, due to the necessary illegality of the 
irregular migrant‟s travel, and since the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, 
the counter-terrorism discourse supplements the label of „criminal‟ with the label of „potential 
terrorist‟ in the discursive construction of the „migrant‟ Other. There is no recognition within 
this discourse strand of the role Western governments have played in the creation of the 
„migrant‟ Other as a „problem‟ in reality. Frances Webber highlights the lack of responsibility 
taken by Western governments for the refugees created by the wars in the Middle-East, the 
resources wars in Africa, the fall-out wars from the „perverse‟ boundaries of colonialism or 
the proxy wars against communism.
47
 There is also a lack of responsibility taken for those 
migrants seeking better economic working conditions as a result of the negative impacts of 
free-market global economic policies. It is the „migrant other‟ and „not the western policies 
and actions creating or contributing to their displacement‟ that „are seen by western European 
politicians and popular media as the problem‟. Through this process of construction (as first 
an economic or social threat) and then reconstruction (as a security threat) the migrant 
becomes Europe‟s „Other‟, against which the fluidic concept of European political identity is 
continually (re)defined.  
 
This strand of the discourse which assumes that there is a threat posed by potential or actual 
terrorists, who take advantage of the migratory system of a „globalised‟ or „open‟ society 
such as that of the EU, is inextricably linked to another discourse strand which is also central 
to the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse: the potential threat posed by terrorism requires 
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the strengthening of border controls and the increased surveillance of border crossers. The 
next section will seek map how this strand of the discourse is constructed and to demonstrate 
how the representations contained within the texts help to shape the meaning, logic and 
policy responses to the threat of terrorism.     
 
 
A Discourse of ‘Surveillance’ and ‘Control’ 
 
This „openness‟ that is characteristic of European society had led the EU, even before the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to first, „develop common policies on asylum and 
immigration‟ and second, to focus on „consistent control of external borders to stop illegal 
immigration and combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes‟.48 
The EU had consistently framed the debate on irregular migration as part of a wider problem 
related to sophisticated international criminal networks engaged in the smuggling and 
trafficking of persons operating within the EU area. The Tampere Conclusions, 1999, focused 
on the need for „protection‟ for the „immigrant‟, the „asylum-seeker‟, the „refugee‟, as well as 
being „fair and efficient‟ when examining applications to remain within the EU area. The EU 
policy focused on „protection‟ for the migrant necessitates „combating those who engage in 
trafficking in human beings‟.49 What defined this approach to the problem of illegal 
immigration was a focus on the exclusion of irregular migrants through „effective control of 
the Union‟s future borders‟, the promotion of „voluntary return‟, as well as „assistance to 
countries of origin‟ needed to help them meet their „readmission obligations‟.50 Although the 
Tampere Programme advocated migration control as a way in which to protect the rights of 
the irregular migrant, what characterised the approach to the question of migration, 
immigration and asylum within the EU (and across national governments within Europe in a 
more general sense) was the „emphasis on exclusion as the preferred solution‟.51 This then is 
the discursive environment within which EU policy had been (and continues to be) 
formulated.  It can be argued therefore that in the pre-September 11 period, EU policy 
towards irregular migration was defined by a need to protect migrants from criminal 
networks engaged in human trafficking through increased control of migration flows and 
restriction of entry. In the post-September 11 period, a new imperative has been added to the 
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policy agenda. The framing of the issue of irregular migration in the EU now concerns not 
only the problem of human trafficking but also the possible abuse of the immigration and 
asylum regime by potential or actual terrorists.  
    
The policy response to the events of September 11, 2001, by the key institutions of the EU, 
made the first clear discursive links between the threat of terrorism and policy issues 
surrounding migration, asylum and border control. The Conclusions adopted by the Council 
(JHA), which were released on 20 September, 2001, focused on the „heinous acts‟ and the 
„seriousness of events‟ as reasons for the „speeding up‟ of the „process‟ of creating the 
AFSJ.
52
 The document itself focused on seven key „measures at borders‟. The language of 
these measures has played an important role in the discursive construction of the 
immigration, asylum and human rights regime, as well as the immigrant (him or herself), as a 
security threat. In response to the terrorist threat, the document argued for measures to 
„strengthen controls at external borders‟, „strengthen immediately the surveillance measures‟ 
provided for in the Schengen agreement, „exercise the utmost vigilance when issuing identity 
documents‟, as well as „examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal 
security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments‟.53 The 
conclusion of the JHA policy document focused on the exchange of information between 
member states in order to „combat terrorism‟ including „controls at airports, cross-border 
controls, controls at express roads, controls at the external borders of the European Union‟.54 
   
The post-Madrid Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004, strengthened this discourse of 
control through the discursive linkage of the threat of terrorism with security, migration, 
asylum and border control.
55
 There was an assertion within the policy document that 
„improved border controls and document security play an important role in combating 
terrorism‟. The syntactic ordering of sentences linked „combating terrorism‟ to a series of 
measures designed to ensure tighter „border control‟. These included the establishment of „a 
European Borders Agency‟, „incorporation of biometric features into passports and visas‟, as 
well as developing a common EU approach to „the use of passenger data for border and 
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aviation security‟, including for „other law enforcement purposes.‟56 Objective Four of the 
Revised Plan of Action was even more explicit in discursively linking counter-terrorism 
policy to border control in that its stated aim was: „To protect the security of international 
transport and ensure effective systems of border control‟. Indeed it seeks to „ensure the 
integration of counter-terrorist consideration into the work of relevant EU bodies (transport, 
border controls, identity documentation etc)‟.57 The discursive construction of measures of 
control at borders, as being central to counter-terrorism responses, gained ever more traction 
in the post-Madrid environment 
    
The Hague Programme, 2004, helped to reify the discursive link between the regulation of 
„migration flows‟, the aim to „control the external borders‟ and the need to „repress the threat 
of terrorism‟.58 The document itself contained three sections: „strengthening freedom‟; 
„strengthening security‟; „strengthening justice‟. The section on freedom was the longest and 
seemed to be given the most importance. The document stated that „freedom, justice, control 
at the external borders, internal security and the prevention of terrorism should henceforth be 
considered indivisible within the Union as a whole‟.59 The document interpreted the concept 
of „freedom‟, a concept defined in previous counter-terrorism documents as an intrinsic value 
of the EU, as best served through restrictive immigration practices that were constructed as 
central to ensuring the security of the Union. Every measure proposed under the 
„strengthening freedom‟ section of the Hague Programme related to immigration policy, 
border control and security with the implicit assumption that these measures would provide 
protection against the possibility of further terrorist attacks.
60
 It is also interesting to note that 
the potential security implications represented by advances in biotechnology were introduced 
for the first time. The document linked the „fight against illegal immigration‟ with the „fight 
against terrorism‟ by advocating the development of „a continuum of security measures that 
effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border 
crossings‟, which were also viewed as essential measures „for the prevention and control of 
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crime, in particular terrorism‟.61 In order to achieve this objective, the document also called 
on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to „integrate biometric identifiers in 
travel documents, visa, residence permits, EU citizens‟ passports and information systems 
without delay and to prepare for the development of minimum standards for national identity 
cards‟.62 The discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ has thus played a central role in 
legitimising the development and implementation of biometric technology for the 
„surveillance‟ and „control‟ of the EU border.  
    
Migration, in particular border control, was also dealt with under the „Protect‟ objective of 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005. The document contributed to the continuous 
construction of „border control‟ as one of the most appropriate responses to the terrorist 
threat. It stated that „while member states have the primary responsibility for improving the 
protection of key targets, the interdependency of border security, transport and other cross-
border infrastructures require effective EU collective action‟. It focused on a „need to 
enhance protection of our borders to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter 
or operate within the EU‟.63 Simultaneously, it reinforced the link between a series of 
measures designed to enforce migration and asylum control with the desired policy response 
to terrorism. The use of new technologies already advocated in earlier policy documents are 
constructed as indispensible in the „fight against terrorism‟. For example, „the capture and 
exchange of passenger data‟ and the „inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel 
documents‟ it is argued, will play a role in improving „the effectiveness of our border controls 
and provide greater assurance to our citizens‟.64 Migration continued to be linked to terrorism 
and constructed as a security problem, with the assertion that „the European Borders Agency 
(Frontex) will have a role in providing risk assessment as part of the effort to strengthen 
controls and surveillance at the EU‟s external border‟.65     
    
This discourse strand has gained ever more complexity throughout the historical development 
of EU counter-terrorism policy. The reports of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) 
highlighted the advancements made under the „protect‟ objective of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy in relation to border control. For example, the report from November 
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2008, entitled Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, has a 
specific section on „border security‟.66 It reinforced this discursive linkage between security 
and asylum and migration policy by rearticulating the second objective of the Counter-
Terrorism Strategy. It stated that the EU shall seek „to protect citizens and infrastructure and 
reduce our vulnerability to attack, inter alia through improved security of borders, transport 
and critical infrastructure‟.67 The document also linked the Schengen Information System 
(SIS II) to terrorism through a proposal to establish „a system for early detection of persons 
suspected of activities related to terrorism or organised crime, with the help of SIS alerts‟.68 
The report explicitly linked EU counter-terrorism policy to migration and asylum policy 
through the identification of two documents central to the future border management of the 
EU: the European Commission “Communication on preparing the next steps in border 
management in the European Union”; and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 
adopted by the European Council.
69
 The discursive construction of policies that were 
designed to ensure border control, as policies that would also serve EU counter-terrorism 
priorities, continued in the most recent report from the CTC (released November 2009).
70
 
Again it discursively linked EU counter-terrorism policy to a series of ever increasing 
complex measures at borders. For example, it identified the introduction of legislation related 
to the Visa Information System (VIS) as a key part of the „protect‟ objective of the Counter-
Terrorism Strategy. The VIS is a database that stores biometric information (digital facial 
images and digital fingerprints) on individuals over the age of twelve. The CTC report 
emphasised the importance of this database as a counter-terrorism tool, through the assertion 
that access to the VIS was to be granted to „the designated authorities of the Member States 
and to Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist 
offences and of other serious criminal offences‟.71  
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Although The Stockholm Programme, 2009, does not explicitly link terrorism to border 
control policy, it did continue to articulate this discourse strand of „surveillance‟ and „control‟ 
through an assumption that „technology can play a key role in improving and reinforcing the 
system of external border controls‟.72 The document explained that „the entry into operation 
of the SIS II and the roll-out of the VIS system therefore remains a key objective‟ in ensuring 
effective and efficient border control. Within the document itself, the threat of terrorism 
remained in the background as an ancillary reason for the development of these policies. 
However, as the reports of the EU CTC reveal, these instruments were also discursively 
constructed as central to the EU counter-terrorism response. The threat of terrorism therefore 
played a powerful role in legitimising the measures that are being introduced within the EU; 
measures which it is argued have contributed to increased surveillance and control of EU 
citizens and non-citizens alike.  
 
It is argued therefore that this discourse of „surveillance and control‟ has three main 
characteristics. First, there is the focus placed on the „control‟ of EU borders to protect 
against the perceived threat of actual or potential terrorists who may take advantage of the 
„open‟ EU migratory system in order to carry out acts of violence. Second, the „migrant‟ or 
„immigrant‟ is constructed as a potential terrorist threat through the discursive fusing of 
migration policies with counter-terrorism policies and the reconstruction of instruments 
designed for migration control (e.g. EU databases such as SIS, SIS II, Eurodac, VIS) as 
instruments that can serve a counter-terrorism purpose. Finally, the discourse strand plays a 
central role in the construction of a whole range of new surveillance technologies and 
biometric measures, used primarily at EU borders, as key elements in the EU response to 
terrorism. Again, the assumptions upon which this narrative of „surveillance and control‟ are 
built, and the relevance to counter-terrorism of the specific measures advocated as a result of 
this narrative, are open to multiple interpretations. The next section seeks to demonstrate how 
the construction of this discourse strand in this way, can illuminate our understanding of what 
is done through this particular account of the threat of terrorism. It does this in three sections: 
first, it analyses the assumption that the EU migratory system is being abused by actual or 
potential terrorists; second, it explores the securitisation of the „migrant‟ Other and migration 
policy through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse; and third, it draws out a biopolitical 
dimension to the evolution of the discourse of „control‟.      
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Analysing the Assumption that the EU Migratory System is being abused by Actual or 
Potential Terrorists 
 
In much the same way that the discourse strand of the threat posed by a globalised or „open‟ 
society is predicated on a series of assumptions, which conflate the „migrant‟ Other with the 
„terrorist‟ Other and exaggerate the gravity of the threat posed by terrorism; the discourse 
strand of „control‟ of migration as a counter-terrorism policy response is also based on an 
assumption that to „control‟ the EU border is to „protect‟ against terrorism. Andrew Neal has 
argued that the language used by the EU in the early stages of the production of counter-
terrorism policy was representative of a traditional „securitising‟ move. He emphasised that it 
demonstrated „an assumption that the human rights and asylum regime is being abused or 
taken advantage of by actual or potential terrorists, and is an immediate externalisation of 
threat which is by implication foreign‟.73 Certainly, in the initial post-September 11 period, 
we can detect the first instances of the discursive construction of „control‟ emerging as a 
central element in terms of EU responses to terrorism and the threat represented by the 
„migrant‟ Other.  
    
 This assumption has contributed to a change in how the EU conceptualises the idea of 
„freedom‟. For example, an analysis of The Hague Programme, 2004 helps to illustrate this 
point.
74
 The document demonstrated the pervasiveness of this discourse of control and its 
impact on the concept of freedom. As Didier Bigo has acknowledged, a closer look at the 
document revealed something in the equilibrium of the titles that did not add up: the second 
section on „strengthening security‟ had in fact infiltrated and contaminated the other sections 
on „strengthening freedom‟ and „strengthening justice‟. This has led Bigo to argue that „we 
need to adapt the titles to their actual content by renaming the three parts: 1. strengthening 
security, 2. strengthening security, 3. strengthening security‟.75 In The Hague Programme 
„freedom‟ is conceived of as a series of restrictive immigration and asylum policies. 
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„Freedom‟ in this programme is understood not as the right to act but instead „freedom‟ is 
understood as the right to be protected. It is not without irony that this conception of freedom 
means that in order to be free one must also be secure. This has led Bigo to conclude that the 
perceived threat of terrorism has provided the catalyst for the development of a „concept of 
freedom that has become more dangerous for the fundamental rights of individuals than even 
traditional security measures [could be]‟.76 This tendency towards securitising other policy 
areas, through their discursive construction as important elements in the EU‟s wide ranging 
counter-terrorism policy responses, is reflective of the direction of EU counter-terrorism 
policy in general. 
    
Even where the EU policy documents have sought to provide a positive rationale for the 
securitisation of migration, that is the protection of the „migrant‟ Other from those engaged in 
organised crime and the trafficking of humans, the policy of control and its intended effects 
can be questioned from the perspective of critical discourse analysis. Zucconi identifies a 
„vicious circle of the strengthening of control over unauthorized border crossings by 
smugglers and traffickers and the more limited access being established by Western European 
governments for asylum seekers‟.77 The result of this has been asylum seekers seeking to 
reach those countries finding it increasingly difficult to gain entry; as such exacerbating the 
problem as those migrants turn to traffickers for access. These problems were already 
apparent in the pre-September 11 period, with the EU focusing on migration policies as part 
of its developing internal security programme. The effect of the events of September 11, 
2001, was to encourage the discursive meshing of counter-terrorism issues with migration 
control issues, resulting in the overloading of domestic systems and interstate relations 
already fraught with tensions regarding the question of migration. Zucconi argues that what 
unquestionably changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was „the 
atmosphere of the debate on migratory movements and immigration in Western Europe‟.78 
This environment has led to the development of restrictive practices and the normalisation of 
a deep-rooted suspicion of foreigners (as a security threat) in migration control policy. The 
UN International Migration Report, 2006, offered support to this line of argument through an 
acceptance that „concern about clandestine entry of foreigners has grown in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the bombings in Bali, Casablanca, Madrid and 
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London‟, leading Western governments to introduce more „stringent requirements for 
granting visas‟ or to „impose visa requirements for nationals of countries that consistently 
produce unauthorized migrants‟.79     
 
The Securitisation of the EU Migratory System through EU Counter-Terrorism Discourse 
 
Boswell contends that migration policy and in particular migration control, has not been 
securitised; and if one takes a traditional understanding of the securitisation framework then 
her point holds some water. The EU has not explicitly evoked the threat of terrorism in order 
to force through special measures on migration control. She contends that the linkage 
between terrorism and migration has proved hard to sustain by arguing that from 2001 
„references to terrorism are almost wholly absent from debates on irregular migration and 
migration control in Europe‟.80 Boswell offers a possible answer for this in that with the focus 
on Al-Qaida, the profile or image of international terrorists did not fit with the established 
patterns of framing irregular migration in Europe (as explained above). While it may be true 
that terrorism has not been referenced in debates on irregular migration in Europe, a brief 
survey of the security policy documents produced by the EU, which constitute the EU 
counter-terrorism policy response, demonstrate very clear discursive links between migration 
control and counter-terrorism goals. Much of the EU counter-terrorism policy, including 
more general security policy, is based on an assumption that actual or potential terrorists may 
take advantage of the European migratory system. There is also a clear conflation of 
unrestricted immigration with other security concerns such as organised crime, drug and 
people trafficking as well as terrorism, which one can identify in both the European Security 
Strategy, 2003, and its predecessor, the Report on the Implementation of the Security 
Strategy, 2008.
81
 What is occurring is a much more subtle form of securitisation that traverses 
the distinction between the two types of securitisation, exceptional measures on the one hand 
and more mundane, every-day practices of security, defined by Bigo as a „governmentality of 
unease‟, on the other, 
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The vociferousness with which the discourse continually links the control of the „migrant 
other‟ to counter-terrorism policy is matched only by the silence of the „in-security‟ 
professionals and politicians on how those activities linked to the control of the flows of 
people have not only extended their reach but been strengthened by the adding of extra 
imperatives to the security agenda. Bigo argues that this has been achieved by extending 
„internal security‟ into a wide range of disparate phenomena (terrorism, drugs, organised 
crime, immigration) that are constructed as mutually constitutive; extending the control of the 
movement of people (trans-nationally) be they migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker or other 
border crosser; or even more generally extending control to any citizen who does not 
correspond to the social image that one holds of his national identity.
82
 The effect is control 
goes beyond the parameters of conventional control measures and policing of foreigners to 
include persons deemed at „risk‟, who are put under surveillance because they correspond to 
an identity or behaviour more likely to make them predisposed to that risk: the „migrant 
other‟ then as a possible terrorist threat. In the discursive construction of EU counter-
terrorism policy the „migrant‟ Other is implicitly constructed as a security threat, whilst the 
concept of „freedom‟ is afflicted by an EU preoccupation with the need for „security‟ above 
all else. 
    
This interpretation of migration has a real impact on migrants themselves. In his research on 
migration between Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the EU, Robert Dover suggests that fewer 
controls on the flow of people would have a positive impact on the individual migrants 
themselves as well as economic benefits for both the African and European economies.
83
 
Dover argues that, in spite of the fact there is „very little evidence that migrants from SSA 
present a terrorist threat to the EU... the changes to how migrants enter the EU have been 
informed by these beliefs and the counter-terror agenda‟ and furthermore that „the racial 
profiling that typifies these procedures constitutes a form of unacknowledged and systemic 
racism throughout the European policy sphere‟.84 For Dover, the securitisation of migration 
policy has been counter-productive for the EU and those Africans affected by it.
85
 The 
tension one can observe between the economic, social, political and security spheres has led 
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to a need amongst EU members for greater numbers of migrant workers to sustain economic 
growth. At the same time, it has simultaneously resulted in a failure to manage the political 
and social expectations and consequences of such an influx of migrants. Dover argues that in 
order to mitigate the worst effects of these tensions the EU and its member states need to 
develop effective coordination of member-state policies through a common policy 
framework. He emphasises however that when securitisation of migration policy is tied into 
EU efforts to develop an agenda for justice, freedom and security, the effects is that migrants 
(in this case African migrants) are placed in real physical danger and economic servitude, 
which may result in breeding resentment leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of the migrant 
as a security threat.  
 
The Evolution of Control: a Biopolitical Dimension 
    
The final point to be made on the influence of this discourse of control is that throughout the 
production of EU counter-terrorism policy it has become more complex. This has occurred 
through the discursive linking of preventative counter-terrorism measures, to ever more 
sophisticated policies and practices designed to control the movement of the „migrant‟ Other. 
Central to this has been the development of biometric measures of control. Juliet Lodge has 
drawn attention to this by arguing that the creation of an EU „homeland security agenda‟ and 
its associated biometric instruments signal not only an increasing securitisation of social and 
political life within the EU more generally, it also challenges the EU‟s commitment to the 
principles of freedom, security and justice as well as compromising the privacy of citizens 
and non-citizens alike.
86
 As such, the result of the application of biometry to service 
immigration and „internal security‟ concerns (such as the „fight against terrorism‟), may 
instead „compromise rather than strengthen EU legitimacy‟.87 With this in mind Didier 
Bigo‟s assertion that there exists a „governmentality of unease‟, which has the implicit effect 
of profiling and containing foreigners, seems apt.  
    
As a manifestation of what Walters has called the „biopolitical border‟, Louise Amoore has 
argued that biometric borders now extend into the governance of mobility regulating aspects 
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of everyday life.
88
 She states that „subject to biopower, the crossing of a physical territorial 
border is only one border crossing in a limitless series of journeys that traverse and inscribe 
the boundaries of safe/dangerous, civil/uncivil, legitimate traveller/illegal migrant‟.89 It is not 
the emergence of these borders which is necessarily the problem but the performance of the 
idea of the biometric border that tells us something about the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟. 
As Bigo argues immigration and the terrorist threat become combined as a problem „not 
because there is a threat to the survival of society‟ but because „scenes from everyday life are 
politicized, because day-to-day living is securitised‟.90 The introduction of measures at 
borders is not so much about the „new‟ threats at the borders, as it is identifying and 
separating out the „safe from the dangerous at multiple borders of daily life‟.91 
 
The work of Ben Hayes offers support for this line of argument. He has argued that EU 
border controls are now expanding inwards through the construction of large scale IT 
systems, which include measures that have been developed in order to detect illegal 
immigrants, to exchange information on persons to be refused entry to the EU area and to 
facilitate security checks on travellers. In particular, this is being achieved through „the 
introduction of biometric ID systems, the recording of entry, exit and transit through 
European countries, and the development of automated targeting and risk-profiling 
systems‟.92 Hayes explains that EU agreement on the introduction of biometric identifiers (in 
this case fingerprints and digitised photos) into all passports, residence permits and visas 
issued by member states, marks a fundamental shift in the European approach to privacy and 
civil liberties.
93
  
 
Furthermore, Hayes points out that, while technology can undoubtedly assist in police 
investigations, there is no evidence to suggest that it can prevent „terrorism or crime because 
technology can do nothing to address the multifaceted “root causes” of these social 
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problems‟.94 It is difficult not to agree with Hayes when he argues that these technologies can 
have a role to play if adequately regulated. However as he explains, certain technologies such 
as CCTV or DNA profiling have  „generally been made available to the police with 
inadequate controls or regard for individual human rights‟ and EU legislation on the 
introduction of biometric measures into passports and travel documents „has also come at the 
expense of democratic debate‟.95 The discursive construction of this technology as a central 
new element in the „fight against terrorism‟ has occurred with ever more frequency in the 
post-Madrid period, whilst „serious privacy concerns have been ignored and serious questions 
remain about the usefulness, reliability and accuracy of the underlying technology‟.96 These 
developments in EU security policy have led the European Civil Liberties Network (ECLN) 
to conclude that EU justice and home affairs and internal security policy has taken „a 
dangerously authoritarian turn‟; and that the EU has effectively put in place „militarised 
borders, mandatory proactive surveillance regimes and an increasingly aggressive external 
security and defence policy‟.97 The EU is therefore at the centre of a paradigm shift, with the 
„fight against terrorism‟ providing a discursive legitimacy for this shift, in „the way that 
Europe and the world beyond will be policed‟.98 The ECLN concludes that in effect these 
developments represent the „militarisation of security, the securitisation of everything‟, the 
result of which is „an increasingly security-militarist approach to protracted social and 
economic problems‟.99 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse constructs 
the „migrant‟ Other as a potential security threat, throughout the production of EU counter-
terrorism policy. It has been argued that this is achieved through the articulation of two 
interlinked strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse: one that implicitly constructs the 
„migrant‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat, through an assumption that actual or potential 
terrorists are seeking to take advantage of the „open‟ or „globalised‟ environment provided by 
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the EU migratory system; and one that explicitly constructs the „migrant other‟ as a potential 
terrorist threat, through an assertion that the „openness‟ of European society requires 
adequate „border controls‟ and „surveillance‟ of border-crossers in order to „protect‟ against 
any further terrorist attacks. These strands of the discourse are inextricably linked to other 
assumptions about the nature and causes of terrorism that are outlined in the previous chapter. 
As such, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse constructs a specific type of „external‟ 
terrorist threat: the „new‟ terrorist, „committed to maximum violence‟, who takes advantage 
of the „open‟ or „globalised‟ environment, provided by the EU migratory system, to carry out 
acts of terrorism. This is a particularly powerful image. It is also one which plays a key role 
in the legitimisation of the new policies and practices of security at the EU border; as such 
these strands of the discourse helps to normalise the use of new measures (biometrics) and 
instruments of „control‟ (IT Systems and databases), which are advocated by the EU as 
central to the counter-terrorism response. The result of such a discourse is the securitisation 
of migration and asylum policy; moreover, it is part of a more general trend of securitisation 
of social and political life within Europe. 
 
It has been argued that the discursive construction of terrorism as an existential or extreme 
threat to the „open‟ or „globalised‟ civilisation/society of the EU and the assumption that the 
EU migratory system is being abused by actual or potential terrorists, is but one of a number 
of possible interpretations of the threat of terrorism. It has been argued that the migrant or 
immigrant is, within European societies, increasingly cast as the Other against which a 
European (or national) sense of Self is defined. As such, the discursive meshing of migration 
policy with the threat of terrorism and the reconstruction of the „migrant‟ Other as a security 
threat should be considered unsurprising, given the susceptibility of the issue of migration to 
different types of framing. It has also been argued that the threat of terrorism has led to a 
fundamental change in how the EU perceives the concept of „freedom‟. In the „fight against 
terrorism‟, freedom is conflated with security and redefined as protection from certain threats 
that discourses of insecurity tell „us‟ we are prey. Within this discursive environment 
biometrics, information systems and border controls represent a first step towards a much 
broader form of social control, which is concerned not just with migrants but citizens as well. 
Therefore, the discourse of a „fight against terrorism‟ plays a central role in the legitimisation 
of these policies; contributing to the securitisation of social and political life within Europe. 
The next chapter will now turn to an analysis of how the EU counter-terrorism discourse 
constructs the „Muslim‟ Other as potential terrorist threat. 
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Chapter 6: The Construction of the ‘Muslim’ Other as Potential Threat in 
the ‘Fight against Terrorism’  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
constructs issues concerning Islam and the „Muslim community‟ as central to the EU counter-
terrorism response. In particular, it focuses on how this strand of the discourse implicitly 
constructs the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat through a focus on „violent 
radicalisation‟ and how the discourse surrounding „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to 
terrorism is in effect contributing to the securitisation of issues regarding Islam and the role 
of „Muslim communities‟ in Europe societies. The first section analyses the main EU 
counter-terrorism policy documents in order to map how this strand of the discourse is 
constructed. This section identifies the key words, terms, phrases and labels that are central to 
the construction of this strand of the discourse. It is argued that this strand of the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse is characterised by an explicit and conscious effort on the part of 
the EU to avoid discursively linking the religion of Islam to terrorism. However, it is also 
argued that although the EU seeks to develop a „non-emotive lexicon‟ for the discussion of 
issues surrounding „violent religious extremism‟, the discourse constructs the current terrorist 
threat as a problem which is implicitly linked to Muslims or Islam.  
 
The chapter argues that this implicit linkage between Islam and terrorism is achieved through 
a number of assumptions that are central to the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. First, the 
discourse constructs the „terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qa‟ida and extremists inspired by Al 
Qa‟ida‟ as „the main terrorist threat to the Union‟; second, in order to combat this type of 
terrorism the policy focuses on the promotion of „cross-cultural‟, „inter-religious‟ or „inter-
cultural‟ dialogue between European and Muslim communities, as well as the „engagement‟ 
of „Muslims, in Europe and beyond‟, as a central element in the prevention of terrorism; 
third, „violent radicalisation‟ is constructed as a major problem in Europe, which leads 
inexorably to terrorism. Whilst the EU argues that it is important not to link Islam to 
terrorism, the policy proposals to tackle „radicalisation and recruitment‟ call for the direct 
involvement of „Muslim organisations and faith groups‟, „governments which have faced this 
problem‟ and „Muslim communities in Europe and beyond‟ to help prevent terrorism. The 
  Chapter 6: The Construction of the „Muslim‟ 
  Other as Potential Terrorist Threat 
 
186 
 
first section concludes by arguing that there is a tension at the heart of this strand of the 
discourse. This is reflected in the contradictory nature of stating that terrorism is not linked to 
Islam; yet also stating that in order to prevent terrorism there is a need to engage „Muslims, in 
Europe and beyond‟. 
 
The second section of this chapter explores how this discourse strand structures the meaning, 
logic and policy response to the groups that it describes, how the discourse construct a 
„European‟ sense of Self against a notional „terrorist‟ Other (including how it implicitly 
constructs the „Muslim‟ Other as potential threat), as well as the knowledge and/or practices 
that are normalised and/or legitimised by the discourse. First, the use of terms or labels such 
as the „Muslim community‟, the „Muslim world‟, the „Islamic world‟ or the „Arab and 
Muslim world‟ are highlighted in order to demonstrate how the „othering‟ of Muslims or 
Islam is achieved through the counter-terrorism discourse. It is argued that this discourse 
strand is constructed on the basis of an assumption that there is a transcendental or over-
arching Muslim identity that overrides all other forms of identity; instead, this section 
demonstrates that given the variety of difference that exists between Muslims or within the 
religion of Islam itself, other interpretations are possible. Second, the discourse surrounding 
„radicalisation and recruitment‟ is investigated in order to demonstrate how it constructs the 
„Muslim community‟ as a potential security threat, reconstructing issues surrounding social 
cohesion and the wider role of Muslims in European societies as part of the EU counter-
terrorism response. Third, a wider contextual analysis of the threat of the „Muslim‟ Other is 
offered in order to demonstrate how this threat has not been constructed in isolation; the 
construction of the Muslim „Other‟ as a potential security threat has a long genealogy in 
Western societies. The chapter concludes by focusing on the process of securitisation, 
seeking to show how this type of terrorism („Islamist‟/‟Islamic‟/„violent religious 
extremism‟) is perceived to have an internal and external dimension; the responses to which it 
is argued play a key role in the securitisation of the „Muslim‟ Other. 
 
 
The Discursive Construction of the ‘Muslim’ Other and the Threat of Terrorism  
 
The aim of this section is to map how this discourse strand is constructed, which it is argued 
implicitly conflates the „Muslim‟ Other with the „terrorist‟ Other. As such, one aspect of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse which represents a source of continuity throughout the 
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production of EU counter-terrorism policy has been the ongoing endeavour by the EU to 
explicitly resist the conflation of terrorism with Islam. This is achieved in two main ways: 
first, the policy documents produced by the EU make a number of clear statements on not 
directly and discursively linking terrorism to Islam; second, the EU advocates a policy of 
„engagement‟ with the „Arab‟, „Muslim‟ or „Islamic‟ world that promotes „cross-cultural‟, 
„inter-religious‟ or „inter-cultural‟ understanding as a key element in the prevention of 
terrorism. There is however a certain amount of tension in this line of thought: terrorism is 
constructed as something that should not be considered synonymous with Islam or the 
„Muslim world‟; yet in order to prevent terrorism the EU advocates a policy of engagement 
towards the „Islamic‟ or the „Muslim world‟.  
 
Resisting the conflation of Islam and Terrorism 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York, the Conclusions and Action 
Plan of the Extraordinary Council Meeting, released in September 2001, quite clearly stated 
that „the European Union categorically rejects any equation of groups of fanatical terrorists 
with the Arab and Muslim world‟ and furthermore, that the European Council „rejects any 
equation of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world‟.1 The action plan referred to 
„solidarity and cooperation‟ with the US as a central objective of EU counter-terrorism 
policy, as well as establishing „the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism‟ 
designed to defend „our common values‟ and including „our Arab and Muslim partners‟ or 
„any other country ready to defend our common values‟.2 The document also stated that the 
„fight against terrorism‟ would require the EU to play „a greater part in the efforts of the 
international community to prevent and stabilise regional conflicts‟. In particular, the 
document accepted that in order to meet this objective the EU would have to work with the 
US, Russia and its „partners in the Arab and Muslim world‟, claiming that it would „make 
every endeavour to bring the parties to the Middle East conflict to a lasting understanding on 
the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions‟.3 At this early stage there was a tacit 
acceptance that, while it was important not to link terrorism to Islam or the „Arab and Muslim 
world‟, the context within which the terrorist attacks occurred, on September 11, 2001, would 
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require some sort of resolution to the Arab/Israeli conflict if the EU was to be successful in 
its „fight against terrorism‟.  
 
The European Security Strategy, 2003, deployed a reconciliatory language towards the 
„Muslim world‟ in that although it did not explicitly link this policy goal to prevention of 
terrorism in Europe, the strategy once again emphasised a need for „resolution of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict‟. Under the headline goal of „building security in our neighbourhood‟, 
the resolution of this conflict was defined as „a strategic priority for Europe‟ and without 
which it was argued „there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle 
East‟.4 The document also continued to reinforce the need for cooperation and engagement 
with Muslim countries, stating that „broader engagement with the Arab world should also be 
considered‟.5 The  Declaration on Combating Terrorism, March 2004, containing the new 
action plan to combat terrorism, released in the aftermath of the Madrid attacks,  helped to 
strengthen this line of reasoning with a focus on the development and implementation of a 
„strategy to promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the 
Islamic world‟.6 The clearest example of this EU effort not to link the religion of Islam or 
Muslims themselves to terrorism can be found in the EU Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005. The document stated that the EU should 
work to „correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims‟ as well as seek to 
„develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking Islam to 
terrorism‟.7 The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, reinforced the main points of the EU 
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism by rearticulating many 
of the articles contained within the strategy (for combating „radicalisation and recruitment‟) 
under the „prevent‟ section of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  Again the document made 
every effort not to link Islam and terrorism by restating that „we must also ensure that our 
own policies do not exacerbate division‟ and that „developing a non-emotive lexicon for 
discussing these issues will support this‟.8 It also stated that the focus of the EU should be to 
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2003, p. 8, paragraph 4. 
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„target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue 
and long-term integration where appropriate‟.9 
 
From the post-Madrid period until present, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse has 
constructed this idea of „inter-cultural dialogue‟ as an essential aspect of the EU response to 
terrorism. Indeed, the promotion of „cross-cultural understanding‟ between „Europe and the 
Islamic world‟ had now become a central part of the EU counter-terrorism response. The EU 
CTC report on the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
from November 2008, continued this line of reasoning, introducing for the first time a „light‟ 
framework of cooperation with the United Nations Alliance of Civilisations (UNAOC) as 
part of the EU response to terrorism. The framework identified five areas for „focus‟ and 
„cooperation‟ including the; „promotion of human rights and political reform‟; „media and 
access to information‟; „intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity, including exchanges and 
promotion of people-to-people contacts‟; „immigration and integration‟; and the „role of civil 
society in the prevention of polarisation and radicalisation‟.10 The UNAOC is an initiative of 
the UN Secretary-General, established in 2005, the aim of which is to „improve 
understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and 
religions, and to help counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism‟.11 In particular, 
one of the main capacities of the UNAOC is as a „bridge builder and convener, connecting 
people and organizations devoted to promoting trust and understanding between diverse 
communities, particularly – but not exclusively – between Muslim and Western societies‟.12 
 
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, further promoted 
this line of thought that „inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of 
Civilizations, has an important role‟ to play in addressing „extremist ideology‟ and „tackling 
discrimination‟.13 This is an assertion repeated under section 4.5 (on terrorism) of The 
Stockholm Programme, 2009, the EU stated that in relation to its overall counter-terrorism 
work it must ensure „all the parties concerned should avoid stigmatising any particular group 
                                                             
9 Ibid., p. 9, article 11. 
10 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 19 
November, 2008, 15912/08, p. 5, paragraph 2. 
11 United Nations, Alliance of Civilizations: Mission Statement, Available at: 
http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/39/187/lang,english/ 
12 Ibid. 
13 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changing World, Brussels 11 December, 2008, S407/08, p. 4, paragraph 4. 
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of people, and should develop intercultural dialogue in order to promote mutual awareness 
and understanding‟.14 In the latest report issued by the EU CTC, entitled the EU Action Plan 
on Combating Terrorism, 2009, an argument was made that because „religion can very easily 
be hijacked for political or violent purposes‟, initiatives such as the UNAOC are an essential 
forum „in the field of prevention of extremism and radicalisation leading to violence‟.15 There 
was also an assumption that „from the perspective of [the] counter-extremism dialogue‟ such 
a forum can be „of great value as it constitutes a clear rebuttal of the propaganda of 
extremists‟.16 Indeed, this idea that there exists an extremist „narrative‟ or „worldview‟, which 
is central to the propagation of acts of terrorism or political violence within Europe, has come 
to form a central part of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, whilst responding to this 
„narrative‟ is seen as essential. 
 
The first time the EU explicitly identified this „extremist worldview‟ was in the EU Strategy 
for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, November 2005. The document 
revealed that for the EU the connection between Islam and terrorism was perceived to be the 
fault of an external „narrative‟ and not the policies of the EU or Western governments; in the 
„fight against terrorism‟ the discursive construction of terrorism as something synonymous 
with Islam is attributable instead to „the propagation of a particular extremist worldview 
which brings individuals to consider and justify violence‟.17 Within this context „the core of 
the issue is propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world as a supposed proof of a 
clash between the West and Islam and which claims to give individuals both an explanation 
for grievances and an outlet for their anger‟.18 The effect of this „extremist worldview‟ is to 
simultaneously distort both the religion of Islam and to alter „perceptions of Western policies 
and increases suspicions of hidden agendas and double standards‟.19 Yet the document also 
demonstrated that the EU recognised that there is a relationship between the EU‟s own 
counter-terrorism policy and the potential for instances of terrorism, by stating that „we must 
ensure that by our own policies we do not exacerbate division‟.20  
 
                                                             
14 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting the Citizens, Brussels 2 December 2009, 17024/29, p. 50. 
15 European Council, EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, Brussels 26 November, 2009, 15358/09, p. 5. 
16 Ibid., p. 5. 
17 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism‟, p. 4, article 10. 
18 Ibid., p. 4, article 10. 
19 Ibid., p. 4, article 10. 
20 Ibid., p. 4., article 11. 
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The EU has demonstrated quite a sophisticated understanding of the role of language in 
counter-terrorism policy in that from 2006 onward, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
began to speak of the importance of countering the „narrative‟ of this „extremist worldview‟. 
For example, the term „narrative‟ was used for the first time in a report from the EU CTC 
entitled Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, November 
2006, in which it stated that the Commission had proposed a number of studies into the 
factors that trigger „radicalisation among youths, narratives used by extremists, and the 
methods through which terrorists find new recruits‟.21A more recent report from the CTC, 
from November 2008, built on this line of argument identifying work done by the lead 
member states, including that of the UK, in relation to the communication of a strategy „on 
countering the “narrative” which is used by those promoting terrorism to justify their 
actions‟.22 In addition, the EU now advocated a policy of promoting „solidarity with the 
victims of terrorism‟ as well as „the dissemination of testimonies of victims of terrorism‟ as 
actions intended to „sensitise EU citizens and disseminate a powerful message of democratic 
values countering violent narratives and radicalisation‟.23 
 
While it is clear that the EU recognises the importance of the language it uses, as well as the 
type of policy it promotes, to ensure that it does not conflate Islam (or Muslims) with 
terrorism, the discourse is still constructing terrorism (implicitly and/or unknowingly) in the 
present context as primarily a „Muslim‟ or „Islamic‟ problem. This is because of the emphasis 
the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse places on counter-terrorism polices that are designed to 
tackle „extremism‟, „radicalisation and recruitment‟ or „violent religious extremism‟, 
concepts which are all implicitly linked to Islam. Although there are many different terrorist 
groups in Europe the „fight against terrorism‟ focuses on one particular type of terrorist 
threat, which is represented by the „Islamist militant movement in Europe‟. In particular, 
there is a tension in the line of argument the EU has taken, it seeks to delineate terrorism 
from Islam whilst simultaneously arguing that the present terrorist threat can only be tackled 
through „cross-cultural‟ or „inter-religious‟ dialogue with the „Muslim world‟. This is because 
the EU has made the assumption that the type of terrorism that represents the gravest threat, 
                                                             
21 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
November 2006, Brussels 15 November, 2006, 15266, p. 5, article 14. 
22 Council of the European Union, Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
November 2008, p. 3, paragraph 2. 
23 European Council, EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, p. 17. 
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in the post-September 11 period, is that which is linked to „violent radicalisation‟ or 
„religious extremism‟. 
 
For example, the European Security Strategy, 2003, played a key role in establishing both an 
internal and external dimension to the threat posed by „violent religious extremism‟. It stated 
that „the most recent wave of terrorism is global in scope and is linked to violent religious 
extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, 
cultural, social and political crisis, and the alienation of young people living in foreign 
societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society‟.24 Europe was described as both 
a target and a base for this recent wave of terrorism. In particular it focused on the discovery 
of „logistical bases for Al Qaeda... in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium‟. This 
perception of an internal („home-grown‟) terrorist threat, driven by „religious extremism‟, 
was also tied into other strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse concerning the idea 
of a „new terrorism‟ linked to „unlimited violence‟ and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
For example, the document described the period the EU was now entering as „a new and 
dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle 
East‟.25 The emphasis placed on the religious dimension to this perceived terrorist threat is 
one which helped to explain the EU focus on possible worst-case situations, in which „the 
most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass 
destruction‟.26 The articulation of this strand of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which 
emphasised an almost existential threat to European society, is central to the legitimisation of 
many of the measures contained within the EU counter-terrorism policy. Furthermore, it is 
this perception of a religious dimension to the current terrorist threat that has caused the EU 
to highlight the need for a separation of terrorism from Islam; but is simultaneously the 
reason why the threat of terrorism in the present context is still being constructed as 
predominantly an Islamic or Muslim one.  
 
Although it is possible to identify the EU‟s commitment to resisting the conflation of Islam 
with the threat of terrorism, throughout the discursive construction of its counter-terrorism 
policy, there remains this tension at the heart of the policy discourse. This is because while on 
the one hand the EU states that terrorism should not be equated with Islam; on the other hand 
                                                             
24 European Council, „European Security Strategy‟, p. 3, paragraph 5. 
25 Ibid., p. 3, paragraph 7. 
26 Ibid., p. 4, paragraph 2. 
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it continues to discursively construct the threat posed by Al-Qaida and those inspired by Al-
Qaida as the main terrorist threat that the EU faces. Indeed, the EU states that Al-Qaida „will 
only be defeated with the engagement of the public, and especially Muslims, in Europe and 
beyond‟.27 It is surely contradictory to state at once that terrorism and Islam are not 
interlinked; yet to defeat terrorism it is essential to engage with the „Muslim community‟. 
This is not to argue that issues surrounding Al-Qaida, those inspired by Al-Qaida and the 
radicalisation of certain individuals from the „Muslim community‟ are unimportant, or that 
this type of terrorism does not pose some kind of threat to Europe. Instead, it is to simply 
point out that the focus of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse on one specific type of 
terrorism has (and will continue to have) negative implication for the community that has 
been identified as problematic. Central to the tension at the heart of this strand of the 
discourse is the language associated with combating „radicalisation and recruitment‟ into 
terrorism, which is constructed as the single most important preventative aspect of the EU‟s 
counter-terrorism response.   
 
Combating ‘Radicalisation and Recruitment’ 
 
The first occasion on which the EU spoke of tackling or combating „recruitment‟ into 
terrorism was in the renewed Action Plan contained in the Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism, March 2004, which was released in the wake of the Madrid attacks. Objective six 
of the Action Plan was to „address the factors which contribute to support for, and 
recruitment into, terrorism‟ part of which included a focus on „the links between extreme 
religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for 
terrorism‟.28 This was followed by a statement in The Hague Programme, December 2004, 
calling on the European Council to „by the end of 2005, develop a long-term strategy to 
address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist activities‟.29 
  
This aim was achieved with the release of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, in November 2005. The document was based on The European 
Commission Communication on Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to 
                                                             
27 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism‟, p. 2, article 5. 
28 European Council, „Declaration on Combating Terrorism‟, p. 16. 
29 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 13 December, 2004, 16054/04, p. 21. 
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violent radicalisation (from September 2005), which introduced the concept of „violent 
radicalisation‟ for the first time.30 „Violent radicalisation‟ was defined in the communication 
as „the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts 
of terrorism‟.31 The focus of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment 
to Terrorism was therefore to „address the factors‟ that would lead people towards „violent 
radicalisation‟. The document developed the idea of combating „radicalisation and 
recruitment‟ and has been constructed as the central most important preventative element of 
EU counter-terrorism policy. Although the document accepted that „radicalisation and 
recruitment‟ to terrorism are „not confined to one belief system or political persuasion‟ and 
that Europe has experienced other forms of terrorism throughout its history, „the terrorism 
perpetrated by Al-Qaida and extremists inspired by Al-Qa‟ida has become the main terrorist 
threat to the Union‟.32 The main focus of the strategy has therefore been to provide a 
framework in which the EU member states could counter „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to 
terrorism, through the identification of terrorist propaganda and targeting the conditions 
which draws people to consider terrorism a „legitimate course of action‟. It stated that the 
only way to defeat „Al-Qaida and those inspired by them‟ is through „engagement of the 
public, and especially Muslims, in Europe and beyond.‟ It also stated that it „welcomes the 
strong stance that the people of Europe and beyond, including Muslims, have taken to reject 
terrorism and urges them not to relent in their condemnation‟.33 
    
The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005, 
emphasised the considered nature of the EU response to terrorism through phrases that 
claimed the EU would: „engage in dialogue‟; „not undermine respect for fundamental rights‟; 
and develop „the right legal framework‟ to combat terrorism. However, the problem of 
terrorism in Europe was again constructed as primarily a problem linked to the „Muslim 
community‟. This is because the central element of the policy was the need to „empower 
moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organisations and faith groups‟, „reject the 
distorted version of Islam put forward by Al-Qa‟ida and others‟, „encourage the emergence of 
European imams and enhance language and other training for foreign imams in Europe‟ and 
„enhance our efforts to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly 
                                                             
30 European Commission, Communication concerning Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing 
to violent radicalisation, Brussels 21 September, 2005, COM(2005) 313 final. 
31 Ibid., p. 2. 
32 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment‟, p. 2, article 3. 
33 Ibid., p. 2, article 5. 
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among Muslim communities‟.34 What this reveals then is the tension within the EU counter-
terrorism policy documents, in that although there are a number of statements on not 
discursively linking terrorism to Islam, they do so anyway. 
 
This raises questions over whether such a policy could not be used to develop broader 
engagement with „Muslim communities‟ across Europe, foster community integration, 
cohesion and participation without the discursive linking of such a policy to counter-
terrorism. The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism 
stated that within the EU „we must target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and 
promote inter-cultural dialogue, debate and where appropriate, long-term integration‟ as well 
as promoting outside the EU „good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as 
education and economic prosperity‟.35 Again this has little to do with directly combating 
terrorism; we are left to ponder whether they should not be EU goals anyway and were they 
not before September 11, 2001? The very next article reveals the tension once more by 
stating that, „radicalisation of certain Muslim individuals in Europe is a relatively recent 
phenomenon‟, „even those areas of Europe where radicalisation is not a major issue at 
present, or where large Muslim communities do not exist, could become targets for 
extremists‟.36 
    
The „prevent‟ section of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, reproduced many of the 
words, terms, phrases and assumptions highlighted thus far.  It emphasised the perceived 
need to counter „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism, stating that „terrorist groups 
such as Al Qaeda and the groups it inspires‟ currently „represents the main threat to the Union 
as a whole‟. 37 It highlighted a number of „conditions in society that may create an 
environment in which individuals can become more easily radicalised‟, these included „poor 
or autocratic governance; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; lack of political or economic 
prospects and of educational opportunities‟.38 It claimed that „within the Union these factors 
are not generally present but in individual segments of the population they may be‟. 39 
Although the document did not use the phrase „violent radicalisation‟ it did rearticulate this 
                                                             
34 Ibid., p. 4, article 11. 
35 Ibid., p. 5, article 13. 
36 Ibid., p.5, article 14. 
37 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟, p. 7, article 6. 
38 Ibid., p. 9, article 11.  
39 Ibid., p. 9, article 11. 
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idea of an „extremist worldview‟ which was leading „individuals to consider and justify 
violence‟.40 
 
This strand of the discourse has come to provide the logic for the central most „preventative‟ 
dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy and has been heavily influenced by the European 
Commission, which in turn has been heavily influenced by a number of academic studies into 
„violent radicalisation‟. In September 2005, the European Commission put forward proposals 
for the creation of a „network of experts‟ on „violent radicalisation‟.41 These proposals led to 
the creation of „The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation‟ in April 2006.42 One of the 
tasks of the expert group was to produce a report on the „state of play of research in the field 
of violent radicalisation‟; a task which was duly met with the production of a final report 
submitted to the European Commission on 15 May 2008 entitled „Radicalisation Processes 
Leading to Acts of Terrorism‟.43 As well as this there have been three other major studies into 
processes leading to „violent radicalisation‟ authored by the Change Institute and Kings 
College London. Since 2008, this expert group has been known as the „European Network of 
Experts on Radicalisation‟ (ENER).44 
 
The reason for drawing attention to the role of the Commission and the ENER in the 
production of this discourse on „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism is two-fold. First, 
the involvement of an „expert group‟ to offer advice on policy demonstrates one way in 
which the EU discourse on terrorism has evolved and possibly how institutions can „learn‟ 
over time. Second, the research conducted in the „expert group‟ report actually challenges 
many of the preconceptions and assumptions that underpin the EU counter-terrorism 
discourse (and specifically the strand of the discourse on „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to 
terrorism). For example, the report reveals the problematic nature of the term „violent 
radicalisation‟. It notes that whilst the term is often used to refer to „jihadi terrorism‟ or 
                                                             
40 Ibid., p. 8, article 8. 
41 European Commission, „Communication concerning Terrorist recruitment‟, p. 8. 
42 Official Journal of the European Union, L 111/9 of 25.04.2006 
43 European Commission, „Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism‟, 15 May 2008, Available at: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf 
44 The EU CTC report from June 2009 described the group as „a network of leading experts on radicalisation 
from different academic disciplines who are renowned specialists in their field‟, their role being to focus on the 
processes of „violent radicalisation and extremism that leads to acts of terrorism‟ through the production of 
studies and organisation of seminars, with the aim of „deepening understanding of the violent radicalisation 
phenomenon in order to enhance counter-terrorism and preventive approaches being pursued at EU and Member 
State levels‟. See Council of the European Union, „Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism‟, Brussels, 2 June 2009, 9715/1/09, p. 2.   
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„jihadi violence‟, there are „remarkable parallels between radicalisation to current jihadist 
terrorism and radicalisation to left-wing, right-wing or nationalist separatist terrorism‟.45 The 
report also explains that the limitation of terrorism to acts solely perpetrated by non-state 
actors is erroneous. Although the views of the „expert group‟ do not represent those of the 
EU, the fact that the EU has commissioned such studies demonstrates this willingness to 
„learn‟ and the possibility that the EU discourse on terrorism may eventually achieve the 
stated policy goal of developing such policies without linking Islam to terrorism. 
 
This section has sought to demonstrate that there are three main aspects to this strand of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which has constructed terrorism, in the post-September 11 
period, as a phenomenon primarily represented by „violent religious extremism‟. First, even 
though the current terrorist threat is perceived to have a religious dimension the EU rejects 
any equation of terrorism with the „Arab‟, „Islamic‟ or „Muslim world‟. Second, although the 
EU resists conflating the threat of terrorism with Islam and aims to develop a „non-emotive 
lexicon‟ for talking about these issues, there is a tension at the heart of the policy in that it 
constructs the threat of terrorism as something that is implicitly linked to Islam or the 
„Muslim community‟. Third, this tension is revealed in two interlinked ways: the EU 
constructs the promotion of „cross-cultural‟, „inter-religious‟ or „inter-cultural‟ understanding 
between the EU and the „Arab‟, „Islamic‟ or „Muslim world‟ as an essential element of 
counter-terrorism policy; and the EU promotes a strategy of combating „radicalisation and 
recruitment‟ to terrorism as the most essential preventative element of counter-terrorism 
policy. In particular, it is this focus on „radicalisation and recruitment‟ which is central to the 
construction of the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat. This is because the 
discourse concerning „radicalisation and recruitment‟ constructs wider issues relating to the 
promotion of social cohesion and integration of „Muslim communities‟ within Europe, as key 
policy priorities in the „fight against terrorism‟. Having established how this strand of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ discourse has been constructed, the next section shall seek to 
demonstrate how the language contained within this strand of the discourse structures the 
meaning, logic and policy response to Islam and the „Muslim Other‟; how the discourse 
construct a „European‟ sense of Self in relation to a „Muslim Other‟, which is conflated with 
the perceived threat of terrorism; as well as the knowledge and practices which are 
normalised and/or legitimised by the discourse. 
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Analysing the Discursive Construction of the ‘Muslim’ Other as Potential Terrorist 
Threat 
 
The aim of this section is to analyse the processes by which the „Muslim‟ Other is 
constructed as a potential terrorist threat. It does this in three stages. First, it considers the 
construction of the „Muslim‟ Other through EU counter-terrorism policy, in order to 
demonstrate how the different words, terms, phrases and labels identified above help to 
construct a homogenous or transcendental „Muslim‟ or „Islamic‟ identity (which it is assumed 
is more susceptible to processes of „radicalisation‟ to terrorism). Second, it shows how the 
discourse which is associated with the prevention of „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to 
terrorism has played a key role in structuring the meaning, logic and policy response to 
terrorism in the post-September 11 period. Third, it aims to contextualise the threat of the 
„Muslim‟ Other as a potential security threat and explain how through the creation of a single 
category of identity (the „Muslim community‟) the process of „othering‟ can occur; as well as 
exploring the process by which this strand of the discourse securitises wider social issues 
related to that community by constructing them as part of counter-terrorism discourse. 
 
Constructing the ‘Muslim’ Other through EU Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
It is important to understand that the EU demonstrates a considerable degree of restraint in its 
use of language with regard to the question of Islam and terrorism. The focus of the policy on 
developing a „non-emotive lexicon‟ for discussing such issues is supported by the fact that 
the official policy documents do not at any point uses phrases such as „Islamic terrorism‟, 
„Islamic fundamentalism‟, „jihadists‟, „Islamofascism‟, or any of the other pejorative terms 
that have found their way into social discourse through usage in the media or by politicians in 
the public sphere.
46
 The closest the EU policy documents come to making an explicit linkage 
between Islam and terrorism is in the use of statements or phrases such as: „the terrorism 
perpetrated by Al-Qaida and extremists inspired by Al-Qaida has become the main terrorist 
threat to the Union‟; that this type of terrorism is based on a „distorted version of Islam‟; or 
the EU must seek to combat „recruitment and mobilisation for the Islamist militant movement 
                                                             
46 To provide but one example of the way in which this language is produced and reproduced in the (British) 
media, consider the musings of Melanie Phillips from the Daily Mail. Her columns regularly make reference to 
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in Europe‟.47 However, the documents make an implicit link between Islam and terrorism by 
constructing „engagement‟ or „dialogue‟ with the „Islamic‟ or „Muslim world‟ as an essential 
aspect of counter-terrorism policy. It should also be noted that although the terms „Islamic 
terrorism‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟ have not been used directly in the EU counter-terrorism 
policy documents, they are used in the Europol Terrorism Situations and Trends Report (TE-
SAT). There have been seven TE-SAT reports (from 2002-2010) and each contains a section 
devoted to „Islamic‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟. Given that Europol is the law enforcement 
agency of the EU it becomes clear that when the EU counter-terrorism documents speak of 
countering the threat from „violent religious extremism‟ or the „Islamist militant movement in 
Europe‟, in that context what they really mean is countering the threat from a specific „type‟ 
of terrorism: „Islamist terrorism‟. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the use of these terms (or concepts), to describe the type of 
terrorism perpetrated by „Al-Qaida and those inspired by Al-Qaida‟, differs depending on 
which institution or agency is analysed. The European Commission Communication on 
Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation, from 
September 2005, which would provide the basis for the EU Strategy for Combating 
Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, is quite clear in stating that „there is no such 
thing as “Islamic terrorism” [and that] the fact that some individuals unscrupulously attempt 
to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an ideology cannot be allowed in any way 
and to any extent whatsoever to cast a shadow upon such a religion or ideology‟.48 However, 
this assertion has not prevented the European Commission from referring to the „constantly 
evolving‟ threat that comes from „Islamist terrorism‟, as recently as July 2010.49 What does 
not change throughout the development of EU counter-terrorism policy are the assumptions 
which structure the meaning, logic and policy response of how best to respond to this type of 
terrorism; assumptions which it is argued implicitly construct the „Muslim‟ Other as a 
potential threat. For example, the Commission document from September 2005 concluded 
that to prevent this „type‟ of terrorism (whatever we choose to label it) the EU must seek to: 
„better promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and third 
countries, particularly those in which Islam is the predominant religion‟; and that „since 
                                                             
47 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment‟, p. 2, article 3; and of the European Union, „Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to 
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48 European Commission, „Communication concerning Terrorist recruitment‟, p. 11. 
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terrorists often target also moderate Islam, it is important to reach out to moderate Islamic 
regimes and organisations in cooperating on anti-terrorism policies‟.50 
 
It can be argued that when the EU policy speaks of, or uses terms such as the „Islamic world‟, 
the „Arab and Muslim world‟, „Muslim community‟, or any of the other catch-all phrases that 
are used as guiding categories in the discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism policy, 
it is constructing an „Other‟, in this case the „Muslim‟ Other, against which a „European‟ 
sense of Self is reinforced. However, this construction of a „Muslim‟ Other rests on an 
assumption that there is some kind of transcendental „Islamic‟ or „Muslim‟ identity that 
provides the glue with which the „Muslim community‟ is held together. However, within 
„Islam‟ or the „Muslim world‟ there is a kaleidoscope of different variations that make 
meaningful generalisations a near impossibility. This is not least because Islam has over one 
billion adherents across the globe, with Muslim majorities in some 56 countries ranging from 
Africa to South-East Asia.
51
 Making sweeping generalisations is not a simple task given the 
diversity within Islam in terms of language and culture, the five major doctrinal groupings 
and numerous smaller sects as well as differing theological traditions. In Europe alone, Fred 
Halliday has argued that „Muslim communities‟ are distinguished not just by religious 
differences but also by differences of a national, linguistic and political character.
52
 The 
„Muslims‟ of Western Europe may appear homogenous to the „non-Islamic world‟, or the 
usually self-appointed representatives of Islam, but this perception masks a stunning degree 
of heterogeneity within „Muslim communities‟ themselves. There is a variety of national 
backgrounds: „in Britain, Pakistanis, Bengalis and Indians, but also Turkish Cypriots and a 
variety of Arabs; in Germany, Turks and Bosnians; in France, Algerians, Moroccans, 
Tunisians, Senegalese, Mauritians and Turks‟ to name but a few.53 There is also a great deal 
of linguistic variations, which are concealed by these „national‟ labels, between: „Pathans, 
Punjabis and Gujeratis, between Kurds and Turks, between Algerian Arabs and Kabyles, and 
of course between the different Arab people‟.54 What these differences demonstrate is that it 
is highly problematic when the EU speaks of engaging the „Muslim community‟ in order to 
combat terrorism, given the heterogeneity that exists within that community. Whilst other 
phrases which serve to implicitly construct the „Muslim community‟ as a potential terrorist 
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threat, such as „violent religious extremism‟ or „extremist ideology‟, need to be used with 
careful consideration to the context within which they are applied.  
 
Guilain Denoeux emphasises this line of argument by pointing out that although the terms 
„Muslim‟ or „Islamic‟ are often used interchangeably there are very subtle differences in the 
usage of these two words as adjectives.
55
 He offers the example that a leading student of 
political Islam may use the term „Muslim‟ to refer to a fact, a cultural reality, whilst using 
„Islamic‟ to convey political intent. The difference is subtle but significant. In this instance a 
„Muslim country‟ is a country in which the majority of the population are Muslims. An 
„Islamic state‟ on the other hand is one in which the legitimacy of the state is derived from 
Islam and wherein that religion plays a central role in public life and the legitimisation of the 
socio-political order. Richard Jackson offers a further observation in that there are great 
variations between „Islamic fundamentalist‟ and „Islamist‟ movements, which express 
themselves in the difference between „Sunni and Shia, violent and non-violent, political and 
quietist, utopian and accomodationist, nationalist and internationalist and those that fall 
between and cross over such crude divisions‟.56 So where non-Muslims identify or speak of 
the „Muslim community‟, to denominate the communities that originate from Muslim 
countries, in reality there is no such thing as the „Muslim community‟. Instead, what is 
perceived to be a community is instead „a complex body full of contradictions and 
divergences along ethnic, ideological and generational lines and not keen on presenting 
themselves as one single entity or, being secular, do not see themselves as members of a 
religious community‟.57 
 
This line of analysis is also relevant when thinking of terms and phrases such as „extremist 
worldview‟, „violent religious extremism‟, „Islamic‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟ or the „Islamist 
militant movement in Europe‟. As Jackson points out not only is the dividing line between 
„extremists‟ and „moderates‟ context specific, it is highly porous and therefore a difficult 
distinction to make.
58
 Terms like „extremist‟ obscure the fact that many „Islamist‟ groups, 
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some which have been defined by the EU as terrorist, „engage in an array of political, social 
and cultural activities, few of which could be described as radical‟.59 Furthermore, labels such 
as those outlined above have a homogenising quality which „in itself is highly misleading 
because it lumps together an extremely diverse set of groups, cells, movements and 
individuals, and conceals the importance of local contingencies in their form and 
development‟.60.The more interesting point here is that political discourses (in this case, the 
„fight against terrorism‟) necessarily group everything together in the name of fixing them for 
policy-making purposes. The discourse does this by creating a socially constructed (or 
artificial) identity, „the Muslim community‟, which is assumed to represent a potential source 
of terrorist threat. Central to this „othering‟ process has been the language associate with 
„radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism, the importance of which shall be considered in 
the next section. 
 
‘Preventing Terrorism’: The problem with the language of ‘Radicalisation and Recruitment’ 
 
It is argued here that this discourse which is associated with the prevention of „radicalisation 
and recruitment‟ to terrorism plays a key role in structuring the meaning, logic and policy 
response to terrorism in the post-September 11 period. Furthermore, it is also a contention of 
this thesis that this strand of the discourse constructs the practice of „Islam‟ or the „Muslim 
community‟ itself as suspect; and it constructs these issues as part of a security dynamic. 
Indeed, one of the more revealing statements in the EU counter-terrorism policy can be found 
in the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism; it defines the 
threat as one predominantly represented by Al-Qaida and those inspired by Al-Qaida making 
the assertion that, „even those areas of Europe where radicalisation is not a major issue at 
present, or where large Muslim communities do not exist, could become targets for 
extremists‟.61 There are a number of assumptions at work here, in the post-September 11 
period: Al-Qaida or the „Islamist militant movement in Europe‟ is a major terrorist threat in 
Europe; in the areas in Europe where large „Muslim communities‟ exist, radicalisation is a 
major problem; and radicalisation can lead inexorably to terrorism. Jackson has offered an 
alternative perspective through which to interpret the threat of terrorism in the post-
September 11 period. He cites a number of studies on suicide terrorism, the individual 
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orientation of „Islamic extremists‟ and the statements of terrorist groups themselves as 
suggesting that religion is instead a secondary factor behind nationalism and political 
grievance. He contends that not only is „the religious language of terrorists... instrumental and 
culturally idiomatic rather than causative‟ but that „terrorism is primarily a politically driven 
phenomenon [which] emerges as a fringe activity within broader political movements and 
struggles‟.62 
 
Even though the EU recognises the complex nature of the reasons why individuals or groups 
engage in acts of terrorism; the discursive construction of EU counter-terrorism policy is 
based on a specific interpretation of what those „complex causes‟ mean. In the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse, responding to the „complex causes‟ of terrorism is synonymous with 
tackling „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism. The use of this language and discourse 
regarding the term „radicalisation‟ can however be interpreted in other ways. A recent 
seminar report, from 2005, prepared by the Centre for the Study of ‘Radicalisation’ and 
Contemporary Political Violence argued that the use of the term „radicalisation‟: first, 
assumes simplistic or mono-causal explanations of political violence based on notions of 
extremist „infection‟ or radicalisation „pathways‟; second, constructs everyday Muslim 
practices, Islamically-inspired political activism and the broader Muslim community as 
„suspect‟; third, restricts the scope of legitimate debate about foreign policy and divisive 
political domestic issues; and fourth, is counter-productive, inconsistent and highly negative 
in terms of government goals of preventing further terrorist violence.
63
 The report specifically 
argued that the use of terms like „radicalisation‟ needs to be opposed or resisted by leaders, 
scholars, activists and concerned individuals. In particular, it stated that there is a need to 
challenge the inaccuracies and unreflective use of language by terrorism „experts‟ and the 
media alike, as well as critiquing the use of words such as „terrorism‟, „radicalisation‟ and 
„extremism.‟  
    
Another element of this discourse strand is that Muslims must not only oppose terrorism but 
that they should speak their opposition to terrorism, and furthermore that moderates should 
take a lead in fighting „extremism‟ within their communities. This idea is a central element of 
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the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 2005 and the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005.
64
 A key aspect of this strand of the discourse is the 
aim of empowering moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organisations and faith groups 
in order to reject the distorted version of Islam that is put forward by Al-Qaida.  The 
implication here is that not only can one find an identifiable line between the „extremists‟ and 
the „moderates‟ but it is a problem internal to the „Muslim community‟ and therefore their 
duty to fix it.
65
 
    
Shamit Saggar has argued that there is a need to distinguish policy responses between those 
that target people who engage in terror plots and those who „look the other way‟.66 He 
indicates that the kind of policy needed to disrupt the moral oxygen for (what he calls) 
„Islamist-inspired terrorism‟ provided by those who offer the tacit support for acts of violence 
(sometimes without even knowing), provocatively dubbed „fence-sitters‟ by some 
commentators, is quite different from the policy needed to prevent those who engage in acts 
of terrorism themselves.
67
 He notes that „the kinds of intervention needed to tackle terror 
plots will be distinctive and differ from those needed to address fence-sitters, if they can be 
dubbed as such. Both targets, in turn, need to be distanced from measures aimed at the 
peaceful majority‟.68 The problem being that not all interventions are able to differentiate 
with such precision and that all Muslims, to some effect, will feel the impact of one kind of 
policy. The EU counter-terrorism policy response is not only constructed as a response 
predominantly to „Islamist-inspired terrorism‟. It is constructed through a meshing of these 
different objectives that Saggar has identified, which fail to distinguish between the different 
types of policy needed to combat „Islamist terrorism‟ itself. Furthermore, the question of 
Muslim engagement in European societies involves broader issues that should be dealt with 
separately from counter-terrorism policy objectives. The „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
has the implicit effect of reconstructing many of these issues, regarding Muslim engagement 
in mainstream society, as part of its counter-terrorism response.   
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This idea that the „Muslim community‟ should speak their opposition to terrorism is 
constructed as an important move in efforts to combat „radicalisation and recruitment‟, 
alongside another strand of the discourse which advocates countering the „extremist 
worldview‟ of the terrorists. In particular, the „narratives used by extremists‟ and „the 
methods through which terrorists find new recruits‟, are constructed as responsible for the 
perception amongst the „Muslim community‟ of a supposed „clash between the West and 
Islam‟. It is this „extremist worldview‟ which is seen as responsible for „radicalisation among 
youths‟, distorting the religion of Islam, altering „perceptions of Western policies‟ and 
„increasing suspicions of hidden agendas and double standards‟.69 
 
Saggar is in agreement with the EU proposition that there exists a „narrative‟ within „Muslim 
communities‟, which is most pressing, in terms of issues of perceived group humiliation, 
hopelessness and despair. However, in contrast to the line of argument taken in the discursive 
construction of EU counter-terrorism policy, he does not argue that this perception is a driver 
of modern „Islamist-inspired terrorism‟ in Western countries. For Saggar, that would be 
characteristic of a reductionist simplicity that is not supported by persuasive evidence. 
Instead, he argues that the drivers of political grievance are important enough to merit an 
examination of „what they suggest about generalisations concerning political violence‟.70 The 
main thrust of his argument being that while such „narratives‟ help to prop up considerable 
levels of „fence-sitting‟ about terrorism, and have played an effective role in generating the 
„moral oxygen‟ for violence, counter-terrorism policies that target a whole community are not 
a good thing. For Saggar, counter-terrorism policies have further damaged the effectiveness 
of wider goals of integration and community cohesion because they are seen as symptomatic 
of oppression of Muslims in general. Counter-narratives to Muslim oppression have been less 
visible and effective, leading to a strengthening of this „narrative‟ of oppression.  
 
Whilst the focus of the EU counter-terrorism discourse is on tackling this „narrative‟ which is 
used by members of the „Muslim community‟ both to promote „radicalisation and 
recruitment‟ in to terrorism and to justify acts of terrorism; research suggest that in fact this 
problem may have been over-emphasised. A report authored by the Change Institute for the 
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European Commission investigated the views of „145 stakeholders‟ from within the Muslim 
community across four member states, the UK, Germany, France and Denmark.
71
 The report 
was aimed at exploring the beliefs, narratives and ideologies that lead to violent radicalism, 
underpinned by an „abusive interpretation of Islam‟, and found that the prevalence, 
articulation and adoption of specifically violent radical narratives was not the predominant 
trend they identified within the study. Instead the key narratives they identified were: „living 
in a „hostile‟ society, disenfranchisement and heightened political consciousness, anti- 
imperialism and social justice, revivalism, emancipation and the personal search to be a good 
Muslim and the headscarf as liberation, bringing together a constellation of narratives‟.72 The 
emphasis placed on combating or challenging this „extremist worldview‟ (this „narrative‟) 
that underpins „violent radicalisation‟ processes, is tied into persistent social and cultural 
perceptions of Islam as threat.   
 
Contextualising the Threat of the ‘Muslim’ Other; Securitising the Muslim ‘Other’  
 
It has been argued thus far that the EU counter-terrorism policy discourse helps to reconstruct 
„European political identity‟ through a conception of the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential 
terrorist threat, against which a „European‟ sense of Self is reinforced. It is important to 
remember that the „othering‟ of „Islam‟ or „Muslims‟, as a potential security threat, has a long 
genealogy. If we think of  the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the 1973 Oil 
Crisis, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Rushdie affair of the early 1990s and of course 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent „war on terror‟, all of these events have been 
constructed as representative of a significant „Islamic‟ threat. Jocelyne Cesari has argued that 
the „European discourse on Islam is a microcosm of the debate on Islam‟s compatibility with 
the West‟.73 In particular, she contends that simplistic depictions of Islam have led to „a 
paradoxical policy of European governments both fearing and fostering radicalisation‟ as part 
of a process that she calls the „securitisation of Islam‟.74 She argues that the conditions for 
this development have already occurred: European states have identified Islam as a threat and 
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have taken measures to prevent the incubation of terrorism; this politicisation of religion 
however threatens its survival, leading devout Muslims to feel resentful of non-religious 
actors. Thus, „the measures intended to prevent radicalisation actually engender discontent 
and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism‟.75 What is novel 
about the EU approach to counter-terrorism policy is the way in which it contributes to this 
securitising process. In particular, that it constructs a single category of identity: the „Muslim 
communities in Europe and beyond‟; which in the creation of this single monolithic identity, 
the possibility of processes of othering lie.
76
 The need to „engage‟ this „community‟ to 
„prevent‟ terrorism is thus representative of this process of securitising the „Muslim Other‟. 
This is because the use of the term „engage‟ helps to construct the „Muslim community‟ as a 
group that operates in a parallel space to that of the rest of European society.  
 
It should also be noted that whilst the language of EU counter-terrorism policy may be able to 
distinguish between Islam as a peaceful religion and those who have used an abusive 
interpretation of Islam to justify acts of terrorism; a wider contextual analysis of the 
elaboration of an internal/external threat such as „Islamist‟ or „jihadi‟ terrorism reveals a 
failure to make such a distinction. Jackson argues that to a certain extent „Western identity is 
dependent on the appropriation of a backward, illiberal violent “Islamic” other against which 
the West can organise a collective liberal, civilised “self” and consolidate its cultural and 
political norms‟.77 In support of this line of argument Peter van Ham has argued that for a 
number of historical and cultural reasons „Islam performs the role of Europe‟s ultimate 
Other‟.78 Van Ham argues that for centuries Islam has been the mirror of Western culture and 
Christendom; a social representation which has reinforced a perception that the boundaries of 
the West have needed to be protected against infiltration and perversion. A central part of any 
collective European consciousness has therefore been determined by the interpretation of a 
long and violent struggle between Christendom and the Muslim world which stretches from 
the defeat of the Arabs at Tours and Poitiers in 732, via the Crusades, to „what is now 
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perceived as the somewhat primitive, pre-industrial Islamic rebellion against Western 
modernity and globalisation‟.79  
 
This historical and cultural understanding of Islam as a threat to Europe helps to provide 
context for this perception that the „Islamist militant movement in Europe‟ represents the 
main terrorist threat to Europe; or that there is a single identifiable monolithic Muslim or 
Islamic identity that is represented by the „Muslim community in Europe‟, which must also 
be „engaged‟ to counter this threat. It also helps to explain the silences in the „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse. Indeed, the discourse is underpinned by an assumption that the 
„terrorists are primarily after “us”, and that Western civilisation is the main target of 
“Islamic/Islamist/Muslim” terrorism‟.80 Rik Coolsaet has noted that in fact „framing today‟s 
main terrorist threat in these terms shows a lack of empathy with the many victims of 
terrorism in Muslim countries‟ and that „long before the first victims fell in New York and 
Washington tens of thousands of Muslims and Arab citizens had been murdered in a wave of 
terrorist attacks in Arab countries‟.81 He argues that the use of terms like „Islamic‟ or 
„Islamist terrorism‟ must be avoided in order to emphasise „that we are not confronted with a 
clash between the West and Islam, but with a common threat and challenge for Western and 
Muslim countries alike‟.82 
 
Furthermore, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse constructs both an internal and an 
external dimension to the threat from this type of terrorism, which is implicitly linked to 
Islam and the „Muslim‟ Other. Internally, the focus on „engaging‟ the „Muslim community‟ 
to combat „Al-Qaida and extremists inspired by Al-Qaida‟, as the main element of the 
preventative dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy is having a securitising effect (on that 
community). Not only does it create a single category of identity (the „Muslim community‟) 
in which the process of othering can occur; it is also reconstructing wider social issues related 
to that community as part of a security discourse. For example, the construction of policy 
goals that „target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural 
dialogue, debate, and, where appropriate, long term integration‟, are securitised through their 
construction as elements in the counter-terrorism response. In particular, it is this language 
associated with „radicalisation and recruitment‟ which is having a securitising effect (for the 
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reasons outlined above). This strand of the discourse relies on an assumption that 
„radicalisation‟ leads inexorably to terrorism; and that „radicalisation‟ is a problem inherent to 
the „Muslim community‟. Didier Bigo has argued that the EU‟s focus on clandestine terrorist 
organisations (such as Al-Qaida), as the main terrorist threat to the EU, has helped „to 
develop suspicion towards foreigners or citizens of Muslim origin‟.83 It is this suspicion of 
the other, as a potential terrorist threat, that is central to this securitisation process.  
 
The threat from this type of terrorism is also perceived to have an important external 
dimension. The focus of the discourse is not just on the „engagement‟ of „Muslim 
communities‟ in Europe but also „Muslim communities in Europe and beyond‟. Indeed, the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy stated that „radicalisation and recruitment is an international 
phenomenon‟.84  The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism identified „disrupting the activities of the networks and individuals who draw 
people into terrorism‟ as an important preventative measure, an essential aspect of which 
would be to „pursue political dialogue and target technical assistance to help others outside 
the EU to do the same‟.85 As was noted earlier, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
constructs the promotion of „good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as 
education and economic prosperity, through our political dialogue and assistance 
programmes‟, as essential to the counter-terrorism response.86 Furthermore, the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy expressed an aim to engage „with our partners overseas to assist them in 
combating radicalisation, including through co-operation and assistance programmes with 
third countries and work through international organisations‟.87 Whilst the use of words such 
as „engage‟, „help‟ and „assist‟ reflects an EU perception of its own political identity and self-
image, they also serve to deflect attention away from what is essentially a move towards the 
securitisation of its relations with third countries.  
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to show how the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
constructs the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat. It has been argued that although 
the EU has sought to develop a „non-emotive lexicon‟ for discussing issues surrounding 
„violent radicalisation‟, the EU discourse on terrorism implicitly constructs the current threat 
from terrorism as something that is linked to Muslims or Islam. This is because the strand of 
the discourse which focuses on „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism continually 
emphasises the need for „engagement‟ of „Muslim communities in Europe and beyond‟, as an 
essential preventative dimension of the EU counter-terrorism response. It is also quite clear 
that when the EU speaks of the „terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qa‟ida and extremists inspired 
by Al Qa‟ida‟ as „the main terrorist threat to the Union‟, combating „violent religious 
extremism‟, countering the „extremist worldview‟ of the „current wave‟ of terrorists or 
tackling processes leading to „violent radicalisation‟: the type of terrorism the EU is most 
preoccupied with is „Islamist‟ or „jihadi terrorism‟.  
 
With respect to the technique of analysis outlined in Chapter Two, this method allows us to 
identify the words, terms, phrases and labels, such as the „Islamic world‟, the „Arab and 
Muslim world‟, „Muslim community‟, or any of the other catch-all phrases that are used in 
the production of EU counter-terrorism policy, which are central to the construction of the 
„Muslim‟ Other. It has been argued that although the EU makes every effort to avoid failing 
to distinguish between the illegitimate use of religion for violence (by individuals), and the 
faith and practice of a religion by a majority of Muslims who believe in a religion of peace: 
the EU counter-terrorism discourse constructs the „Muslim‟ Other as a potential security 
challenge. Thus, „European political identity‟ is reconstructed through a conception of the 
„Muslim‟ Other as a potential terrorist threat, against which the „European‟ sense of Self is 
reinforced. The discourse is underpinned by a belief that this „Muslim‟ or „Islamic‟ identity 
overrides all other forms of identity; an identity which in turn makes the „Muslim 
community‟ more receptive to „radicalisation and recruitment‟ to terrorism. The assumption 
that there is a single monolithic or transcendental „Islamic‟ or „Muslim‟ identity, which 
operates in a parallel space to the rest of European society, allows for the construction of a 
single category of identity: the „Muslim community‟. A social construct which it is argued 
susceptible to processes of othering. The „Muslim community‟ is therefore securitised 
through its reconstruction as a central referent point in the „fight against terrorism‟. This 
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process of securitisation is therefore revealed through the construction of „cross-cultural‟, 
„inter-religious‟ or „inter-cultural‟ dialogue between that „community‟ and mainstream 
European society as essential aspects in the „prevention‟ of terrorism. The next chapter will 
draw together the conclusions of this thesis. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion - The ‘Fight against Terrorism’: A Hybridised 
Security Policy Discourse 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis has not been to dispute the fact that at present, sub-state terrorism 
represents a considerable threat to Europe, to the EU, to its member states and to its citizens. 
In recent years, the terrorist attacks in Europe in Madrid, in March 2004, and in London, in 
July 2005, as well as numerous failed „plots‟, highlight the very real challenge that sub-state 
terrorism has and will continue to pose to Europe. In addition, the aim of this thesis has not 
been to dispute the need for an EU counter-terrorism policy; the EU has played (and will 
continue to play) a significant role in the facilitation of cooperation between member states in 
this policy area. Nor does this thesis reject Geoffrey Edwards and Christoph Meyer‟s 
assertion that in certain instances „the EU‟s responses to the challenge have been appropriate 
and in a positive way innovative‟.1 Instead, the aim of the thesis has been to demonstrate how 
the identity of the EU is both shaped by and helps to shape the direction of EU counter-
terrorism policy. Starting from a position whereby the relationship between identity and 
counter-terrorism policy, like the relationship between discourse and policy, is assumed to be 
mutually or co-constitutive; the thesis has sought to show how the „fight against terrorism‟ is 
influenced by the EU‟s sense of Self, whilst simultaneously contributing to the construction 
or shaping of that sense of Self. 
 
It has done this by drawing attention to the often neglected role of language in the 
construction of reality; and in particular, by identifying and analysing the different narratives 
(or themes) which constitute the numerous strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse.  
It has sought to identify the main words, terms, phrases, labels and underlying assumptions 
which make up the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, and which provide a language for 
talking about terrorism; and to understand the way in which the discursive practice of the 
„fight against terrorism‟ helps to structure what is accepted knowledge about the threat of 
terrorism and how best to respond to that threat. This analysis has attempted to demonstrate 
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Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), p. 20. 
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the contested nature of this knowledge about terrorism and, specifically, to challenge the 
perception that terrorism represents either an existential or extreme threat to European 
society. Furthermore, the thesis has sought to explain how the discourse constructs the 
identity of the social actor (in this case the EU) by discerning the particular subject-position 
from which the social actor can speak as the I/We of the discourse; or in this particular case, 
how „European political identity‟ (or a „European‟ sense of Self) is being constructed, 
through counter-terrorism policy, in opposition to a notional „terrorist‟ Other. Finally, the 
thesis has aimed to investigate how certain practices are normalised or legitimised by the 
discourse through their discursive construction as central elements in the EU counter-
terrorism response. It also focuses our attention on the tendency within the EU‟s „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse to conflate the threat of terrorism with other issues, which might 
involve migration or the place of Islam (and Muslims) in European societies, leading to the 
securitisation of those issues through their reconstruction as central elements in the EU 
counter-terrorism response.     
 
Through this focus on the discourse of the „fight against terrorism‟, the thesis is intended to 
compliment other approaches to EU counter-terrorism policy, which have explored the main 
historical and legal developments of EU counter-terrorism policy; or the growing literature on 
governance and implementation of EU counter-terrorism policy, rather than be antithetical to 
them. At this point it is pertinent to restate the research questions as they will be referred to 
throughout this concluding chapter. 
 
 
1. With respect to the role of language, how has the production of EU counter-terrorism 
policy contributed to the construction of „terrorism‟ as a specific type of danger, risk 
or threat to the EU? 
 
2. Having established that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse provides a specific 
conceptualisation of the danger, risk or threat posed by terrorism, what are the main 
themes (or strands) of the discourse and how do they contribute to this specific 
conceptualisation of the „terrorist threat‟? 
 
  Chapter 7: Conclusion – The „Fight against Terrorism‟: 
  A Hybridised Security Policy Discourse 
 
214 
 
3. Having identified the main discourse strands, how does the over-arching „fight against 
terrorism‟ discourse construct a „European‟ sense of Self, understood here as 
„European political identity‟, in opposition to a „terrorist‟ Other? 
 
4. What role does this counter-terrorism discourse, the „fight against terrorism‟, play in 
the legitimisation of new security practices (within the EU), are these practices 
contributing to the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security 
policy and are they reflective of a process of „securitisation‟ of social and political life 
within Europe? 
 
The remaining sections of this chapter aim to do several things. First, it provides a number of 
reflections on the contribution of this thesis to our understanding of EU counter-terrorism 
policy, arguing that „terrorism‟ is a social construct and as such cannot be understood outside 
of the discourse through which it is constituted: the „terrorist‟ Other is a product or 
consequence of discourse. This section seeks to show how a discursive analysis of EU 
counter-terrorism policy can provide answers to the research questions outlined above. 
Second, with respect to the technique of analysis outlined in Chapter Two, this section 
explores the role of the EU counter-terrorism discourse in the „blurring‟ of internal and 
external security policies. It starts by using examples from the EU‟s counter-terrorism policy 
documents, as well as referring back to the analysis conducted in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six, to show how this ubiquitous terrorist threat is constructed. In particular, it reveals how 
the terrorist threat is assumed to have important internal and external dimensions. It is argued 
that as a result of this perception, the discourse articulates a need for policies and practices 
which blur the distinction between internal and external security. This second section then 
turns to an analysis of how these policies and practices are legitimised through their 
construction as central elements in the EU counter-terrorism response. Third, the chapter 
analyses the EU counter-terrorism discourse and its commitment to developing counter-
terrorism policies in accordance with/or respect for „human rights‟. With respect to the third 
research question, it explores how this discourse strand constructs a „European‟ sense of Self 
in opposition to the „terrorist‟ Other.  It is argued however, that not only was this strand of the 
discourse late to develop, there is also a question over the extent to which respect for „human 
rights‟ or „fundamental freedoms‟ has been applied in practice. Fourth, the chapter offers a 
number of recommendations on how to expand this research outwards beyond a focus on the 
EU and its institutions, identifying future avenues for research. These include: the synergies 
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between EU and US counter-terrorism discourse, with an explicit focus on both an analysis of 
the US as the „other‟ against which EU counter-terrorism policy is formulated and the 
„common language‟ of counter-terrorism, including the relationship between the „fight 
against terrorism‟ and the „war on terror‟; as well as another novel idea, the continuities 
between the discourse of EU „security-related research‟ and the „fight against terrorism‟. The 
chapter concludes by offering some final remarks on this discursive analysis of EU counter-
terrorism policy, including a reflection on some of the limitations of this thesis. 
 
 
Reflection on the Contribution of this Thesis to our understanding of EU Counter-
Terrorism Policy 
 
The method used was a form of critical discourse analysis. This method is underpinned by a 
theoretical commitment to Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak‟s idea that discourse should 
be understood as a form of „social practice‟; that there is a „dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation, institution and social structure that frame it‟.2 Or 
to rephrase this idea in the context of this analysis, the counter-terrorism discourse is shaped 
by the EU, but the counter-terrorism discourse is also shaping the EU (its policies, its 
practices, its identity). This thesis has demonstrated that the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ is 
more than just a set of institutional or public policy responses designed to negate the threat of 
terrorism; but that it is also an influential political discourse which has played (and will 
continue to play) an important role in the construction of counter-terrorism policy and the 
legitimisation of counter-terrorism policy responses. It has been argued that critical discourse 
analysis provides a novel approach which allow us: to map how the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse is constructed; to demonstrate how it provides a language for talking about 
terrorism; to understand how the discourse defines what is accepted knowledge about (who or 
what is) terrorism; to explain how the discourse constructs the identity of the social actor; and 
to reveal how that knowledge structures the counter-terrorism policy response as a „natural‟ 
or „common-sense‟ approach to the challenge of terrorism. It has done this in several ways.  
 
                                                             
2 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, „Critical Discourse Analysis: An Overview‟, in Van Dijk, T. A. (ed.) 
Discourse Analysis (Sage, 1996); see also Ruth Wodak, Disorders of Discourse (New York: Longman, 1996), p. 
15. 
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First, it has been argued that this approach allows us to draws out the knowledge (words, 
terms, phrases, labels and assumptions) upon which the EU counter-terrorism policy is built, 
and to understand how this knowledge contributed to a specific conceptualisation by the EU 
(or representation) of the terrorist threat in the post-September 11 period. This analysis has 
sought to examine the constituent parts of the discourse that when taken together make up the 
whole; as such, it has been argued that the EU‟s „fight against terrorism‟ consists of 
numerous themes or discourse strands. For example, Chapter Three provided an overview of 
the development of EU counter-terrorism policy, with a specific focus on the role of 
discourse. In particular, it sought to answer the first research question and explain exactly 
how the EU counter-terrorism discourse had contributed to the construction of terrorism as a 
particular type of threat to the EU. It did this by analysing the EU counter-terrorism 
documents and drawing out the different strands of the discourse. This provided the 
discursive context for the analysis of the different strands of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
discourse that was conducted in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Therefore, what this method 
(critical discourse analysis) allows us to do is to explain how those strands are constructed 
and to show how, when those strands are taken together as a whole, the EU counter-terrorism 
discourse is constituted. As such, the analysis of the different discourse strands carried out in 
those chapters helped to provide an answer to the second research question.  
 
Second, it has been argued that this approach plays a key role in illuminating the connection 
between the ideational and the material, and is attentive to often neglected issue of identity. 
As such, this method focuses our attention on how counter-terrorism discourse constitutes the 
identity of the EU by creating a subject-position whereby it can speak as the I/We of the 
discourse. In particular, it allows us to explore how the EU counter-terrorism discourse 
constructs a specific self-representation of the EU, understood here as a unique form of 
„European political identity‟, which is defined in opposition to the „terrorist‟ Other.  A main 
contention of the thesis therefore is that this method helps to reveal the techniques used to 
construct, describe and legitimise that „always-artificial distinction‟ between Self and Other, 
which is apparent in the texts that were analysed.
3
 In each of Chapters Four, Five and Six, the 
analysis focused on how the „terrorist‟ Other is constructed through the different discourse 
strands. For example, Chapter Four analysed how the discourse constructs terrorism as 
                                                             
3 Matthew Broad and Oliver Daddow, „Half-Remembered Quotations from Mostly Forgotten Speeches: The 
Limits of Labour‟s European Policy Discourse‟, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12 
(2010), p. 208. 
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primarily a „criminal act‟, but also how it constructs terrorism as something more than crime. 
The „terrorist‟ Other is thus defined as not just „criminal‟ but also „ruthless‟, „horrific‟, 
„violent‟ or „heinous‟, to name but a few of the more prominent words, terms or labels. The 
Chapter also demonstrated how the terrorist „Other‟ is constructed as a „non-state actor‟, a 
„new‟ type of terrorist committed to „maximum violence‟ and seeking to/or willing to use 
„weapons of mass destruction‟ (WMD). This type of analysis therefore allows us to draw 
attention to this continuous „othering‟ process that is achieved through discourse; a process 
which plays a key role in constructing the political identity of the EU (in opposition to the 
„terrorist‟ Other) as well as conditioning the type of policy response needed to counter the 
threat of terrorism. In particular, it is all about the creation of in-groups and out-groups: the 
EU is constructed as the in-group, a particular type of actor, with certain „values‟ which are 
assumed to be intrinsic to its conceptualisation of Self; likewise the „terrorist‟ Other is 
constructed as the out-group, as a threat to those „values‟, against which „European political 
identity‟ is reinforced   
 
This research therefore rests on an acceptance that terrorism is a social construction; a 
discursive as well as a material fact. This is the line of argument taken by Rainer Hülsse and 
Alexander Spencer, who assert that „terrorism is a social construction, hence a social fact 
produced in discourse‟.4 Following this lead, the research focused on the discourse through 
which the „terrorist‟ Other is constituted, on the basis that what „terrorism‟ is (or who the 
„terrorists‟ are) can only be „known‟ through that discourse. For these reasons, the source of 
this research has therefore been the discourse in which the social construction of terrorism 
takes place: EU counter-terrorism policy. Furthermore, it has been argued that this focus on 
discourse allow us to do other things, such as: highlight the types of security practices that 
have been constructed as central elements in the EU counter-terrorism response; as well as to 
explore the relationship between these practices and the securitisation of social and political 
life within Europe. This novel method is important for how it makes sense of the world for 
policy-makers, politicians, academics and others influenced by anti-terrorist or counter-
terrorism discourses, as well as the novel interpretations it provides (the added value, if you 
like) for understanding and explaining the social world.  The next section shall explore how 
the EU counter-terrorism discourse is contributing to the blurring of internal and external 
security through the discursive construction of this process as an essential element in the EU 
                                                             
4 Rainer Hülsse and Alexander Spencer, „The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist 
Turn‟, Security Dialogue, 39 (2008), pp.  571-592, see p. 572. 
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counter-terrorism response. 
 
 
The Blurring of Internal and External Security Policy  
 
This section of the concluding chapter explores the role of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse in the „blurring‟ of internal and external policy, investigating its connection to the 
development of new security practices. In fact, it has been argued throughout the thesis that 
the EU counter-terrorism discourse has constructed the threat of terrorism, or the threat of the 
„terrorist‟ Other, as having important internal and external dimensions. Indeed, one of the 
main aims of the research was to understand what role the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse 
has played in the legitimisation of new security practices (within the EU), and whether these 
practices were contributing to a „blurring‟ of the distinction between internal and external 
security policy, since the events of September 11, 2001 (across all the periods analysed). The 
first sub-section below draws out how this internal/external threat was constructed; it does so 
with specific reference to a number of the policy documents that were discursively analysed 
in this thesis, as well as to the analysis of the different discourse strands carried out in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. The second sub-section identifies the ways in which the „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse constructs this blurring of internal and external security policy as 
a necessary and legitimate process. In particular, it argues that the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse plays a key role in the legitimisation of a „hybridised‟ or „holistic‟ security policy 
that traverses the internal/external distinction, which is itself reflective of a „securit ising‟ 
process.   
 
 Constructing the Threat of Terrorism: An internal and external dimension  
 
The construction of an external dimension to this threat was apparent from the outset of EU 
counter-terrorism policy. One of the first EU counter-terrorism documents, the Conclusions 
and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting, released in September 
2001, stated clearly that „the fight against the scourge of terrorism‟ would target specifically 
„those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being‟.5 Conversely, 
it was the articulation of this perceived external terrorist threat, which would provide the 
                                                             
5 European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary Meeting on 21 September 2001, 
SN140/01, p. 3.  
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justification for the numerous internal security measures that were proposed to combat that 
threat. The focus on an internal dimension to the perceived terrorist threat came slightly later, 
at the end of 2003. Indeed, the European Security Strategy, from December 2003, was the 
first time that the EU began to articulate a presumption that the „current wave‟ of terrorism 
had both an internal and an external dimension. Whilst constructing the threat of terrorism as 
something that was „global in scope‟, the document was quick to recognise that „this 
phenomenon is also a part of our own society’.6 Europe was seen as ‘both a target and a base 
for such terrorism’.7 This ubiquitous internal/external threat, which is represented by the 
‘current wave’ of terrorism, has also been constructed through other strands of the ‘fight 
against terrorism’ discourse. 
 
The current period that the EU had entered was constructed as ‘new and dangerous’, with the 
perception of an „increasing risk‟ that terrorist groups might „acquire weapons of mass 
destruction‟, in the event of which it was argued „a small group would be able to inflict 
damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies‟.8 This idea of a „new‟ 
terrorism containing both an internal and an external dimension was investigated in Chapter 
Four. The conflation of the threat posed by terrorism with that posed by the proliferation of 
WMD, as an internal and external threat, was best demonstrated in the EU strategy against 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, also released in December 2003.
9
 Not only did 
the document focus on preventing the external proliferation of WMD by states of concern, in 
order to prevent „the risk of non state actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction‟; 
it also identified an internal dimension to this threat, reflected in the perception that the 
possibility of „WMD being used by terrorists present a direct and growing threat to our 
societies in this respect‟.10 Indeed, the articulation (or fear) of some type of apocalyptic 
scenario in which the „new‟ terrorist could cause previously unimaginable devastation 
remained (and still remains) latent in the background, providing further legitimacy for the 
policies advocated as part of the EU counter-terrorism response. 
 
                                                             
6 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December, 
2003, p. 4. 
7 Ibid., p. 4. 
8 Ibid., p. 5. 
9 Council of the European Union, EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels 
10 December, 2003. 
10 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 
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The need to „protect‟ the EU border and deny ease of access for potential or actual terrorists, 
discussed at length in Chapter Five, has played a key role in the construction of the „migrant‟ 
Other as a potential security threat. It also represents a clear securitisation of issues 
surrounding migration (through their reconstruction as central aspects of EU counter-
terrorism policy) and a conflation of the threat posed by the „terrorist‟ Other with that of the 
„migrant‟ Other. Again, it is an assumption which rests upon the need to combat the internal 
and external dimensions of the terrorist threat.   
 
As was discussed in Chapter Six, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse constructed another 
aspect of this internal/external terrorist threat as that represented by „violent religious 
extremism‟ or „violent radicalisation‟. It was argued that this type of terrorism has been 
constructed as having (or is characterised by) an „extremist worldview‟ or „extremist 
ideology‟ that is „willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties‟. Indeed, 
whilst the main elements of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment 
to Terrorism, 2005, focused primarily on responding to the internal dimension of this „type‟ 
of terrorism, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, argued that there was also an external 
dimension to this threat, stating that „radicalisation and recruitment is an international 
phenomenon‟.11 As such, the threat from this „type‟ of terrorism was also assumed to have 
important internal and external dimensions.  
 
More recently, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, 
argued that „terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat... [whilst] home-
grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent‟.12 Furthermore, a 
Commission Communication from May 2010 entitled „The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: 
main achievements and future challenges‟, contended that the threat of terrorism is 
continually „evolving‟.13 It argued that „threats now come both from organised terrorists and 
from so-called "lone wolves", who may have developed their radical beliefs on the basis of 
extremist propaganda and have found training materials and recipes for bombs on the 
                                                             
11 Council of the European Union, The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24 
November, 2005, 12781/1/05; Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, 30 November, 2005, 14469/4/05, see p. 9.  
12 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changing World, Brussels 11 December, 2008, S407/08, p. 4. 
13 European Commission, „The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges‟, 
Brussels, 20 July 2010, COM (2010) 386 final. 
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internet‟.14 Indeed, the ubiquitous nature of this internal/external threat is something that has 
continued to be emphasised throughout the production of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
As such, it has been argued that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse is constituted through a 
series of interlinked strands, which when taken together construct the threat of terrorism as an 
all encompassing internal/external threat to the EU. The threat of terrorism or the „terrorist‟ 
Other is simultaneously constructed as „criminal‟, involving „non-state actors‟, „new‟, 
seeking to gain access to and/or use WMD, linked to an „open‟ or „globalised‟ geo-strategic 
environment, requiring measures of „control‟ at the EU border, and linked to „violent 
religious extremism‟ or „Islamist terrorism‟ emanating both internally („home-grown‟) and 
externally to the EU. However, it is the discursive practice of this internal/external terrorist 
threat which has played a key role in the legitimisation of policies and practices that blur the 
once traditional distinction between internal and external security. The construction of 
terrorism in this way also has practical implications in that it normalises processes which treat 
internal and external security as inextricably interlinked policy domains. The next section 
shall draw out how this need for security measures that traverse the internal/external divide 
was justified, through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, and whether it was (and still is) 
representative or reflective of a process of the „securitisation‟ of social and political life 
within Europe.   
 
Normalising the Blurring of Internal and External Security Policy 
 
There are numerous examples within the EU „fight against terrorism‟ discourse where the EU 
policy documents make reference to this idea that internal and external security are 
interlinked, and that [as such] the EU needs to develop security measures that traverse the 
internal/external divide, in order to combat the perceived threat of terrorism. Not only is this 
„blurring‟ of internal and external security presented as an essential process in relation to the 
prevention of terrorism, it is also presented as a positive development (because it makes the 
EU more „secure‟) the legitimacy of which is never questioned. 
 
The European Security Strategy, 2003, made the claim that „the post Cold War environment 
is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are 
                                                             
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
  Chapter 7: Conclusion – The „Fight against Terrorism‟: 
  A Hybridised Security Policy Discourse 
 
222 
 
indissolubly linked’.15 As well as the extensive range of internal counter-terrorism measures 
developed by the EU, it has continually advocated the development of external counter-
terrorism measures. For example, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004, begun to 
focus on the need for an external dimension to the EU‟s counter-terrorism capacities; in 
particular, through the development of relationships with third countries „where commitment 
to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced‟. 16A key element of this had been the need to 
address counter-terrorism concerns into „all relevant external assistance programmes‟.17  
 
The EU‟s multi-annual internal security programme, The Hague Programme, released in 
December 2004, was revelatory in the sense that it demonstrated how the EU viewed the 
relationship between internal and external security policy. It made the statement that the need 
to tackle cross-border problems, such as terrorism, had meant that „in the field of security, the 
coordination and coherence between the internal and the external dimension has been 
growing in importance and needs to continue to be vigorously pursued‟.18 Furthermore, the 
document advocated the development of measures that blur this distinction on the basis that 
„freedom, justice, control at the external borders, internal security and the prevention of 
terrorism should henceforth be considered indivisible within the Union as a whole‟.19 Again, 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, rearticulated this idea that „the internal and 
external aspects of security are intimately linked‟.20 
 
The threat of terrorism also played a central role in the development of the EU‟s Strategy for 
the External Dimension of JHA, released in November 2005. The document argued that the 
„recent terrorist atrocities in Bali, Madrid, London, and Amman underline the fact that it is no 
longer useful to distinguish between the security of citizens inside the European Union and 
those outside, and that terrorism is increasingly international in nature‟.21 The „changing 
nature‟ of the threat posed by the terrorism had necessitated that „the Union should pursue all 
the objectives of its counter-terrorism strategy - from preventing radicalisation to improving 
                                                             
15 European Council, „European Security Strategy‟, p. 3. 
16 European Council, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 15 March, 2004, 7906/04, p. 9. 
17Ibid., p. 12. 
18 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 13 December, 2004, 16054/04, p. 3. 
19 Ibid., p. 4. 
20 Council of the European Union, „The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy‟, p. 6. 
21 Council of the European Union, A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security 
and Justice, 30 November, 2005, 14366/3/05, p. 2. 
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our response to attacks - both inside and outside its borders‟.22 Whilst, the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, stated that in relation to combating 
the threat from „terrorism and organised crime‟, the EU must „improve the way in which we 
bring together‟ the „internal and external dimensions‟ of EU security policy.23 
 
The Stockholm Programme, from December 2009, offered the clearest example of how this 
strand of the discourse, which emphasised the need for policies that traverse the distinction 
between internal and external security, had evolved. As well as advocating a number of 
internal counter-terrorism measures the document reasserted that counter-terrorism 
„cooperation with third countries in general and within international organisations needs to be 
strengthened‟.24 Section 7 of the programme was entitled „Europe in a globalised world – the 
external dimension of freedom, security and justice‟.25 In particular, it stated that „the 
European Council emphasises the importance of the external dimension of the EU's policy in 
the area of freedom, security and justice and underlines the need for the increased integration 
of these policies into the general policies of the European Union‟.26 The document 
constructed the external dimension of EU internal security policy as „crucial to the successful 
implementation of the objectives of this programme‟ and explains that the policy should „be 
fully coherent with all other aspects of EU foreign policy‟.27 Furthermore, it stated quite 
clearly that „internal and external security‟ policy were now seen as „inseparable‟ and that 
„addressing threats, even far away from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its 
citizens‟.28 
 
In May 2010, the EU CTC released a discussion paper on the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
in which it was argued that the current priority for all EU institutions would be on how to get 
„maximum advantage‟ from the opportunities provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.29 In 
particular, the CTC noted that the treaty would provide a framework for the EU to „take a 
major step forward in the coherence of its policy making, especially combining internal and 
                                                             
22 Ibid., p. 2. 
23 European Council, „Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy „, p. 4. 
24 Council of the European Union, „The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizen‟, Brussels 2 December 2009, 17024/09, p. 52. 
25 Ibid., p. 73. 
26 Ibid., p. 73. 
27 Ibid., p. 73. 
28 Ibid., p. 73. 
29 Council of the European Union, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Discussion Paper, Brussels 10 May, 2010, 
9685/10. 
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external aspects of policy‟.30 Specifically, the document identified a number of challenges for 
the future of EU counter-terrorism policy, one of which was the need for „connecting internal 
and external security‟.31 The document asserted that because „almost every major terrorist 
plot has an international dimension‟ there is a necessity to „develop and focus the external 
dimension of EU CT policy‟. The document explained that as recently as 2008 „the Union 
had a limited range of external political dialogues on counter-terrorism, but no direct 
programmes of assistance and capacity building‟.32 Since then „the Commission and 
successive Presidencies‟ have „developed political dialogues with key countries supporting 
the implementation of the Union's first ever international assistance programmes in the CT 
field‟. The EU now has „an €15 Million programme underway in Pakistan, a similar €15 
Million programme about to start in Yemen and a €10 Million programme in the Sahel‟.33 
The document went on to list a number of other policy priorities for the future that would 
help to further „connect‟ the internal and external dimensions of EU counter-terrorism policy 
and security policy more generally. 
 
With respect to the techniques of analysis outlined in Chapter Two, it is clear from this 
exploration of the EU counter-terrorism documents that the perceived threat of terrorism has 
played a central role in facilitating the emergence of new security policies and practices that 
are challenging the traditional distinction between what is considered internal security and 
what is considered external security. The „fight against terrorism‟ discourse makes 
continuous reference to the idea that „internal‟ and „external‟ security policies are „intimately‟ 
or „indissolubly‟ linked. As such, the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse plays a key role in 
the construction of these new security practices, which traverse the boundaries between the 
two policy areas, as essential elements in the EU counter-terrorism response. The need for 
these policies is in turn based on this conceptualisation of a „new‟ threat environment, 
articulated succinctly throughout the production of counter-terrorism policy. Indeed, 
numerous policies, including management, surveillance and control at the European border, 
the implementation of biometric technology, the targeting of „Muslim communities‟ as a 
potential threat, even trade and development assistance, are all presented as having important 
internal/external security implications and all are linked to the articulation of this ubiquitous 
terrorist threat.  
                                                             
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 Ibid., p. 2. 
32 Ibid., p. 6. 
33 Ibid., p. 6. 
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The merging of internal and external security is a process which Didier Bigo has referred to 
as the „de-differentiation‟ of the question of internal and external security; that this process 
was already underway before the events of September 11, 2001, is not in question.
34
 Nor is 
there a question over Bigo‟s assertion that the „trans-nationalisation‟ of security concerns has 
meant that the distinction between internal and external security has become increasingly 
difficult to maintain.
35
 Instead, what should cause concern are the types of policies and 
practices which are legitimised and/or normalised by this discourse; a discourse which 
proclaims that this process should be vigorously pursued. As Derek Lutterbeck has explained 
(in the context of Western Europe and with a specific focus on the EU), this convergence of 
internal and external „security agendas‟ is having a real impact in practice.36 He notes for 
example, that „while police forces are taking on military characteristics, and are extending 
their activities beyond the borders of the state, military forces are turning to internal security 
missions, and are adopting certain police features‟.37 Indeed, „the growing involvement of 
military forces in domestic security, the convergence between foreign intelligence and law 
enforcement, or the increasingly prominent role being played by „intermediary‟, i.e. neither 
purely internal nor purely external security forces‟, are all important issues that have been 
neglected at present.
38
 
 
It is important to understand that the reach of this „holistic‟ or „hybridised‟ form of security 
goes beyond the traditional boundaries of „internal security‟ (understood now as security at 
the European level). As Bigo argues „on the one hand, reach is geographic, with the 
dimension of European (and trans-Atlantic?) cooperation; on the other, the reach derives 
from the role and duties of the various agencies affected to security‟.39 Bigo explains how this 
EU internal security framework now includes „a range of measures concerning information 
exchange, police and judicial cooperation, the security of travel documents, money 
laundering, the freezing of assets, specific instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant 
and the EU evidence warrant... the setting or reinforcement of specific institutions such as 
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35 Didier Bigo, „When Two become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe‟, in Morten Kelstrup 
and Michael C. Williams (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, 
Power, Security and Community, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 171-/205. 
36 Derek Lutterbeck, „Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western 
Europe‟, European Security, 14:2 (June 2005), pp. 231-/253.  
37 Ibid., p. 231. 
38 Ibid., p. 232. 
39 Didier Bigo, „Globalized-in-security‟, p. 118. 
  Chapter 7: Conclusion – The „Fight against Terrorism‟: 
  A Hybridised Security Policy Discourse 
 
226 
 
Eurojust, the new powers given to Europol, the automation and acceleration of procedures, 
reinforced control over the Internet, enhanced surveillance of mass demonstrations and the 
launch of routinised discussions between the intelligence services‟, all internal policies or 
practices that have been linked to the prevention of terrorism and which have (or are 
constructed as having) important external dimensions.
40
 However, the reach of these new 
policies and practices go beyond or exceed „the actual borders of the European Union when 
[they] create demands on EU candidate countries, such as those placed on the ten new 
member countries to be added to the EU in 2004, or when it extends to the EU‟s “circle of 
friends,” by conditioning economic aid to the permission to have police and immigration 
activities inside each of these countries‟.41 
 
These new security practices, which are blurring the once clear distinction between internal 
and external security policy, are the result of more than just the discursive practice of security 
discourse(s). Yet, the development of these new security practices can only be understood 
within the context of the discursive construction of a „new‟ threat environment and the 
constant articulation of this all-encompassing terrorist threat. As such, this thesis has sought 
to identify the ways in which the „fight against terrorism‟ discursively securitises issues by 
reconstructing them as essential elements in the counter-terrorism response. It has been 
argued that, given the nature of EU counter-terrorism policy, when an issue area is 
constructed as a central element in the „fight against terrorism‟ it is immediately securitised. 
However, it is also important to recognise or be aware that the „securitisation‟ process can 
occur in a multitude of ways and just as often through non-discursive practices. If we return 
to the conceptualisation of the process of „securitisation‟ outlined in Chapter Two, then 
„securitisation‟ should be understood as a complex process that incorporates both discursive 
and non-discursive practices. Indeed, securitisation processes in the EU occur just as often 
through the quiet, technical and unspectacular procedures and practices of security, much of 
which Andrew Neal has argued „does not declare itself to be in the name of security at all’, as 
it does through discursive statements of threat and danger (articulated in the policy 
documents).
42
 The next section shall consider EU counter-terrorism policy, the discourse 
strand of „respect for human rights‟ and the construction of European political identity. 
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EU Counter-Terrorism Policy and ‘Respect for Human Rights’ 
 
Alongside the development of these new policies and practices of security, which are 
constructed as central to the „fight against terrorism‟, rests a question as to the implications 
that such practices will have on the „fundamental rights‟, „privacy rights‟ and/or „human 
rights‟ of the individual citizen and non-citizen alike. Throughout the production of EU 
counter-terrorism policy (and security policy more generally) we can detect a number of 
discursive statements as to the importance of these rights. The articulation of a set of social 
and political values, such as „democracy‟, „fundamental freedoms‟ or „human rights‟, provide 
the basis for the construction of „European political identity‟ (and reflect a certain „European‟ 
sense of Self), through the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. It also plays a key role in the 
construction of an in-group (the EU) which is defined in opposition to the out-group (the 
„terrorist‟ Other), who is constructed by implication (and in certain instance by explicit 
statements) as a challenge or a threat to the in-group (to their values and their identity).   
However, as the next section will demonstrate, not only was this strand of the discourse 
(which emphasises respect for „human rights‟) late to develop (there is only passing reference 
to „human rights‟ in the Tampere Programme, 1999); there is also a question over the 
discursive assertion (or self-perception) that the EU is committed to developing security 
measures that respect „human rights‟, as well as to what extent respect for „human rights‟ or 
„fundamental freedoms‟ have been applied in practice.43 
 
The Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting, from 
September 2001, promised that the EU would „step up its action against terrorism through a 
coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies‟, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring that this approach would be „reconciled with respect for the 
fundamental freedoms which form the basis of our civilisation‟.44 Interestingly, whilst the 
policy document which outlined the Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home 
Affairs), also from September 2001, referred to a series of measures needed to „maintain the 
highest level of security‟ including measures to combat terrorism, there was no mention of 
developing these policies in accordance with/or respect for human rights. In relation to 
„measures at borders‟ the JHA Council invited the Commission to investigate the relationship 
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between „safeguarding internal security‟ and compliance with „international protection 
obligations and instruments‟.45 However, the need to ensure „fundamental‟ or „human rights‟ 
was at this point missing from the discourse. 
 
The European Security Strategy, 2003, also made only passing reference to the issue of 
„human rights‟. It argued that the best way to ensure European security (externally) would be 
through the promotion of a „world of well-governed democratic states‟, which could only be 
achieved through the „spreading’ of ‘good governance’, support for ‘social and political 
reform’, dealing with ‘corruption and abuse of power’, ‘establishing the rule of law’ and 
importantly ‘protecting human rights’.46 The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, March 
2004, whilst speaking of „respecting the rule of law‟ and „respecting due process‟, again 
made absolutely no mention of the need to consider the role of/or to ensure respect for 
„human rights‟ in the production of EU counter-terrorism policies.47  
 
The first time the more general internal security policy documents explicitly made reference 
to the need to ensure respect for/or accordance with „human rights‟ was in The Hague 
Programme, from December 2004. The document argued that the citizens of Europe „expect‟ 
the EU to effectively combat cross-border problems such as terrorism „while guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental freedoms and rights‟.48 Specifically, the document advocated for the 
first time the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU treaty base to 
ensure that the EU, and its institutions, would be „under a legal obligation to ensure that in all 
its areas of activity, fundamental rights are not only respected but also actively promoted‟.49 
With particular reference to terrorism, the document stated that „effective prevention and 
combating of terrorism in full compliance with fundamental rights requires Member States 
not to confine their activities to maintaining their own security, but to focus also on the 
security of the Union as a whole‟.50 The document made a number of similar statements that 
policies or measures agreed upon under The Hague Programme must „strike the right balance 
between law enforcement purposes and safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals‟.51 
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The document spoke of incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EU treaty 
base; as well as extending „the mandate of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia towards a Human Rights Agency‟.52 However beyond these basic proposals, and 
the discursive assertion that human rights must be incorporated into the security policies of 
the EU, there was little explanation of how this would be achieved. 
 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, November 2005, was the first counter-terrorism 
document, released by the European Council, to discursively construct the issue of respect for 
„human rights‟ as a strategic element of the EU counter-terrorism response. Indeed, the 
headline goal was a „strategic commitment‟ to „combat terrorism globally while respecting 
human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice‟.53 The document asserted that terrorism continued to pose a „serious 
threat‟ to „the values of our democratic societies‟ and „the rights and freedoms of our 
citizens‟. In responding to this problem, the strategy was also clear to state that in the pursuit 
of the terrorist(s), any effort to bring them to „justice‟ must be conducted „while continuing to 
respect human rights and international law‟.54 
 
The Stockholm Programme, released in December 2009, was the first security policy 
document to place a substantial focus on the protection of/or respect for „fundamental‟ or 
„human rights‟. The first section of the document outlined the „political priorities‟ currently 
facing the EU, stating at the outset that „it is of paramount importance that law enforcement 
measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law [and] international 
protection rules go hand in hand‟.55 The document listed five key „political priorities‟, the first 
of which was „promoting citizenship and fundamental rights‟. In particular, it stated that „the 
area of freedom, security and justice must above all be a single area in which fundamental 
rights are protected‟.56 Indeed, the second section of the document was entitled „Promoting 
citizens' rights: a Europe of rights‟, and outlines in great detail an EU commitment to 
ensuring respect for human rights in all „legal initiatives‟, „legislative processes‟ and the 
development of all „policies and legislation‟.57  
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The Stockholm Programme is important in that it was also the first time that a security policy 
document explained how the discursive commitment to the protection of/or respect for 
„human rights‟ (in the „fight against terrorism‟ but also security policy more generally) would 
be achieved in practice. In particular, the European Council „invited‟ (not required), the 
European Commission to „submit a proposal on the accession of the EU to the European 
Convention on Human Rights as a matter of urgency‟; the EU institutions „to ensure that 
legal initiatives are and remain consistent with fundamental rights throughout the legislative 
process [through the] rigorous monitoring of compliance with the Convention and the rights 
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights‟; and for the EU institutions to make „full use of 
the expertise of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and to consult, where 
appropriate, with the Agency, in line with its mandate, on the development of policies and 
legislation with implications for fundamental rights‟.58  
 
With specific reference to terrorism, The Stockholm Programme stated that „measures in the 
fight against terrorism must be undertaken within the framework of full respect for 
fundamental rights so that they do not give rise to challenge‟ and furthermore, that „the Union 
must ensure that all tools are deployed in the fight against terrorism while fully respecting 
fundamental rights‟.59 Section seven of the document draws out the „external dimension of 
freedom, security and justice‟ (that is the external dimension of EU internal security policy) 
in which it also dedicates an entire section to „human rights‟. The document explained that 
„the Lisbon Treaty offers the Union new instruments as regards the protection of fundamental 
rights both internally and externally‟ and as such it calls for the „establishment of a Human 
Rights Action Plan to promote its values in the external dimension of JLS policies‟.60  
 
This section has sought to draw out how respect for „human rights‟ or developing counter-
terrorism policies in accordance with „human rights‟ has been constructed as a central 
element in the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. With respect to the third research question 
(outlined in Chapter One and above), it has been argued that this strand of the discourse plays 
a key role in the construction of „European political identity‟ (an EU sense of Self/or self-
representation) through a commitment to certain „values‟ (e.g. human rights), in opposition to 
the „terrorist‟ Other, who is constructed as antithetical or inimical to those „values‟. However, 
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it has also been argued that whilst respect for „human rights‟ is constructed within the 
discourse as a central aspect of this sense of „Self‟, quite how this commitment would be 
carried out in practice is not articulated. The next section will focus on future avenues for the 
expansion and development of this research.  
 
 
Future Avenues for Expanding this Research 
 
 This section aims to draw out two separate lines of inquiry that can provide the basis for the 
development of this research. The first line of inquiry relates to the relationship between US 
counter-terrorism discourse, the „war on terror‟, and EU counter-terrorism discourse, the 
„fight against terrorism‟. The second line of inquiry relates to the relationship between the 
discourse of EU security-related research and the „fight against terrorism‟. This section is 
split into four sub-sections. The first offers a brief explanation of the difference between the 
EU and US approaches. The second sub-section considers the potential for analysing these 
differences between the EU and US approach to counter-terrorism through the prism of 
identity formation; in particular, highlighting the possibility of interpreting the US as the 
„other‟ against which EU counter-terrorism policy is formulated. The  third offers an analysis 
of a number of joint EU and US declarations on terrorism in order to demonstrate the 
similarities in the discursive formations, demonstrating the existence of what Richard Jackson 
has called a „common language of counter-terrorism‟.61 It then offers a number of 
recommendations for how to carry out this research, as well as why a comparison of the two 
discursive formations would be insightful. The fourth sub-section contends that there are a 
number of similarities between the ideas contained within the different EU counter-terrorism 
policy documents and those contained in the security-related research documents 
commissioned by the European Commission to provide advice on EU security policy. It 
argues that this is an interesting avenue for research given the type of relationship that exists 
between the providers and end-users of this research; and its role in the formulation of 
security policy more generally.  
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US influence, the ‘war on terror’ and the EU ‘fight against terrorism’ discourse 
 
Fraser Cameron has argued that the terminology used to describe the response to the terrorist 
threat by the US (the „war on terror‟) and by the EU (the „fight against terrorism‟) is 
representative of the difference in approaches.
62
 The US has focused primarily on the external 
dimension of the threat posed by „international terrorism‟, emphasising an approach based on 
military means; whilst the EU has focused primarily on the internal response to the threat of 
terrorism, emphasising an approach based on police, judicial and intelligence cooperation.  
For Cameron, in response to the events of September 11, 2001, most European governments 
tried to distance themselves from „other Bush rhetoric like the “axis of evil” speech, his calls 
for pre-emptive strikes and his demand that allies follow the US‟.63 As such, Cameron has 
argued that „Europeans... do not believe that terrorism can be fought primarily with military 
means‟.64 Indeed, this focus on the military dimension of counter-terrorism responses is what 
has differentiated the US approach from the European. It is this military dimension which 
Jackson has called the most visible and controversial practice of the „war on terror‟, reflected 
through „the construction of a global military campaign involving two major wars, covert 
assassinations, foreign military assistance programmes and the expansion of America‟s 
military presence into new regions‟.65 The next sub-section will briefly explore this point of 
departure between the two discursive formations, arguing that it is possible to understand this 
difference in approach to counter-terrorism as something related to the self-perception of the 
EU as a qualitatively different type of actor in world politics  
 
The difference between the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘fight against terrorism’: The US as the 
EU’s ‘Other’ against which policy is formulated 
 
Whilst there are quite obviously a many number of similarities in relation to both the types of 
counter-terrorism policies that have been pursued and the type of language central to the 
construction of each discursive formation; it is important to consider the potential for 
understanding the difference in US and EU counter-terrorism responses as being shaped by 
the EU‟s own self-perception as a different type of actor in world politics. From this 
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perspective, the EU counter-terrorism response can be viewed as a policy shaped by the EU‟s 
relationship with the US as the „other‟ against which its own sense of self is defined. This is 
not to argue that the „war on terror‟ and the „fight against terrorism‟ are not intimately linked; 
the similarities discussed below highlight the many ways in which they are linked, 
particularly with respect to what Jackson has called a „common language of counter-
terrorism‟. However, it will be argued briefly that the differences in the approach to counter-
terrorism adopted by the EU and the US after the events of September 11, 2001, can also be 
interpreted through the prism of identity formation. 
 
The role of the EU as an actor in world affairs was described by François Duchêne in the 
1970s as one of a „civilian power‟; his argument was later developed further by Ian Manners 
who argued that this role could be interpreted as one of a „normative power‟.66 Without 
engaging in a detailed analysis of these concepts (including their similarities, differences and 
problems), the main argument put forth by supporters of these concepts is that traditional 
forms of military power („hard power‟) have given way to more progressive forms of power 
such as „civilian‟ or „normative‟ power („soft power‟) as means through which actors can 
exert influence in world affairs. Indeed, the EU has embraced the idea of itself as a 
„normative power‟ and this can be identified in the numerous declarations contained within 
its internal, external and counter-terrorism security policy documents. For example, a 
European Commission document from 2007, outlining EU commitments in its foreign policy, 
spoke of using its „soft power‟ to seek a „close relationship with its neighbours‟ as well as to 
„work with others to spread the advantages of open markets. Economic growth and a political 
system based on social responsibility and democracy‟.67 These types of commitments can be 
detected throughout the documents that were analysed for the purpose of the research 
conducted in this thesis. For example, the European Security Strategy, 2003, advanced the 
idea of an „international order based on effective multilateralism‟ as an essential aspect of any 
attempt to combat threats such as terrorism.
68
 The document argued that these „new threats‟ 
could not be dealt with solely by military means, noting that each would require „a mixture of 
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instruments‟. Terrorism it was noted would have to be tackled through a mixture of 
intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means‟.69 Although the document identified a 
military dimension to the counter-terrorism response, the main thrust of the document 
highlighted the diffusion of EU norms, such as „integration‟, „cooperation‟, „consolidation‟ 
and „effective multilateralism‟, into the international system, as the most effective way 
through which to combat threats such as terrorism. 
 
At present, although there are questions arising over the impact the increasing militarisation 
of the EU is having on its role as a „normative power‟, the basic proposition here holds. The 
EU development of a „fight against terrorism‟, with its commitment to the „rule of law‟, 
„dialogue‟ , „negotiation‟, „solidarity‟ and „cooperation‟ between states, can also be 
interpreted as a way in which the EU has sought to distinguish itself as a qualitatively 
different actor in world politics.
70
 With respect to the issue of „terrorism‟, the normative 
commitments of the EU response can also be interpreted as a way in which the EU has sought 
to distinguish itself from the counter-terrorism policies of the US, which as noted above has 
focused primarily on the military dimension of its counter-terrorism response. For example, if 
we examine briefly the US „National Strategy for Combating Terrorism‟, 2006, the 
differences become quite apparent.
71
 The opening prologue to the document makes a number 
of ideational claims about the US being „at war with a transnational terrorist movement 
fuelled by a radical ideology of hatred‟ and that „the “War on Terror” is a different kind of 
war‟.72 This is accompanied by a number of policy proposals that promote intervention in 
third states in order to prevent terrorism, including for example proposals aimed at denying 
„terrorists‟ the „support and sanctuary of rogue states‟ and denying „terrorists control of any 
nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror‟. The difference in approach can 
certainly be traced back to a difference in institutional capacity between the two actors; 
however, it is argued here that the difference can also be attributed to identity and the self-
perception of each actor. Indeed, much has been made of the idea of American 
exceptionalism in relation to the conduct of its foreign policy and its self-perception as a 
„world policeman‟, and particular with regard to the pursuit of terrorists or in dealing with 
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rogue states.
73
 However, any EU claim to a „civilising‟ or „normative power‟, which it can be 
claimed is reflected through the type of counter-terrorism policies it pursues, can also be 
interpreted as a claim to exceptionalism and as a way of defining the EU sense of self in 
opposition to the American „other‟. 
 
The Common Language of EU-US Counter-Terrorism Discourse 
 
Having noted the differences in the approaches taken to counter-terrorism policy by the EU 
and the US, it is important to remember that regardless of those differences both the 
formulation of policy and the construction of the different discourses remain intimately 
linked.
74
 As Wyn Rees explains, whilst transatlantic security cooperation on counter-
terrorism has been undermined as a result of difference over the external dimension of the 
counter-terrorism response, this contrast in threat perception has not prevented the 
development of significant cooperation in internal security matters between the US and EU.
75
 
The analysis in this next section will now investigate the similarities in the counter-terrorism 
discourse(s), drawing attention to numerous „joint declarations‟ between the EU and US on 
counter-terrorism matters. It is argued that the different strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse, that can be identified in these declarations, are representative of what Jackson has 
called a „common language of counter-terrorism‟, which are central to the discursive 
construction of both EU and US counter-terrorism discourse. Finally, this section offers ideas 
for ways to take this research forward in the future. 
 
There have been a number of EU-US „joint declarations‟ on combating terrorism. The 
declaration from June 2004, entitled the „EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism‟ is 
particularly revealing.
76
 Principally, the document advocated enhanced cooperation between 
both parties under the seven objectives of the EU Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 
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contained in the EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which was released three months 
prior in March 2004. With respect to the method of analysis outlined in Chapter Two, a brief 
exploration of these documents reveals several interesting points. 
 
The declaration stated that the EU and the US would seek to improve „dialogue and action at 
all levels‟, whilst „sharing a commitment to protect and respect human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law on which our societies are founded‟. The declaration also 
rearticulated certain strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse, which have helped to 
form a common threat perception of terrorism and how best to respond to that threat. In 
particular, the declaration constructed terrorism as a threat to EU and US identity by stating 
that the common values of both actors, that is „human rights‟, „fundamental freedoms‟ and 
the „rule of law‟, are ideals „which terrorism seeks to destroy‟. It can also be argued that the 
proposals to improve legal coordination and cooperation on law-enforcement reveal an 
embedded perception of terrorism as a „criminal act‟. The declaration also focused on a need 
for „effective systems of border control‟ to help prevent terrorism; again conflating issues 
surrounding migration with terrorism. The strand of the discourse which constructs terrorism 
as an existential or extreme threat to society can also be detected in relation to articulation of 
a need to coordinate responses to terrorist attacks, „including attacks using CBRN 
contaminants‟. There is also an externalisation of the terrorist threat (outside of the EU and 
the US) with the document advocating developing „counter-terrorist objectives into the work 
of external assistance programmes‟.  
 
More recently, in January 2010 there was the Toledo „joint statement‟ on aviation security 
and in June 2010 another EU-US „declaration on combating terrorism‟. The Toledo 
Statement was released after a meeting between Ministers of the Member States of the EU 
and the US Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to discuss „current terrorist 
threats‟ and in particular, the attempted attack in Detroit on 25 December 2009. Again, the 
different strands of the discourse are articulated in order to legitimise counter-terrorism 
cooperation. The document stated that „the rights threatened by terrorism, such as life, liberty 
and security of person, are among the most cherished human rights‟ and as such, in 
responding to that threat „the preservation of those rights is a fundamental task and a shared 
responsibility‟. In the Toledo Statement „international air transportation‟ is constructed as „a 
global resource on which we all rely‟; a resource which it is argued is threatened by 
terrorism. As such, it is the „responsibility‟ of the EU and the US to „prevent terrorists and 
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serious criminals from conducting, planning, and supporting operations with the intention to 
cause harm to our populations including by exploiting civil aviation‟. Again, it is stated that 
this must be done with „respect for international law, including international human rights 
law‟. There is also a reassertion (or an externalisation) of the „the international nature of this 
threat‟, which in turn „demands an international response‟. 
 
Likewise, the 2010 EU-US Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism also rearticulated 
numerous strands of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse in the process of constructing a 
framework for counter-terrorism cooperation. The document reaffirmed a commitment to 
„respect for the rule of law, including human rights law‟ as fundamental elements of 
„international efforts in the fight against terrorism‟ and as „the basis of our shared action‟, 
outlining a framework for cooperation under three main sections. The first section focused on 
combating terrorism „in accord with our fundamental values‟, in particular constructing 
terrorism as a „criminal act‟ which is inimical to those values. The second section focused on 
a number of policy priorities that would need to be „brought‟ to combat terrorism, „including 
law enforcement, judicial cooperation, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and security‟. The 
final section outlined the need for „an effective and comprehensive approach to diminish the 
long term threat of violent extremism‟, which specifically focused on integrating the policy to 
combat „radicalisation and recruitment‟ into the EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation 
framework. These „joint declarations‟ on combating terrorism are important because they 
embody the common ground (or the common threat perception) upon which cooperation and 
coordination of counter-terrorism policy between the EU and the US has taken (and will 
continue to take) place. Furthermore, from the perspective of a discursive analysis of counter-
terrorism discourse(s) they are revelatory because they also represent what Jackson has called 
the „common language of counter-terrorism‟.77  
 
Indeed, this analysis therefore gives credence to Jackson‟s assertion that many of the words, 
terms, phrases, labels and assumptions that are central to the EU and the US counter-
terrorism texts (that he has also discursively analysed) are representative of a „common 
language of counter-terrorism‟. Jackson identifies four key similarities between the EU and 
the US counter-terrorism discourse. First, both actors treat terrorism as a form of nonstate 
political violence carried out by individuals and groups, often working in networks. He 
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argues that this conceptualisation limits our understanding of terrorism to a form of 
illegitimate violence which is carried out by individuals and groups against the state; whilst 
other conceptualisations of terrorism, for example as a repressive form of governance or 
counter-insurgency carried out by state actors, remain silent or are never articulated. Second, 
there is an assumption that „small group terrorism‟ poses a clear, unprecedented and 
existential or extreme threat to modern societies. Terrorism does not just represent a threat to 
the lives of EU or US citizens, it is also a challenge to their „values‟ or to their „way of life‟. 
Furthermore, at present the primary type of terrorist threat to both the EU and the US is 
assumed to be the Al-Qaida „organisation‟ or „network‟, which is itself considered to be part 
of a wider „Islamic‟ or „Islamist‟ terrorist threat to Western democracies. Third, this 
„common language‟ of the EU and US counter-terrorism discourse(s) constructs the present 
terrorist threat as something that is a „new‟ phenomenon, which is religiously motivated 
rather than politically, willing to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and committed to 
indiscriminate mass casualties. Fourth, Jackson contends that another similarity in both EU 
and US counter-terrorism discourse is the assumption that „coercive forms of 
counterterrorism are a legitimate and effective response and, in any case, given the nature of 
the „new‟ terrorism facing the world, are the only realistic alternatives‟.78  
 
Although there are a number of similarities between the US and the EU counter-terrorism 
discourse(s), there are also a number of significant differences. Jackson identifies the main 
difference being the tendency within US counter-terrorism texts to refer to terrorism as an 
„act of war‟; whereas in the EU texts the documents refer to terrorism primarily as a „criminal 
act‟ (there are no references within EU texts which conflate terrorism with an act of war). 
Certainly, the research conducted in this thesis provides support for many of these 
propositions about the language of counter-terrorism discourse. With respect to Jackson‟s 
first three assertions, Chapter Four demonstrated how the EU conceptualises terrorism as 
primarily: an act of violence (or the threat of violence) by non-state actors (individuals or 
groups) against the state and its interests; an ideational threat to the „values‟ or the „way of 
life‟ of the EU and its member states, as much as it is a material threat to the lives of EU 
citizens; and in the post-September 11 period a „new‟ type of threat committed to „maximum‟ 
or „indiscriminate violence‟, including the acquisition and use of WMD‟s. EU counter-
terrorism discourse is replete with reference to this type of language. Furthermore, the „fight 
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against terrorism‟ discourse is based on a number of assumptions about the need to develop 
(and implement) new security practices in order to combat or protect against that threat. As 
such, the EU discourse constructs numerous repressive or coercive measures as central 
elements in the counter-terrorism response.       
 
In order to take this analysis forward, an interesting avenue for further research would be to 
investigate in much greater detail the relationship between the US counter-terrorism 
discourse and the EU counter-terrorism discourse. In order to do this, a discursive analysis of 
US security documents, including the numerous US Counter-Terrorism Strategies that have 
been released since September 11, 2001, (in 2002, 2006 and 2010), or the US National 
Strategies for Combating Terrorism (in 2003 and 2006), alongside a much broader analysis of 
the numerous EU-US „joint statements‟ or „joint declarations‟ is recommended to identify the 
main strands of the US counter-terrorism discourse. Once this has been conducted a 
comparison between the two discursive formations would be illuminating, especially with 
regard to the question as to the extent to which the US represents the „other‟ against which 
EU counter-terrorism policy has been formulated. Importantly, as Jackson highlights, the 
point that core elements of the „common language‟ of the present counter-terrorism discourse 
are not unique to the EU and the US is also another interesting avenue for research. He argues 
that they also form „the basis of counterterrorism discourse in most states, especially those 
allied to the „war on terrorism‟, and in all major international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the like‟.79 They are also reproduced in the media, 
in a great number of academic texts and at many other sites of discursive production. As 
such, another way of taking this research forward would be to investigate in greater detail the 
relationship between the EU counter-terrorism discourse and the UN discourse on terrorism, 
through an analysis of the numerous UN Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and the 
recent UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006. Alongside the influence of the US on 
the EU counter-terrorism discourse, there is another interesting area of influence which shall 
be analysed in greater detail in the next section: the impact of security-related research.  
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Security Research 
 
As part of the „Protect‟ dimension of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005, the document 
stated that „to support work‟ in the fields of „border security‟, „transport security‟ and „critical 
infrastructure protection‟, „EU research and development policy including the European 
Commission‟s R&D programmes should continue to include security related research in the 
context of terrorism‟.80  Indeed, there are numerous references to the importance of security-
related research throughout the reports of the EU CTC. For example, the report from May 
2006 constructed „security-related research and development‟ as „indispensable to address the 
threat of conventional and non-conventional terrorist attacks‟.81 The most recent CTC reports, 
from June and November 2009, contained specific sections on „security-related research‟ for 
counter-terrorism purposes.
82
 Indeed, the report from November 2009 highlighted research 
being conducted under the EU‟s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7) of which a full theme is dedicated to „security research‟. This area has a 
budget of €1.4 billion and includes research projects on violent radicalisation, border control, 
detection of CBRN materials and the ethical dimension of security technology. Interestingly, 
although the research is supposed to address „exclusively civil security‟, it also „recognises‟ 
that „there are areas of dual use technology relevant to both civilian and military applications‟ 
(or the blurring of internal and external security), and as such „coordination is taking place 
with the European Defence Agency‟.83 
 
Security-related research falls under the remit of the European Commission and is part of the 
DG for Enterprise and Industry; it should also be noted that it is rather interestingly not part 
of the DG for Research. The decision to create an EU Security Research Programme (ESRP) 
was taken by the Commission in 2003 and became fully operational in 2007.
84
 The 
development of the ESRP was heavily tied into a number of reports commissioned by the 
European Commission to review EU security policy and make recommendations for the 
future. Without going into any great detail, these reports include: the European Advisory 
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Group on Aerospace (EAGA) report, entitled the Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21
st
 
Century (Star21) released in July 2002; the Group of Personalities report (GoP), entitled 
Research for a Secure Europe, released in March 2004; the European Security Research 
Advisory Board (ESRAB) report, entitled Meeting the Challenge: The European Security 
Research Agenda, released in September 2006; and the European Security Research and 
Innovation Forum (ESRIF) report, entitled European Security Research and Innovation in 
Support of European Security Policies, released in December 2009.
85
 
 
Ben Hayes has argued that much of the research conducted within these reports is corporate- 
led, and advocates the public procurement of new security technologies, including the 
development of new EU security policies that mandate their implementation.
86
 A brief survey 
of the membership of the different groups advising on EU security related research and 
therefore EU security policy reveals a great deal of vested interest. The make-up of these 
groups includes primarily the suppliers and end-users of security technologies: arms 
manufacturers, companies that deal in information, electrical and engineering technologies 
and foreign and interior ministries.
87
 Likewise, individuals or groups from civil society, 
including lawyers (human rights) or academia are under-represented. This has led Hayes to 
explain that European security research and in particular, the „ESRP has been outsourced to 
the very corporations that have the most to gain from its implementation‟.88 Hayes asserts 
that „this largely hidden influence is now exerting a tremendous influence on the EU policy 
agenda in an expanding cycle of largely unaccountable and highly technocratic decision-
making‟.89 Without engaging in a critique of this policy-making process, it is still possible to 
highlight some interesting points that require further investigation in relation to the EU „fight 
against terrorism‟ discourse and the invocation of discourse(s) of threat and danger that can 
be identified even from a cursory exploration of the different security-related research 
reports. For example, if we take the ESRAB report from September 2006, it made numerous 
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references to the threat posed by „terrorism and organised crime‟ as a key reason for the 
development of new security technologies (designed for procurement by European 
governments). In particular, it focused on the development of „dual use‟ technologies that can 
be used in both civilian and military settings. It also directly paraphrased (without direct 
reference) the European Security Strategy, 2003, stating that „the new threats underline the 
fact that internal and external security is increasingly inseparable, with the first line of 
defence often being abroad‟; the original ESS stated „with the new threats, the first line of 
defence will often be abroad‟.90 What this reveals is that there is a direct relationship between 
the language of the EU counter-terrorism policy documents and that of the reports produced 
by groups commissioned to advise on EU security policy. As was noted above, this provides 
another potential avenue for further research on the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse.  
 
 
Limitations of the Thesis 
 
This discursive analysis of EU counter-terrorism policy focused mainly on the policy 
documents produced by the European Council, arguing that they represented the primary 
source of the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse. However, it is important to recognise that 
EU counter-terrorism discourse has also been (and still is) constituted at other sites of 
discursive production, including the documents produced by other institutions such as the 
European Commission and the speeches of EU politicians and policy-makers. Whilst the 
thesis used these other sites of discursive production to critically analyse (where appropriate) 
the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse; in order to take this analysis forward and develop a 
more complete understanding of EU counter-terrorism discourse, a further avenue of research 
would be to expand the analysis to include a focus on the documents of the European 
Commission and the speeches of EU politicians and policy-makers. To bring extra clarity to 
this analysis, another possibility would be to incorporate interviews with EU policy-makers 
as a new source of information that would offer the potential to test some of the propositions 
arrived at in this thesis. For example, subjecting the transcripts from a set of semi-structured 
interviews (with EU counter-terrorism policy-makers) to a critical discourse analysis might 
provide novel insight into the processes through which the discourse is constructed.  
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Furthermore, as Jackson argues, whilst „language is crucial to the notion of discourse, society 
(and politics) is not reducible to language and linguistic analysis alone‟.91 As such, discourses 
are broader than just language; they are not constituted through text and/or words alone. As 
was explained in Chapter Two, they should be understood as discursive practices constituted 
through inter-subjective webs of meaning. Therefore, they are produced and reproduced at 
various sites of discursive production. As Stuart Croft explains dominant interpretations of a 
particular event(s), articulated through discourse, can be co-produced and reproduced in 
many different aspects of social and cultural life. As such, „discourse... is wider than those 
words written and spoken by a political elite‟, it should also be understood to include „those 
relevant words spoken and written in popular culture, authored by this wider elite‟, as well as 
incorporating „images‟ which „can produce and reproduce discursive understandings‟.92 
Again, this research has been limited to a textual analysis (that is an analysis of the EU 
counter-terrorism policy documents) of the discursive level of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse‟. A more in-depth analysis of European counter-terrorism discourse(s) might 
include a focus on how understanding or meaning of terrorism (or the „terrorist‟ Other) has 
been shaped by the media, radio, television and community leaders, as it has by politicians 
and policy-makers or the policy itself. 
 
Finally, it was noted in Chapter Two that (in the EU) the provision of security is as much 
about discursive practices as it is non-discursive practices; this includes the ever increasing 
number of „technical‟ security measures contained within EU counter-terrorism policy, which 
are themselves legitimised through the invocation of discourse(s) that emphasise the threat of 
terrorism. Again, the focus of the thesis has been primarily on the processes by which 
counter-terrorism policy discursively securitises certain issues; however, securitisation 
processes are as much about non-discursive practices (e.g. policy instruments, such as 
databases) and the mundane bureaucratic decision-making of everyday politics, as it is about 
the implications of discourse(s). As such, there remains considerable scope to explore the 
relationship between the discursive practice of the „fight against terrorism‟ and non-
discursive practices of security. 
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Final Remarks 
 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that the perceived threat of terrorism is but one of a 
number of security concerns that has led the EU to increase its role in the governance of 
European security, including the development of evolving practices of internal and external 
security cooperation; practices which it has been argued here are structured by discourse. As 
such, the „fight against terrorism‟ should be understood as more than just a set of institutional 
or public policy responses designed to combat the threat of terrorism; it should also be 
understood as an influential political discourse, which is constituted through a series of 
different discourse strands that when taken together form accepted knowledge about who is 
terrorist or what is terrorism. In turn, it was argued that this knowledge  plays a key role in 
shaping or influencing the types of counter-terrorism responses that are perceived to be 
acceptable or unacceptable, appropriate or inappropriate.  
 
It is important to remember that the „fight against terrorism‟ discourse was not created in 
isolation; the different strands of the discourse identified in this thesis are not unique. Instead, 
the discourse should be understood as an amalgamation of a number of pre-existing social, 
cultural and political narratives reproduced or refracted back through EU counter-terrorism 
policy. Whilst the focus of the thesis was primarily on mapping how the discourse has been 
constructed, to understand how it structures the meaning, logic and policy responses to 
terrorism, to explore how it constructs a notional „terrorist‟ Other in opposition to a 
„European‟ sense of Self and how it legitimises or normalises certain practices of security, 
there remains considerable scope for investigating the production and reproduction of 
counter-terrorism discourse(s) in a more general sense. The point here is not that the EU takes 
these different narratives and uses them in an instrumental manner in order to justify the 
development of counter-terrorism policy; instead these narratives are revealed in the process 
of constructing a counter-terrorism response. The discursive analysis carried out in this thesis 
allows us to access that process, it allows us to understand how discourse(s) creates meaning 
and to understand how constructing language in particular ways leads to particular outcomes. 
As such, this thesis has sought to illuminate our understanding of EU counter-terrorism 
policy by providing insight into the discursive construction of the „fight against terrorism‟ 
discourse.
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